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Impact of Interest Group Testimony on Lawmaking in Congress

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CHAPTER ONE

INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

Interest groups actively seek to influence governmental policy. On its face this suggests a certain level of self interest among groups. They exist to pursue policy objectives that will further their interests. This is true of each and every group. Even groups that exist to combat poverty are serving their own interests in that members and organizers of the interest group are receiving some payoff for pursuing laws to alleviate poverty. The realized benefits as theorized initially by Mancur Olson can be material (1965). The group may receive government tax subsidies that might reduce its overhead costs or encourage more individuals to contribute to its cause. But the benefits might move beyond the material. Members, staff and organizers might be advantaged by the sense of solidarity they receive from working among others with similar goals or they may simply feel fulfilled in some way by having done their part to help combat this problem (Clark and Wilson 1961). The latter type of incentive is often referred to as an expressive or purposive benefit, while the former is labeled as being a solidary benefit (Salisbury 1969).

Whether seeking expressive, solidary or material benefits, interest groups lobby government to provide them. While some may value certain types of benefits over others, or view some as a more appropriate target for government action, understanding what types of groups do gain access and have influence is important. Does providing

campaign contributions to committee members guarantee access? Is there something else that better explains the success of some groups over others?

Almost every interest that exists among our citizenry is represented in government either through an existing organization or a latent group that could form given the right situation (Truman 1951). The population of interest groups, as such, is a reflection of all the interests that exist in our complex society (Truman 1951). The cardinal principle of pluralist theory was expressed by James Madison in Federalist #10. By increasing the size of the republic, the number and diversity of interests will be increased and, as a result, it is less likely that any one interest will be able to dominate the political process. It is the varied perspectives, ideas and input on policy from such a wide range of interests that ensures the policy output will be optimal for the public good. Pluralism works only if all interests have equal access and an equal opportunity to influence the policymaking process.

This research focuses on the role of interest groups in policymaking and the function of congressional hearings. There have been a variety of ways to specify interest groups, but this research uses the broadest definition. An interest group is any organized interest that seeks to shape public policy. Using such a broad definition enables comparison of a number of organized interests that together comprise the interest group populations: membership groups, trade association, governmental entities, business corporations, etc. While groups serve to represent individual interests in government, linking citizens and policy makers, they also serve perhaps a more important role. Once organized and working toward their policy goals, interest groups have found a way to

make themselves indispensable to policy makers. They serve as purveyors of information (Wright 1996). The reason why pluralism values inclusion of the widest range of interests possible is that they bring different perspectives to the table. Those varied perspectives provide information to policy makers who are weighing a number of legislative alternatives. Understanding this role, interest groups over time have worked to provide information to policy makers that would lead to those legislators adopting the positions being advocated by the interest groups. Interest groups have hired onto their staffs, scientists, analysts and researchers whose work gets compiled into reports that serve to influence not only legislators but also other actors that indirectly influence policymaking such as the media and public opinion. Interest groups are now an integral part of the policy process.

This role being sustained by interest groups has become increasingly important as our society has become more complex and hence also our public policy (Rich & Weaver 1998; Smith 1984; Schlozman & Tierney 1986). Our economy is no longer dominated by a handful of industries and interests. It has evolved rapidly into an intricate web of a large number of different industries whose own developments occur so quickly that it is difficult to remain informed about those interests. The complexities and intricacies of our economy and society require similarly complex and involved policy which in turn requires a high level of understanding by legislators (Smith, Roberts, Wielen 2007). Our legislators, through their backgrounds, however rarely represent the full range of interests present in our economies and our society at large. Even when it comes to long standing American interests like agriculture, many members of Congress who work with

agriculture policy lack any relevant background experience. It becomes even more difficult when Congress legislates over newer industries like biofuel technologies. Making policy requires understanding the intricacies involved. When members of Congress lack this expertise, interest groups bridge the gap. They step in and share their information with policy makers so that Congress can effectively consider and pass necessary legislation.

Interest groups provide more information than just regarding the specialized or intricate nature of the issue being considered. They also inform legislators on the political and electoral consequences of acting on different policy alternatives (Kingdon 1973). This type of information is equally attractive, if not more so, to legislators as they work in an environment where they are always keeping an eye on the next election (Mayhew 1974). They only have a job as long as they keep winning the next election. With all of the demands placed on members of Congress, they welcome interest group help in gathering intelligence relating to policy, politics or elections.

Interest groups certainly do more than just represent individual interests and provide information. For example some of them are very active in elections, working in support of a party or candidate. It is in these pursuits that at times they begin to generate negative attention and raise questions about the propriety of their role. Interest groups, especially the newly emergent 527 committees, are often behind the negative issue advertising that some Americans abhor so much (Borick 2005; Dwyre 2007; Kaid & Dimitrova 2005)[1]. Their ability to raise millions of dollars for elections also raises

[1] In a study conducted by Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2000) following the 1996 presidential campaign, 43 percent of their sample indicated that "negative ads are unethical."

suspicion among Americans, for an interest group that contributes upwards of $10 million in any single election cycle must be reaping some material return.

This overview of interest groups and the role they play in American politics suggests they are necessary players in the governmental system. But is their presence good for democracy? Do they serve to help or hinder the legislative process? Interest groups theoretically should enhance the representation of citizens in government while at the same time providing information to policy makers, but does this occur? What would the implications of limiting interest group activity be? Without information made available to interest groups Congress possibly would have to increase their budgets for staff and services like the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budgeting Office and the Government Accountability Office. Perhaps without interest groups providing information we would see different types of policy outcomes that are not reflective of a wide range of interests.

There is substantial evidence to suggest pluralism in practice does not always meet the lofty standards just articulated. From a theoretical standpoint, pluralism was largely discredited by scholars beginning in the 1960s on a number of grounds. Theodore Lowi (1969) indicted interest group pluralism as the root of a stagnant political system in which every vested interest served to protect the status quo thus disabling government from ruling in a manner best suited for the public as a whole. Others charged interest group pluralism as being tilted toward moneyed and better resourced interests, creating a system which prevents newly emerging groups or disadvantaged interests from gaining access (Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960, Wolff 1970). Some go even further to

suggest the moneyed and better resourced groups have gained power within government and either construct policies to their advantage or prevent a legislative agenda which might threaten their hold on government (Bachrach & Morton 1962; McConnell 1967).

Moving beyond the theoretical debate over pluralism, the term "special interests" has evolved to describe those interests that enjoy an advantaged position of influence in Washington. They have used campaign contributions and personal connections to extract special consideration (Coughlin 1985; Crawford 1939; Fleisher 1993; Frendries & Waterman 1985; Jones & Keiser 1987; Knappen 1950; Mason 1950; Odegard 1928; Schattschneider 1935; Shott 1950; Zeller 1937). Congressional reformers during the 1970s attempted to eliminate the revolving door phenomenon in which congressional staffers, members and aids leave public life to accept high paid lobbying positions because of the perceived impropriety of these relationships (Roberts and Doss 1997)[2]. One also cannot forget the numerous scandals involving lobbyists ranging from Samuel Colt using gifts of guns and money to garner patent protection from Congress for the Colt revolver in the 1850s to Union Pacific Railroad creating the front company of Credit Mobilier to win no-bid contracts for stretches of railroad. In most recent memory is Jack Abramoff who pocketed $85 million from lobbying contracts with Native American tribes – when he had paid Ralph Reed and Grover Norquist to lobby against the tribes so they would require Abramoff's services.

Certainly corruption will never be completely eliminated, but at the same time interest groups serve a public good they fulfill their own needs, sometimes at the expense

[2] Cited in Suzanne J. Piotrowski and David H. Rosenbloom. "The Legal-Institutional Framework" in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington* eds. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko and Clyde Wilcox. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2005.

of that same public good. Within the vast interest group universe, perhaps there can never be a uniform role and/or function for interest groups, but this research will aid in understanding their place in policymaking.

Overview of Congressional Committees

Woodrow Wilson (1885) wrote, "… it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee room is Congress at work." The heart of all legislative activity occurs within congressional committees.

The First Session of Congress in the House of Representatives saw the implementation of the first committee as well as the formation of the prestigious Ways and Means Committee. The initial Ways and Means Committee was only a temporary committee which was re-established as a standing committee in 1795 during the Fourth Congress (Kennon & Rogers, 1989). While initially most work was addressed by the full House sitting as a Committee of the Whole, the creation of committees to handle legislative tasks tied to specific issue areas quickly followed. Nine standing committees had been created by 1809 and committee reforms in 1822 established that bills in the jurisdiction of the standing committees would be referred directly to them and also enabled committees to propose bills on their own accord (Schickler 2005). According to Eric Schickler (2005), in part these reforms came about because of the rising workload of the House. The reforms in 1822 marked the institutionalization of the committee system that still persists today.

Reflecting the evolving complexity of American society, the House continued to initiate new standing committees to meet its legislative demands until they numbered forty-eight in the early 1940s. The sprawling committee system led to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which streamlined committees into the current system of nineteen standing committees and nearly a hundred subcommittees. In addition, the Act charged each committee with oversight of the federal agencies in its jurisdiction (Schickler 2005). This enhances the power of the committees but also the workload. Although legislative reform occurs once again in the 1970s, this round deals with leadership issues and does not reshape the structure of the committee system established in 1946. The Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1995 also resulted in rules changes. Term limits were placed on committee and subcommittee chairs, multiple referrals of bills was limited and the jurisdiction of the committees was slightly altered. Yet the same committee structure established in 1946 remains in place.

Committees occupy a central position in the legislative process. When a bill is introduced into the House, the Speaker assigns it to one or more committees that have jurisdiction. Once assigned to the committee, the chair decides whether the bill shall proceed along the legislative path, or whether it will be tabled. This is the power of gate keeping, a significant power in Congress. If the chair agrees to proceed, he or she then assigns it to the appropriate subcommittee. The subcommittee chair, with similar gate keeping power can either continue to proceed or leave the bill aside. Choosing to continue, the chair then schedules a hearing and invites testimony from interested parties, including interest groups. In their testimony, interest groups communicate information

about the policy under consideration as well as recommend changes they would like to see made to the bill. The subcommittee may hold one hearing or a series of hearings depending on the nature and complexity of the issue. In other words hearings are held until the committee or subcommittee feels sufficiently informed. Once hearings are concluded the chair may then table the issue or move to begin markups on the bill. During the markup session, members of the subcommittee may offer amendments to the bill which must receive majority support before being added. At the conclusion of the bill markup session, the subcommittee reports the bill back to its parent committee.

The parent committee may then either hold hearings again or immediately schedule a markup session for the bill attended by the whole committee. Again, the chair has the power to move the legislation along or he or she may decide to table the bill. Once the final committee markups are completed, the committee reports the bill to the full House.

During the 109th Congress (2005-2006), in total 6,438 bills were introduced into the House of Representatives. The House was in session for 241 days which means for each day the House was in session, 26 bills were introduced. Over 2,744 hearings were conducted and 570 markups[3]. After markup 409 bills were reported. All of this activity occurs in committee. While many bills get stalled in the policy making process (605 bills were passed by the House during the 109th Congress) "bills reported from committee

[3] Not every markup is directly preceded by a committee or subcommittee hearing. Most bills will encounter two markups, one at the subcommittee level and one with the full committee. Some bills will face a hearing before both markups, while others will simply hold one hearing at the subcommittee level and then follow with the two markups. While unusual, some bills go straight to markup without a hearing especially if the bill had already been passed by the Senate and is deemed a partisan issue for the majority party.

have passed a critical stage in the lawmaking process" (Davidson & Oleszek 2006, pg. 244)[4]. Bills reported are then placed on a calendar where they await floor consideration, including a stop before the Rules Committee for all important bills. What occurs in the hearings and markups determines if and how a bill will be reported, making them important stages in the process. In any case, this is a significant amount of work requiring much research and learning on the part of the legislators.

As a way to make the policymaking process more efficient, many House members rely on their colleagues within the committee that originated a bill for information on how to vote on that bill (Kingdon 1973; Krehbiel 1991; McFarland 1984; Walker 1991). They are able to trust their colleagues, in part, because specialization has given committee members significant expertise in their issue area (Asher 1974; Matthews & Stimson 1975; Morrow 1969). While most members of Congress do not arrive to the House with that expertise in hand, they learn much from legislative staff and from interest groups (Matthews & Stimson 1975). The committee hearings are instrumental in the transfer of information from interested groups to committee members (Wright 1996).

The bulk of legislative activity goes unnoticed even when the legislation is successfully enacted. This is true not just of casual observers; academic studies have largely relied upon major pieces of legislation for case studies. E.E. Schattschneider (1935) examined the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. The Employment Act of 1946 was the focus of Stephen Bailey's *Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the*

[4] When the House is operating under suspended rules, committee reports are not required. Recent Houses have passed more than half of their bills under suspended rules (Davidson & Oleszek 2006).

Unemployment Act of 1946 (1950). Theodore Marmor's (1973) classic centered on Medicare while Birnbaum and Murray (1988) wrote about the Tax Reform Act of 1986. By focusing on legislation of great consequence rather than ordinary or mundane bills, we might not have a complete understanding of the daily workings within the policy process.

Perhaps the only study to look at ordinary legislating is T.R. Reid's (1980) *Congressional Odyssey: The Sage of a Senate Bill*. Reid, a journalist with the *Washington Post* decided to trace from its inception, a bill sponsored by newly elected Senator Pete Domenici to implement a waterways user charge on the barge industry. This case study of legislating details the "not so glamorous" work which accompanies most policymaking. While the study makes inroads into ordinary legislating, it is a journalistic account and fails to make any theoretical contributions to the literature.

This skewed depiction of policymaking is also found in the media. Only legislation that is divisive enough to generate the conflict that the media always reports or legislation that is sweeping in nature or scale tends to gain our attention. Considering, creating and passing legislation is a tedious job and often times a thankless job. Nonetheless, year after year, hundreds of bills are considered, deliberated and marked up in the House. For example, during the 109th Session of Congress (2005-2006) 6,438 bills were introduced and 2,744 hearings held. The public policy outputs provide the safety, support and regulation we have come to require in our society. We must not overlook how ordinary policy is made.

Importance of Studying Interest Group Influence in Committees

Over 20,000 groups are active in the American governmental system. Ninety eight percent of interest groups lobby Congress.[5] Interest groups are irrevocably an important component of policymaking. Fully understanding their role, the amount of access given to them and their ability to influence policy is important. By studying their activity in congressional hearings, we can better understand where power lies in Congress and how the leadership utilizes interest groups to its advantage or limits their influence to protect its own interests, if Congress is able to control interest groups at all.

Once the source of power in this process is detected, we can be clearer on the exact function of interest groups in this venue. David Truman identified three possible functions for interest group testimony: 1) transmitting information; 2) propagandizing; and 3) a means of adjusting group conflict. Testing Truman's hypotheses, several earlier works on committees concluded no such informational role of interest groups; rather they were strategically selected by chairs to showcase and help gather support for a committee bill (Del Sesto 1980; Huitt 1954; Farnsworth 1961; Lutzker 1969). Other research confirmed the informational role (Bauer, Pool & Dexter 1963; Milbrath 1963; Scott and Hunt 1965). However, none of these studies directly tested the impact of interest group testimony on legislation. Not only were the studies unable to test the true function of interest groups, but recent congressional scholarship on information exchange and

[5] This percentage comes from a large scale survey of interest groups in Washington D.C. conducted by Schlozman and Tierney in 1986. Nownes and Freeman's (1998) survey of interest groups at the state level reported 97% of groups lobby legislators. Walker's (1991) examination found 78% and Berry's (1977) revealed 84% engaged in this activity.

member preferences raises the important question again, of what is the role of interest groups in committee hearings (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990).

Interest group scholarship has brought us to a similar question on the role of interest groups in congressional hearings. While within the literature the manner in which power is to be conceptualized still remains largely unspecified, scholars acknowledge the importance of information as a means of influence for interest groups (Ainsworth 1993; Berry 1989; Lowery & Brasher 2004; Wolpe & Levine 1996; Wright 1996). At the same time, the literature on interest group influence has turned its focus to congressional committees (Esterling 2007; Hall & Wayman 1990; Schroedel 1986; Wright 1990). It is also known through survey research that testifying before congressional committees ranks high on the list of preferred interest group lobbying activities (Berry 1997; Nownes & Freeman 1998; Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Walker 1991). Having the necessary resources to test the influence of this testimony on markups, this research is the next contribution to our understanding of the relationships between interest groups and congressional committees. Not only is this the next logical step, but it is a needed step.

The work presented here takes that next step and in doing so fills an empirical void that currently exists in the literature. The overriding normative questions that should guide research on interest groups were formulated by E. E. Schattschneider nearly sixty years ago. At that time pluralists assumed that interest groups were a universal phenomenon, and they "attempt[ed] to explain everything in terms of the group theory" (p. 22). But Schattschneider dissented from that orthodoxy and drew our attention to two

dimensions of the pluralist system. First he drew a distinction between "public" or "private" interests. Public interests, such as national survival, are common to all Americans whereas private or special interests are "shared by only a few people or a fraction of the community" because "they exclude others and may be adverse to them" (p. 24). For this reason Schattschneider did not believe that all pluralist politics involved "special" interests all the time. Second, he drew the important distinction between organized and unorganized interests, and he took note that "the most likely field of study is that of the organized, special-interest groups (p. 29). This piece of the pluralist puzzle Schattschneider termed the "pressure system." (p. 29).

The pressure system promotes political bias because, in words Schattschneider made famous, "organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action" (p. 30). Bias exists because the pressure system is very small. "The range of organized, identifiable, known groups is amazingly narrow; there is nothing remotely universal about it"(p. 30). More specifically, the pressure system has a "business or upper-class bias" because, he explained, "businessmen are four or five times as likely to write their congressmen as manual laborers are." Also statistics show the multitude of trade associations in the United States. Upper-class bias is proven by the "overwhelming evidence that participation in voluntary organizations is related to upper social and economic status; the rate of participation is much higher in the upper strata than it is elsewhere" (p. 31-32). In sum, this bias is so pervasive that "even non-business organizations reflect an upper-class tendency" (p. 33). Substantial research supports the

validity of this claim, but participation does not guarantee, let alone prove, that any group has access to the centers of power nor influence over legislation.

Schattschneider's analysis was highly theoretical, for its day, but not grounded in any empirical analysis of the pressure system. It is precisely because the pressure system is selective and biased that those interest groups are effective: "if everybody got into the act the unique advantages of this form of organization would be destroyed, for it is possible that if all interests could be mobilized the result would be a stalemate" (p. 35). Of course the population of the United States has vastly increased since Schattschneider wrote, and he did not see the rise of new social movements—women's rights, consumerism, and environmentalism—and the proliferation of new interests and membership groups. We need to revisit Schattschneider's dire analysis of the pressure system to determine if its "class" bias operates today as then.

The effectiveness of upper-class and pro-business interests in the pressure system depends upon the "scope of conflict," another seminal concept by Schattschneider. Given that the contestants in private conflicts are likely to be unequal in strength, "the most powerful special interests want private settlements because they are able to dictate the outcome as long as the conflict remains private." On the other hand, "[i]t is the weak who want to socialize conflict, i.e., to involve more and more people in the conflict until the balance of forces is changed" (p. 40). Schattschneider believed that big interests do not always prevail through lobbying and, in fact, the "biggest corporations in the country tend to avoid the arena in which pressure groups and lobbyists fight it out before congressional committees" (p. 41).

Business prevails not from direct lobbying and, indeed, its political strategy to "mobilize a united front of the whole business community does not resemble the classical concept of pressure politics" (p. 42). Here Schattschneider makes explicit the political alignment between business and the GOP. "The Republican party has played a major role in the political organization of the business community, a far greater role than many students of politics seem to have realized" (p. 42). In sum, business does not win in Congress through the pressure system. "The success of special interests in Congress is due less to the 'pressure' exerted by these groups than it is due to the fact that Republican members of Congress are committed in advance to a general probusiness attitude" (p. 43).

Scholars in the pluralist tradition continue to cite Schattschneider's indictment of the pluralist system as biased toward upper-class and especially business interests. Yet there has been virtually no concerted effort among scholars to addresses the political issues that he raised. My data base will permit me to address (if not entirely answer) some aspects of Schattschneider's indictment of pluralism.

1) Is the pluralist system today as "small" and "exclusive" as Schattschneider once characterized it? If not, then is there greater competition among organized interests seeking to influence public policy?

2) Are business groups and trade associations still the dominant actors in the pluralist system?

3) Do business groups and trade associations enjoy more "access" to Congress and "influence" over legislation than other types of interest groups?

4) Is access by business groups and trade associations and their influence over legislation facilitated by Republican control and frustrated by Democratic control of Congress?

5) Since "weaker" interests want to socialize conflict in the public domain, are they advantaged in congressional committee deliberations (being a public venue) relative to business groups or trade associations?

I build an interest group impact theory of access to and influence in congressional hearings and test it with two statistical models. The access model tests what factors drive the decision of which groups to invite to testify in hearing for the 105th-108th sessions of Congress. Testing whether or not interest group testimony has any influence on the subsequent markups is accomplished with the influence model. The influence model incorporates data from the 103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress.

The next two chapters elaborate on the literature regarding interest group influence and committee power and build a theory that describes the influence of interest groups in congressional hearings. Chapter four then lays out the research design detailing how the research was conducted and how data was compiled. Chapter five tests and discusses the Access Model and the chapter six does the same for the Influence Model. The conclusions of this research are found in the last chapter.

Committee hearings play an important role in policymaking yet they are rarely a topic of study. They are crucial to the needs of legislators and operate in a way that is desirable to interest groups as well. We need to fully understand this process as well as

how interest group influence operates here if it exists at all. This research will fill the gap that currently exists in the literature.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Serious scholarly attention to interest groups in American politics followed the seminal work of David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (1951). Truman postulated a theory of American government based on the multitude of interests that exist in society. These interests, when they attempt to exert influence upon one another or on government, become political interest groups. Truman believed that interest groups are established to reflect the increasingly specialized society and to maintain "equilibrium" in a society that is prone to many external shocks, such as war, industrialization or technological advancement. One of the main contributions of Truman's work is that it is not just organized interests that get representation but also *latent interests* that could at any point in the future come together to become an organized interest.

From Truman's work, pluralism became the paradigm for democracy. Pluralism holds that the multitude of interests working in the political system serve to check one another so that no one interest is able to dominate the policy making process. There are no barriers to groups participating in the policy making process. Different groups will enter the process when they have policy considerations and will just as easily exit the system when they have no active interest. In their attempt to gain influence, the varied interests will compete with one another and within this competition engage in a debate about what is best for the public good. The policy that ensues would in fact be the result

of a series of bargains and compromises negotiated by these interests and our policy makers and would be the best policy for the public good.

Shortly after the publication of Truman's work, researchers sought to test the pluralist theory, and some of their research lent support for the theory. For example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) concluded that political participation was mediated through groups, which served the system well, because the groups supported stability and continuity in the American political system. Robert Dahl (1959), in his study of New Haven politics, concluded that all the interests that wanted to participate in the policy making process were given access and that no one interest group dominated the process.

Just as pluralism was gaining in popularity, however a number of scholars began to attack this theory. The most frequent critique was that not all groups were represented in the policy making process, and among those groups that did participate there was an "upper class bias" if not a "pro-business" agenda to their activism. Such was the argument found in Schattschneider's *The Semi-Sovereign People* (1961). The same business elites were found to be controlling the political, social and cultural institutions in C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite* (1959), using their position to enhance their goals. Theodore Lowi provided another critique of pluralism in his *The End of Liberalism* (1969). Lowi maintains that interest group liberalism has rendered the political system impotent and because of the participation of groups, formal procedure has been replaced with informal bargaining. Because of these attacks on pluralism, as a *descriptive* theory, it lost credibility, yet it still retains much support as a *prescriptive* theory. Truman's

work also led to a burgeoning literature concerned with the formation and maintenance of interest groups. This work shifted the level of analysis away from the group and toward the members who support these groups. Most notable was the work of Mancur Olson and Robert Salisbury. They were concerned that Truman's theory gave no explanation for how groups came into being. Mancur Olson (1965), using a rational choice framework, pointed out the problems of collective action. He noted that larger public interests would have difficulties in forming organizations that would not be shared by smaller, narrower interests such as business and corporations. The only way for larger organizations to overcome the barriers to collective action would be to require mandatory membership or to offer members some type of particularized benefits in return for their membership. Salisbury (1969) took Olson to task for an excessively economic view. Building on the work of Clark and Wilson (1961), he suggested that the exchange of selective goods for membership need not solely be material but that selective goods could be solidary or purposive in nature. Salisbury also introduced the notion that many groups get started by entrepreneurs who take it upon themselves to start the interest group in return for a job with a nice salary; entrepreneurs are not unlike business entrepreneurs who underwrite the costs of starting up a business.

From this point, the scholarship on interest groups splits into two streams. The first draws on the work of Olson and Salisbury and focuses on the existence and maintenance of interest groups, examining the environment of the interest group system. The second focuses on the impact of interest groups on public policy and how they exert their influence. The first stream of research has been productive and has significantly

advanced our understanding of what Allan Cigler calls the "demand aggregation" aspect of interest groups (1991). Research within the second stream, "group impact" while prolific, has not led to a better understanding about the conditions of influence (Baumgartner & Leech 1998). Over reliance on PAC studies, conflicting results, the inability to specify power, and lack of an overarching theoretical framework has prevented growth within the group impact literature (Baumgartner & Leech 1998).

Interest Group Influence

Within the impact literature, largely because of data made available with the creation of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in the 1970s, most research has examined the link between interest group contributions and congressional roll call votes. Data on PAC contributions and congressional roll calls are both easily accessible. Moreover, public cynicism concerning the purported buying of votes by special interests has made this a popular area of research for scholars. The theoretical underpinnings of this work rests on the idea that members of Congress are continually focused on the next election (Fenno 1973; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974) and concerned about raising enough money to fend off any qualified challengers (Herrnson 2004). Most of the research here is quantitative. Different models employed by different scholars yield results that are mixed, confusing and contradictory. Some research reports that interest group campaign contributions are largely unrelated to the voting decision of members of Congress (Chappell 1981, 1982; Grenzke 1989; Kabashima and Sato 1986; Rothenberg 1992; Owens 1986; Vesenka 1989; Wright 1985). Contradicting results are reported by others

who find statistically significant relationships between interest group contributions and the voting behavior of members of Congress (Ashford 1986; Coughlin 1985; Durden, Shogren & Silberman 1991; Ginsberg & Green 1986; Feldstein and Melnich 1984; Fleisher 1993; Jones and Kaiser 1987; Langbein & Lotwis 1990; Masters & Zardhoohi 1986; McArthur and Marks 1988; Peltzman 1984; Silberman & Durden 1976; Stratmann 1991; Wilhite & Thielman 1987). Welch (1982) finds some support for the theory that PAC contributions influence members of Congress although he emphasizes that other variables such as party, ideology and constituency have a much stronger influence.

Finding no clear evidence that money buys votes, scholars began to examine the theory that the influence of money will not appear on floor votes in Congress, but rather in the committees (Hall & Wayman 1990; Schroedel 1986; Wright 1990). Whereas Wright and Schroedel examine the influence of money on committee votes, Hall and Wayman suggest that contributions will have a more indirect effect, mobilizing some legislators on behalf of issues that groups support. Studying two bills in the Ways and Means and Agriculture Committees, Wright finds no direct influence of money on votes at the committee level. Schroedel, however, does find that contributions from banks, insurance companies and brokerage firms were strongly related to the decisions of members of the House Banking and Energy and Commerce Committees. Hall and Wayman interview staff committees and examine markup records and conclude that PAC contributions serve to mobilize legislators to fight for the policy interests of the groups that made the contributions.

Taking yet another tack in the approach to studying the links between interest group contributions and legislator behavior is Kevin Esterling (2007). Esterling theorizes that interest groups make campaign contributions to "work horse" members, members he depicts as having a higher capacity to engage in the technical and analytical debate. The contributions made then are an incentive for the "work horse" members to engage in such specialized discourse that the interest groups deem necessary for creating effective public policy. The idea is to steer those members with the mental acumen toward a technical debate and away from the political debate. Looking at the hearings held on the Medicare program from 2000- 2003, he finds support for his theory.

Interest Group Access to Policy Makers

In part due to the confusing results of those studies, other scholars have modified the hypothesis about the impact of money. They posit that the purpose of campaign contributions is not to buy votes but rather to buy *access* to members of Congress (Berry 1984; Gopoian, Smith & Smith 1984; Magleby and Nelson 1990; Sabato 1985, 1989; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Souraf 1992; Wittenberg and Wittenberg 1989; Wolpe 1990). With the shift of focus now moving toward access, the question becomes what is access and can we measure it empirically? Very few empirical studies have looked at access.

The first attempt to empirically measure the access given to interest groups was conducted by Laura Langbein (1986). She operationalized access as the number of minutes members of Congress spend face-to-face with interest groups. She relied on a

unique study conducted by the Obey Commission in Congress that included data on the time members of Congress reported spending with interest groups in a sample week. Langbein's study found that PAC contributions did appear to significantly influence access, but there are problems with her approach. First, she was working with aggregate data so there is no evidence that specific contributions made by a single group led to access to certain legislators. Second, the sample only included 92 members of the House from the 95th Congress. Although the sample is large enough, it is only considering one point in time. Longitudinal data would be necessary before any inferences can be made more generally about the behavior of members of Congress because the political conditions and environment within Congress change and certainly affect access. Longitudinal studies would be better equipped to understand the conditions of access. Yet, it was an important first step towards gathering empirical evidence on the link between contributions and access.

Both Chin, Bond and Geva (2000) and Hojnacki and Kimball (2001) defined access as face-to-face meetings with members of Congress. Chin, Bond and Geva conducted an experiment involving congressional schedulers. Schedulers were asked to create a mock four day schedule for their member of Congress. Given a folder with 24 scheduling requests (more requests than slots available) the scheduler had to decide which requests would be granted and in what order. The results of the experiment revealed no influence of PAC contributions on access. The strongest influence on whether interests gained access was constituency. Those interests that resided within the congressional district of the member were given priority access over other requests for

appointments. Hojnacki and Kimball also found minimal support for the hypothesis that PAC contributions buy access. They found that contributions only engender access to lawmakers when the contributions are given to a member of Congress who is typically on the other side of the issue stance of the interest group. In other words, when money is given to legislative allies it has no influence on how much access is granted to an interest group. However when the "unlikely" contribution is made to a more hostile lawmaker, it tends to open doors.

Another attempt to measure interest group access was provided by Hansen's (1991) study of the farm lobby. He theorizes that interest groups gain access when two conditions exist: (1) when lobbying organizations enjoy a competitive advantage over other intermediaries and (2) when member of Congress expect groups, issues and circumstances to recur. This is a well-developed theory of access to the policy-making process. However Hansen never explicitly defines access; he describes access as a close working relationship with members of Congress. Another difficulty is the theory is not as easily transferred to other policy areas.

In sum, there are very few studies that attempt to empirically assess the link between interest groups and access when defined as face-to-face contact with members of Congress. The constraints of available data have forced researchers to *assume* that PAC contributions facilitate interest group access. Perhaps there are more direct ways to measure access.

Kevin Leyden (1995) is the only published researcher to define access as invitations to testify at congressional hearings. His model tested the influence of several

variables on whether or not interest groups were invited to testify. Incorporating data from congressional hearings held in 1985 he found that the number of lobbyists employed by a group, the size of the group's membership and whether the group has a PAC influenced which groups received invitations to testify. This supports the suggestions that groups which have more resources wield more influence.

Thomas Holyoke (2003) also recognizes congressional testimony as an avenue of access to Congress. Recognizing the appeal of testifying in committee for interest groups, Holyoke examines whether interest groups attempt to alter their positions on a policy in order to secure an invitation to testify. Theorizing a difference in the function of interest groups for ideological outlier committees from non-outliers, he suggests interest groups will be strategic in their attempts to testify before those ideological outlier committees. Holyoke argues that while non-outlier committees will rely on a range of groups to testify so they can gather appropriate information to pass good legislation, ideological outlier committees will only invite interest groups that are already supportive of the policy under consideration. The outliers will use that testimony to garner support as they push the bill through the policy process. Building a database from interviews he conducted with 82 interest groups and the testimony from those groups that were invited to testify, Holyoke tests his theory. He finds that the ideology of the interest group is a concern behind which groups are invited for both ideological outlier and non-outlier committees although it is a stronger consideration for the outliers. Constraints of interest group member preferences and the competition from other lobbying groups prevent an interest group from tailoring its position to appear more supportive of the outlier

committees; without these constraints interest groups do alter their positions in order to find favor with a committee and hence access to the hearings as a testifier.

Approaching the same problem form the subgovernment model of policymaking is the work of Ken Kollman (1997). The question he asks is whether interest groups only testify before friendly committees, because the subgovernment model assumes that a "cozy" or friendly relationship exists among interest groups, congressional committees and bureaucrats. Therefore Kollman seeks to determine whether this assumption is valid insofar as groups deemed unfriendly will be excluded. He uses measures of interest group ideologies along with the ideologies of committee chairs in a bivariate correlation test. The interest group ideologies are determined by looking at questions Jack Walker asked of groups in his 1985 survey. The first question asked which committees the interest group frequently communicated, consulted and interacted with. A second question asked the group how the 1976 switchover from a Republican presidency to a Democratic presidency affected their cooperation with federal agencies. A couple of other questions asked generally about the policy positions of the group, for example whether they favored more or less government regulation. Congressional committee ideologies were measured by a scale he created from scores such as the ADA and ACU rankings. While Kollman does find that interest groups testify before "friendly committees" he shows that what appears to be invitations made based on close friendships is actually due to general homogeneity of ideological biases. The interest groups end up testifying before many committees with which they do not report frequent contact and thus are not considered "friendly" committees. Although those committees

are not “friendly” they still share similar ideologies. “What looks like friendly lobbying of committees is actually bias in representation by interest groups and committees” (539). While this study is revealing and important, it doesn’t directly address the question of what factors determine how interest group invitations are made.

A study on corporate political activity by Hansen and Mitchell (2000) also examined interest group access to congressional hearings. Looking at Fortune 500 companies in 1988 they attempted to gain a better understanding of the political activity of American owned corporations as compared to that of foreign owned corporations. While the focus of their study looked to the determinants of lobbying, PAC contributions and charitable contributions, as a means of substantiating those results they also ran a regression on their model to indicate the determinants of participation in congressional hearings. In other words, they viewed testifying in congressional hearings as a good indicator of corporate political activity. Their dependent variable was the number of times a corporation testified in Congress. They found the size (dollar sales) of the corporation, its level of government procurement, firm and industry measures of regulation, countervailing power, and foreign ownership (negative relationship) to be indicators of whether a corporation testified. Countervailing power refers to the lobbying efforts mobilized to counter the corporate lobbying activity measured as the level of lobbying activity and PAC spending of labor unions. They also had included measures for the number of *Wall Street Journal* citations and the concentration of the industry which were not found to be statistically significant. This study, while advancing the literature on corporate political activity, fails to look at the conditions of access, modeling

this as a group driven decision. It does not discuss the congressional side to this process at all.

Thus there are only three known studies that directly test the question of which groups will gain access to testify before a congressional committee. A fourth tests the access to committee hearings, but only as a subsidiary interest. The studies have begun to build our understanding of interest group access to congressional hearings but are still limited. They are limited in their breadth as well as in their modeling of committee characteristics beyond the ideology of the committee. The research presented in this work does incorporate committee characteristics beyond ideology and will help build theory on interest group access and help us to begin to understand the conditions under which access is granted.

Congressional Testimony as Interest Group Influence

Ninety eight percent of interest groups lobby Congress.[6] As reported by interest groups active in Washington, the most popular lobbying activity is providing testimony at legislative hearings.[7] This is a preferred form of lobbying activity because it is a low-cost activity (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Wright 1996). Despite the popularity of this form of lobbying and the access scholars have to transcripts of that testimony, this forum remains a virtually unstudied aspect of interest group influence on the policy making

[6] This percentage comes from a large scale survey of interest groups in Washington DC conducted by Schlozman and Tierney in 1986. Nownes and Freeman's (1998) survey of interest groups at the state level reported 97% of groups engage in lobbying legislators. Walker's (1991) examination found 78% and Berry's (1977) revealed 84% engaged in this activity.

[7] Both the Schlozman and Tierney (1986) and the Nownes and Freeman (1988) surveys report that 99% of interest groups testify at legislative hearings. Heinz, et al. (1993) report 95% and Berry (1977) shows 88%.

process. To date, neither interest group nor congressional scholars have examined the impact of interest group testimony on the markup of bills in committee.

In his literature review on interest group influence in the United States Congress, Richard Smith (1995) found only three studies that examine interest group activity in congressional committees. His bibliography included over 250 articles and books written about interest group influence. Thus, Smith concludes "it's readily apparent that what we know is more speculative than definitive" (Smith 1995, 122). A more comprehensive literature review by Baumgartner and Leech (1998) reveals that of all the studies conducted on lobbying only one used hearing testimony as a measure of lobbying (Segal et al. 1992).

The one study using hearing testimony as a measure of lobbying examined the effect of a senator's personal ideology on his or her Supreme Court nomination votes (Segal et al. 1992). These researchers built a spatial model of roll call voting on Supreme Court nominations from 1955 through 1988. Two of the independent variables in their model measured the number of interest groups testifying in support of the nominee and another tapped the number of interest groups testifying in opposition. The results of the statistical analysis reveal a slight, positive impact by the number of groups testifying in support of the nominee and a modestly stronger, negative influence exerted by the number of groups testifying against the nominee. This is a thoughtful look at confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees. However, as the authors note, this type of voting is a special form of voting in the Senate. The roll call votes cast here are largely influenced by the ideology of the individual senator. Also, the study looked at the

Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing which was unusual in several respects and perhaps may have led to the identified relationship being spurious. This speaks little about the influence of interest group testimony on other types of policy considerations.

Most studies that considered the influence of interest group testimony in Congress came from scholars writing shortly after the publication of David Truman's seminal work. Through a variety of case studies, these scholars found committee hearings to be carefully planned events in which witnesses are chosen strategically to bolster and promote the already formulated position of the committee or committee chair (Del Sesto 1980; Farnsworth 1961; Huitt 1954; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Lutzker 1969; Morrow 1969; Redman 1973).

The earliest study in this regard was conducted by Ralph Huitt (1954). He looks at the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1946 to test David Truman's hypotheses regarding the purposes of congressional hearings. Truman suggested that committees use hearings to collect information from interest groups, to disseminate propaganda in support of committee legislation or to provide a catharsis for frustrations and grievances. Huitt specifically looks at questions that were being asked by the committee members to see if they were properly answered. He concludes that committee hearings were clearly being used as a public platform for opposition groups the senators identified. He also states that a great deal of information was presented by interest groups but senators accepted or rejected it in accordance with their preconceived notions of the facts.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1947-1956 is the subject of study for David Farnsworth (1961). Farnsworth observes hearings are seldom directed primarily at the acquisition of information. If an issue becomes the subject of public hearings, the committee has already selected a course of action. The testimony primarily serves as an instrument through which the committee builds support for its position. Farnsworth discerns that the committee allows opponents to use the hearings to "blow off steam," committee members then are able to gauge the intensity of opposition to a given proposal.

Lutzker (1969) applies a group interaction analysis to the House and Senate subcommittees that held hearings on the Higher Education Act of 1965. This analytical technique was borrowed from sociologists who developed it to profile the types of interactions amongst individuals. There are 12 profiles that include categorizations such as: shows solidarity; shows tension release; agrees; gives suggestion; etc. Lutzker applies this analysis to profile the testifiers in these congressional hearings and finds witnesses gave more opinion than information in these hearings.

Taking a similar approach, Del Sesto (1980) develops a typology of roles taken on by committee members during hearings. The cooperative roles consist of the investigator, instrumentalist and organizer/administrator. On the other hand are antagonistic roles including the debunker of facts, the procedural antagonist and the debunker of qualifications. He applies this classification to members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. As he anticipated, his analysis reveals that when questioning and cross-examining witnesses representing the nuclear establishment,

committee members assumed cooperative role behaviors more frequently. Conversely, when questioning and cross-examining witnesses representing environmentalists, concerned citizens and public groups, committee members more frequently took on antagonistic role behaviors.

All of these earlier studies on the influence of interest group testimony in congressional committee came to the same conclusion: it did not serve to transmit information. The result is that for decades the prevailing conventional wisdom dismissed any real influence of interest groups. If anything, interest groups were being used by committees (or perhaps complicit with them) as a tool to build support for the preconceived policy positions.

However, during the 1970s, there was a paradigm shift in congressional studies. The seminal works of Anthony Downs (1957), Kenneth Arrow (1951) and Mancur Olson (1965) in this field influenced congressional scholars. Embracing rational choice and game theory, scholars began to question the conventional wisdom that congressional hearings were little more than pre-planned policy showcases. Over 3,000 hearings are held each year (Wright 1996). These hearings are expensive in terms of resources and opportunity costs. Why would Congress expend so many resources for these hearings if there was no informational value to them? This is the central question that led formal theorists to re-evaluate the role of congressional hearings.

Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990) were perhaps the lead scholars that questioned the function of hearings. In their modeling of Congress, a key component is the information gathered by committee members through hearings. The underlying

rational choice theory is that members of Congress are interested in learning any political information about policy as they are consistently looking forward to the next election (Mayhew 1974). Committee members turn in part to congressional hearings to gather this political information as well as technical information regarding the policy being considered. The technical information, testimony that suggests which policy alternatives are best suited to address the problem at hand, is also useful in members' pursuit of advancing what they consider to be good public policy.

Gilligan and Krehbiel's work is centered on the informational role of committees, but they never consider the specific agents who transmit that knowledge. This is done by David Austen-Smith (1993) who builds on their model by introducing a lobbyist into the game. He recognizes not only the importance of information, but that it is interest groups who possess the relevant information. Taking Gilligan and Krehbiel's modeling in a different direction, Diermeier and Feddersen (2000) reassess who actually benefits from the information gained by committees. Recognizing the costliness of holding hearings, they suggest members of Congress outside of the committee benefit from the committee actions. They believe that even when committees who are ideologically extreme hold hearings other members, understanding the costliness involved in holding a hearing, will take the action as a signal that the committee is seeking to transmit information to the House floor. They also suggest members outside of the committee are more likely to trust the testifiers in the hearing than they are to trust the members of an ideologically extreme committee, which is why these committees would take on the costs of holding a hearing.

Certainly the formal modeling of congressional activity is based on the assumption that information is useful and necessary for members of Congress. Scholars employing more empirically based research also have reassessed the belief that committee hearings do not serve an information gathering function. Recognizing that the types of policy being considered in the post-reform Congresses require much more specialized information, some have suggested that interest groups have become increasingly important as purveyors of knowledge. Also, the changes in the structure of Congress itself in the post-reform era require much more of interest groups. Looking at labor and environmental groups during the post-reform 86th through 102nd sessions of Congress, Heitshusen (2000) does in fact find evidence that suggests an increased demand for information from interest groups.

In an earlier study, Browne and Paik (1993) come to a similar conclusion. They were primarily interested in the effects of modern information needs of Congress on the iron triangle networks in Washington. Relying on personal interview they conducted with 120 members of Congress and their staffs in the agricultural domain, they find interest groups were the overwhelming choice as the second most important information source. The only source of information more important than the interest groups was members' own constituents.

Within congressional studies, there has been a paradigm shift toward rational choice theory that began during the 1970s. The popularity of formal modeling of congressional behavior gave rise to the importance of information. As noted the critical role of information has also been resurrected among more empirical work. Despite

information being recognized as important and committees being seen as the heart of congressional activity, no study yet has tested directly the conventional wisdom suggesting that congressional testimony yields no information of relevance to committee members.

Conclusion

Since the seminal work of David Truman in 1951, research on interest groups has shown noticeable theoretical and empirical advances in explaining group membership, organizational maintenance, and the political environment. Less decisive are the findings in the literature testing for the connection between PAC contributions and roll call votes. Since they have not discerned any solid relationships, other scholars have looked elsewhere for group influence. Some began to theorize and test models on the influence of interest groups at the committee level. This seemingly is an important avenue of access since most congressional activity occurs within the committees. To date only a couple of studies have looked at the access given to interest groups to congressional hearings. With so many interest groups reporting that providing testimony in hearings is a favored activity this should be an access point that is given more attention.

This access point is worth studying because presumably the interest group testimony is a lobbying attempt. This is one way in which groups try to shape public policy. However, many earlier studies looking at the influence of interest groups within congressional hearings found little evidence to confirm the importance of this information to members in the development of policy. For the most part, policy had

already been formulated and only members who were predisposed to an interest group would find the testimony of that group to be beneficial. These findings likely are the reason that scholars have not paid significant attention to hearings as an access point for interest groups.

Within the congressional field of study, however the rise in popularity of formal methods has brought attention to the centrality of information in congressional activities. Several empirical studies have revealed the degree to which members of Congress have turned to interest groups to provide the information they need. Congressional scholars have at the same time taken note of the amount of time and resources committees spend holding hearings. Rational choice theorists now suggest Congress would not be willing to expend such resources unless there was something to be gained through hearings: information.

This renewed emphasis on hearings and the importance of information along with the strong desire of interest groups to testify suggest this arena needs to be researched. This is potentially a critical avenue for interest group influence. Most of the studies dismissing the importance of hearings were conducted before the congressional reform in the early 1970s and in a time when policy was much less specialized than it is today. As circumstances have changed so might have the importance of interest group testimony. Research needs to look at not only who gains access to congressional hearings, but whether the information conveyed influenced policy.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research develops the interest group impact theory describing under what conditions an interest group receives an invitation to testify before a committee or subcommittee and, furthermore, under what circumstances that testimony will affect the legislative markup. No such theory currently exists. Building one requires a foundation that intersects both interest group theory and congressional committee theory.

Organized interests have a large arsenal of strategies they employ to influence policy makers. They have an opportunity to lobby at least two levels of government because of the federalist structure and three branches of government. Within both levels and within each branch there are multiple ways to exercise influence. Of all the arenas where one could examine group access and influence, this research focuses on congressional hearings in part because it is reported as the favored lobbying venue of all interest groups. Interest group participation in congressional hearings has also been found to be closely related to the group's overall level of involvement in Washington (Hays 1991).

Another reason to study committee hearings is that research on campaign contributions and congressional voting behavior have suggested that money does not influence floor votes in Congress directly but rather committee decision making (Hall and Wayman 1990; Schroedel 1986; Wright 1990). If lobbying is effective at the committee

level, then which groups gain access might indicate what types of groups are likely to be advantaged by the existing system?

Subgovernments and Issue Networks

Much of the attention devoted to the nexus between interest groups and congressional committees has come from studies of the subgovernment model of policy making. In the subgovernment model, a limited number of interest groups, legislators, and executive agency leaders who frequently interact with one another on policy dominate policymaking in that particular area (McCool 1998). Usually it is only groups with friendly interests or that are aligned with the committee that participate in hearings (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Berry 1989; Hansen 1991; Lowi 1969; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Wilson 1981). Since the relationship between friendly groups and the committee chairs is strong and well established, there is never any surprise as to what the groups will say when they testify formally in hearings. As such, chairs select groups that will buttress the committee position and act as "window dressing" (Berry 1989; Davidson & Oleszek 2004; DeGregorio 1992; Hinckley 1971). Somewhat similar models (and often times confused) such as the iron triangle and subsystem models maintain similar views when it comes to interest groups and committee chairs (Freeman 1965; Thurber 1991). They are friendly, have similar policy views and work together to the exclusion of others. When applied to committee hearing invitations, it is expected that only these "friendly" groups get to participate. However the iron triangle model no longer is the

best description of all policy making in Congress and perhaps never was[8]. For one, this model was intended to describe distributive policy, not regulatory policy (McCool 1998). Also, although on certain issues there may appear to be an iron triangle of influence, for the most part policy networks are more fluid and open. A number of scholars who have studied the issue suggest that in the post-reform Congress the ambitious and highly specialized agenda enables more competition and participation in the policy making process (Browne & Paik 1993; Heclo 1978; Heinz, et al. 1993). It is anticipated that although most invited groups are interests friendly to the committee or subcommittee chair, some opposition groups will also be invited. In fact, current committee rules require the minority party be able to invite witnesses to testify.

The subgovernment model of policy making and the closely related iron triangle and subsystem theories are useful because they examine relationships that extend across branches and actors involved in policymaking. They are most instructive in suggesting that a similar approach should be used in studying interest group testimony access and influence. When it comes to access, the interest group impact theory maintains that committees and subcommittees will be much more inclusive with their witness lists than the subgovernment and related models would have us believe. As the issue network literature has shown, there are many more groups competing with one another for access to House committees since the 1960s and early 1970s that combined with more rules requiring greater transparency in Congress results in a wider range of groups being included in hearings.

[8] Daniel McCool (1998) provides an excellent overview and assessment of the literature pertaining to iron triangles, subgovernment models and policy networks.

Committee Power Theories

Congressional scholars caution not to neglect the committee or subcommittee itself. Committees are the primary arenas of lawmaking, especially in the House. There are several theories on committee power. First, the [party as] cartel model stresses the subordination of the committee to the party and depicts chairs as agents of the party leadership (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Cox & McCubbins 2002). Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins first developed this model in *The Legislative Leviathan* (1993) and have continued to elaborate on it (2002). The majority party, including the committee and subcommittee chairs will in certain circumstances abdicate their power and give it to the party in order to shape a favorable party agenda. The favorable party agenda is one in which there is strong party unity and includes few, if any issues, that divide the party. In order to ensure such an agenda is pursued, the party will use House procedures to obstruct any divisive issues from reaching a floor vote, while, at the same time pushing through those with whole party support. The committee and subcommittee chairs having given their power to the party, submit to the party's wishes and act accordingly. Those who do not comply risk losing their chairs.

Thus, power within the chamber is centralized through the party leadership. Under this model, one would expect to see little influence exerted by the individual chairs. It is expected that only organized interests supportive of the majority party will be allowed to testify. The party leadership would not condone inviting "outside" interests to testify for fear they might influence party members to vote independent from the party

line. The only dissenting testimony would come from the minority party's invited interest. Furthermore, it is expected those interests which are aligned with the majority party will have an opportunity to influence the bill during markup.

Take for instance the issue of medical liability reform. The two parties are divided on issues of tort reform with Republicans supporting caps on the amount of damages courts can award and Democrats generally believing there should be no limit, particularly when it comes to medical liability. During the 108th Session of Congress (2003-2004), the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the HEALTH Act of 2003. This bill contained reforms modeled after California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act including a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages. The opening statements of the Republican chair indicated his strong support of the legislation. The ranking minority member, Representative John Conyers on the other hand, in his opening statement clearly states his opposition to the bill, citing a Center for Justice and Democracy study that reveals no correlation between insurance premiums and tort reform. The witnesses that followed represented the Coalition for Affordable and Reliable Health Care, the American Medical Association, and the Physician Insurers Association of America, all ardent supporters of the proposed HEALTH Act. The one exception was a woman who presumably was invited by the minority party as her testimony told of her tragic tale of medical neglect that led to paralysis. The Center for Justice and Democracy was not invited to testify nor was Public Citizen, a group that submitted written testimony including over 75 pages of research and studies indicating that medical liability reform would not be wise policy. The Republican Party supports

tort reform, and under its leadership, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the issue inviting those groups they knew would support reform. The chair of the committee controlled access to the hearing such that most of the testimony would voice support for the Republican position on the policy.

Contrast what occurred in the House Judiciary Committee hearing in the 108th Congress (2003-2004) with the House Judiciary subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law during the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) when the Democrats were the majority party. The subcommittee held a hearing to examine the same issue of medical malpractice reform. Rather than invite groups with positions that advocate reform, the interest groups invited to testify included the American Bar Association, the American Board of Trial Advocates and the National Center for Patients' Rights. All of which agree with the Democrats that there should be no limit on the amount of damages awarded by the courts. Notably absent in the hearing are the perspectives of the medical community which along with the Republican Party, view the issue as a cause of increasing insurance costs. The majority party in both instances limited access to those groups that were supportive of their position.

According to cartel theory, all majority party members have a vested interest in giving power to the party leadership to ensure that only those bills that have majority party support (without out any defectors) receive attention in committee or subcommittee and make it to the floor where they will be passed. Any legislation that might have members of the majority party breaking party lines is to be blocked by House procedure so that the perception of a strong, unified majority party is not tarnished. Under the cartel

model, “outside” interests would never be allowed to testify; the party does not want to risk fracturing majority party support.

Extrapolating from the cartel model, when it comes to deciding which interest groups to include in committee and subcommittee hearings, only those groups known to support the party position on the proposal would be given access and influence. However this presupposes a party position on a known policy alternative. Those policy alternatives do need to be developed at some stage. While it is true that some legislation is crafted by interest groups and presented to policy makers in private meetings, other legislation is still developed by members of Congress working through their committees and subcommittees. When the bill is conceived within the committee or subcommittee there is often no party line - there is no intelligence on what positions would best be supported by partisan beliefs. As long as there is not a developed party position on an issue, a wide net is cast in choosing which groups will be given access to congressional hearings. Members are motivated to make good public policy and will choose those groups that can bring the most reliable and valuable information to the table.

A second committee power model is conditional party government. This model was developed by John Aldrich and David Rohde (1995, 1997, 2000). Conditional party government is similar to cartel theory in that members are motivated by electoral concerns to cede power to their party. Members recognize that there are advantages built into the structure of Congress for the majority party such as being able to establish the agenda and chair the committees that if utilized properly can not only further their electoral prospects but also aid them in making good policy. The “conditions” that

present the best opportunity for members to empower their leadership are two. The first condition is sharp differences between the two parties, differences that ultimately stem from polarization within the electorate. The second condition is party cohesion on these issues. Party unity and consensus exist on most of these issues. The strength of this model, like that of cartel theory, is its recognition strong party leadership is not always present (it has varied over time) but when it is present, it is ultimately driven by shifts within the party electorate. The primary difference in the cartel theory and conditional party government model is what aspect of party government is the focus. The development of conditional party government centered on roll call behavior whereas cartel theory looked more at agenda control, both positive and negative.

The two models are highly compatible and when it comes to extending the theories to the access and influence given to interest groups, the predictors are largely the same. Perhaps the only difference is the amount of emphasis cartel theory places on negative agenda control. Cartel theory suggests the majority party will only act positively on issues with majority party consensus. While conditional party government does not, the condition of having distinct differences between homogenous parties implies more issues would have majority party consensus than there would be when the two conditions were not met. Therefore, conditional party government applied to interest group access and influence would be limited to those interests that are aligned with the majority party unless the party position has yet to be developed. With no party position to be developed, committees seek out the interest groups that will enable them to best make policy suited to the party interests.

A third distinct model is the informational model. Here the chamber is dominated by the majority interests of its members; that majority is not necessarily partisan and changes according to the policy under consideration (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Maass 1983). While the preferences (on any given policy) of members can be partisan in nature they may also be shaped by ideology, district needs, by committee loyalty, by bargains entered into with other members or by information made available by interest groups. Just as member preferences vary, so do their derivatives. Since party is not the only driving force, it alone is not the organizational backbone of the House. Rather the chamber devises and maintains the committee and subcommittee structure to divvy up the workload. The incentives are for each committee or subcommittee to maximize the information on the subject under its jurisdiction so as to make sound policy. This theory assumes that committees and subcommittees have more information available to them and hence are more knowledgeable about the consequences of a particular policy than the full membership of the House. The committee or subcommittee uses this informational advantage when necessary to sway the House membership to the committee's preferred position. The committee leadership recognizes they need to induce this informational advantage any time the median floor member's position diverges from the median committee member's position.

The members of Congress who lie at the median of their committees and subcommittees and the chamber are pivotal points in legislative negotiations and as such have significant influence (Krehbiel 1998). According to this model, power is decentralized and rests with the committees and their chairs (Arnold 1989; Baron and

Ferejohn 1989; Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1995; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Applying the informational model to interest group access and influence, it is the individual committee or subcommittee chairs that influence the likelihood of a group receiving an invitation to testify and of being able to affect policy. The chair will make these decisions based on which groups have the ability to provide the best information. Because the decision rests with the chair, there will be some variance by chair since each one has a different utility function for the interest group information. Chairs who are ideologues and as such are resistant to a wider range of ideas and viewpoints will not allow as much access or influence as chairs who are more moderate and therefore more open to input from a variety of interest groups.

The informational model fits nicely with the perspective of one interest group scholar whose model is termed the communications theory of lobbying. John R. Wright (1996) emphasizes the critical role of interest groups as purveyors of information. Interest groups aid in the policymaking process by giving relevant information to members of Congress. The information most useful is political, electoral or policy information. Political information relates to the status of the policy in terms of who is supporting and who is opposing in Congress, giving the legislator an idea of whether or not the policy has enough support to be passed. Electoral information provides the legislator a sense of what will happen within his or her constituency if the legislator supports or opposes a policy. The technical or policy specific knowledge about the legislation itself and any alternative approaches is considered policy information.

Wright bases the relevance of all three types of information based on Mayhew's (1974) earlier work that identified three goals of members of Congress: 1) reelection, 2) influence within the chamber and 3) good public policy. Wright sees interest group testimony, therefore, not as window dressing for the committee or subcommittee's position or as veiled support for the majority party but as a repository of knowledge. The communications theory of lobbying applied to the access and influence of interest group testimony suggests the chair would look to interest group resources. Since interest group resources can signal what type of knowledge the group has, how well received and connected the group is, these will determine which groups are successful.

The literature makes it clear that both party and ideology are central considerations in understanding the dispersion of power in congressional committees.

Theodore Lowi (1964) developed a typology of policies which he argues determine the politics surrounding passage and implementation of those policies. Three policy arenas were originally developed by Lowi (1964): distributive, regulatory and redistributive. Since the research sample here is almost entirely distributive and regulatory policy, only these two policy arenas are considered.

The distributive policy arena is one that is characterized by policy which can be made without regard to limited resources. Since limited resources are not constraining the decision making involved in crafting this policy, distributions are widespread. In addition there is little conflict and competition. Distributive policies are made in a policy subgovernment dominated by congressional committee or subcommittee decision making (McCool 1988).

On the other hand, the regulatory policy arena is marked by competition and conflict. This is due to regulatory policy being specific and individual in its impact. There is a clear beneficiary as well as there are clear losers. Whereas distributive policies are theorized to be made within the confines of subgovernments, regulatory policy networks are much more open. Open access to a wide range of policy actors heightens the level of competition and conflict. Decision-making in this policy arena occurs in Congress as a whole, not in the committees or subcommittees (1964).

In addition to the preceding committee variables, I will be including dummy variables representing the type of policy under consideration. It is expected that interest groups will have greater access to regulatory policymaking than distributive since distributive decisions are made within the exclusive cozy subgovernments.

Interest Group Influence Theory

The preceding discussion included a congressional committee model labeled the informational model. It is the only theory outside of subgovernment models of policymaking whose focus includes interest groups. In this context, Wright's communications theory of lobbying was also introduced. Wright's theory was the capstone to many earlier studies that recognized that groups testify not to showcase committee or subcommittee preferences but rather to communicate information which will aid legislative deliberation. While clearly some testimony is for building political support, it is also true testimony provides useful technical and political information that serves the interests of the chamber or party leadership (Bradley 1980; Huitt 1954;

Heitshusen 2000). Such a perspective underscores what interest groups bring to the table. All interest groups lobby; they have information to provide. For many in the field of interest group politics, the theory of interest groups as purveyors of information has been embraced so fully that it is now axiomatic. Interest group scholars, therefore, have turned their attention to what makes some groups more powerful and influential than others. These studies look to interest group resources to find answers.

Lobbyists are an interest group's representatives in Washington. Lobbyists are the individuals who meet with policy makers so they can provide them with information. They are the links between the policy makers and the interest group itself. Since lobbyists are the conduits of information, groups with more lobbyists will be able to transmit more information and hence be more influential. There are two types of lobbyists: those who work full time as a staff member of an interest group and those who work for a public relations or lobbying firm and contract their services out to multiple interest groups. While both types of lobbyists are instrumental in communicating an interest group's message, in house lobbyists tend to have more policy expertise geared toward the interest group's niche, whereas contract lobbyists often times get hired for the connections they have in Washington or for their knowledge of how politics works (Lowery & Brasher 2004). Whether you are counting in house lobbyists or contract lobbyists, the more a group has, the more influential the interest group is thought to be (Lowery & Brasher 2004; Schattschneider 1933; Schlozman & Tierney 1986).

All studies of lobbying assert the importance of an interest group's reputation. Even manuals on how to lobby underscore the importance of reputation. Reputation is

everything (Ainsworth 1993; Berry 1997; Lowery & Brasher 2004; Wolpe & Levine 1996). The credibility of a lobbyist and the group dictates whether their information will be considered reliable by members of Congress, because members don't have the time or resources to verify every bit of information offered to them (Ainsworth 1993; Berry 1977). In other words, members of Congress use reputation as a cue or signal indicating to them which groups provide reliable information. There is plenty of anecdotal and experiential evidence that suggests reputation is the primary currency of lobbyists and interest groups in Washington (Berry 1997; Ornstein & Elder 1978; Rosenthal 1993; Wolpe 1990). However, it is difficult to measure the reputation of a lobbyist.

Although it is difficult to measure reputation directly, it is possible to measure indirectly. It seems reasonable the credibility that assists groups in gaining access and potentially influencing legislators is the same group credibility that assists in gaining media coverage. Journalists like policy makers rely on cues such as reputation when deciding whose information to trust. Therefore one could look to see how frequently a group is mentioned in the major media as a measure of their credibility. Groups who are mentioned in the media more frequently are more likely to be seen as legitimate political actors with reliable information and as a result win access and influence in congressional subcommittees and committees.

It's not just reputation that determines the influence of a group. There are other factors that go into the political calculus of determining which organized interests are considered "major players." Influential groups purportedly are able to gain access by making campaign contributions (Berry 1989; Gopoian, Smith and Smith 1984; Magleby

& Nelson 1990; Sabato 1985, 1989; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Souraf 1992; West & Loomis 1999; Wittenberg & Wittenberg 1989; Wolpe 1990). Conventional wisdom suggests that no group would make any significant financial contribution unless it had something to gain. Furthermore, groups that give once will continue to give money, which points to some type of payoff for the interest group. Although the aforementioned studies on interest group contributions do not operationalize access, it is assumed that such a theory would apply to congressional hearings, in which case groups that make campaign contributions are more likely to have access to congressional hearings and have an impact on bill markups.

It is not just that money buys access. It strikes awe to see the amounts of money raised by interest groups. The top PACs in 2003-04 were: the National Association of Realtors which gave a total of $3,787,083; the Laborers Union which gave a total of $2,684,250 and the National Auto Dealers Association which gave $2,603,600[9]. Again one can point to the conventional wisdom that says this money must be doing something for these groups, but there is another way to look at these inordinate contributions. These groups are capable of raising money. These PACs are not self-funded. They need to make appeals to their membership in order to collect the money they give to candidates for public office. It is an incredible feat to raise that quantity of money and it speaks to the influence these organizations have over their membership. So while PAC contributions are included as variables, in the sense money is buying something, this

[9] These figures were obtained from the website maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics located at www.opensecrets.org.

should not overshadow the fact this variable is an indirect measure of the power and appeal of the groups over their own membership.

In considering what constitutes a powerful interest, West and Loomis (1999) theorize the breadth of lobbying activity and the financial resources of the group indicate power. Those groups which engage in more lobbying activities through a variety of means are more likely to exert an impact on policy compared to those which do not. One lobbyist cannot be nearly as effective as a team of twenty. There is only so much one individual can do. Groups, which employ a staff or contract for lobbyists are able to lobby more and therefore exert more influence than those that do not. In addition to lobbying, the financial resources of a group point to the power of a group. Lobbyists, staff, communication with membership, and office space all cost money. Moreover, a lot of what an interest group is able to accomplish is dependent on the team of researchers who are conducting analyses and developing policy proposals. These individuals almost anonymously blend in with other staff members in interest group studies. Since all of these resources cost money, the budget of an interest group is an effective indicator of its strength and power (Ornstein & Elder 1978). The greater the resources of the group the stronger the group's potential to gain access and influence.

Lastly, one must not forget the membership that supports a group. For some interest groups this is a more important resource than for others. The importance of the group membership is not just the financial support contributed by the membership but rather the "reach" of influence of the group. Recall that one type of information groups provide to members of Congress is electoral information. Members of Congress value

any intelligence about what is happening with the voters in their constituency. Interest groups and membership organizations, in particular, bridge a gap that sometimes exists between voters and their legislators. Interest groups often have more contact with certain constituents than the member of Congress does herself. So when an interest group, such as Americans for Tax Reform, indicates that it represents 600,000 members, it is indicating the reach it has within the electorate. The group is signaling to members of Congress that it is in communication with 600,000 members and has some influence over those individual voters.

Trade associations, like membership organizations, have a membership, but the difference is the membership of trade associations is comprised of businesses or in the case of professional associations, individual professionals. Just as membership groups reach out to their membership so do trade associations. Trade associations are as effective as membership groups in mobilizing their constituencies.

Jeffrey Berry gives an example of the mobilizing capabilities of trade associations in *The Interest Group Society* (1997). A bill was coming up for vote that would have implemented tax withholding on interest and dividend income earned by individuals. Two banking associations that opposed this legislation, the American Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings Institutions effectively mobilized not only their membership, but also the customers of their members by putting inserts in monthly bank statements encouraging the customers to take action against the bill. Because of these efforts, 22 million letters were written to Congress prompting them to vote down the law (Berry 1997). The trade association is also in communication with its members

on other business matters, perhaps even more so than membership groups are with their supporters.

Many observers have suggested individuals who join membership groups are nothing more than check donors. Once a year they write a check to the group but outside of that contribution, there is little interaction between members and the group. Trade associations have much more extensive contact with their membership since they do more than just represent those businesses. The same can be said of labor unions and their membership. In fact, because of the constant communication between labor leaders and the rank-and-file, they are able to train, mobilize and encourage them to participate in elections in unprecedented numbers. The level of membership is symbolic of how powerful the group is.

The difficulty in talking about the membership of interest groups is that not all interests have "members." Businesses stand out in this regard. While businesses might not have dues paying members, they do have employees. The importance of the membership is not size or monetary contributions but rather their electoral reach. A membership group or trade association can communicate a political message or mobilize its membership. Similarly, businesses can communicate political messages or at times, mobilize their employees. An example of this type of communication was recently displayed by Wal-Mart. According to a story broken by the *Wall Street Journal* on August 1, 2008, Wal-Mart warned store managers and department heads a vote for Obama would lead to fewer jobs due to increasing labor costs. This would be the result of an Obama presidency they foresee supporting legislation making it easier to unionize.

Therefore, just as one associates membership size with the political reach of an interest group (trade association, membership or union) one can similarly conceptualize employees of businesses. Given the electoral needs of legislators, the membership (or number of employees) of an organized interest can be a strong indicator of the power of that interest (Ornstein & Elder 1978; Schlozman & Tierney 1986).

Interest group resource theories collectively indicate resources of an interest group are mobilized strategically to influence policy. The more influential groups tend to have more resources at their disposal. One common denominator is interest groups use resources to communicate information and through that information attempt to influence policy. Applying interest group resource theories to the access and influence given to interest groups in congressional hearings, those that have more tools will win more access and influence.

The literature on interest group influence identifies several important factors. These include interest group resources, interest group reputation and PAC contributions. Several variables will specify these interest group factors, the empirical testing of which follows in the next chapters.

Interest Group Impact Theory

Using committee power and interest group resource theories to guide the way, I have developed an interest group impact theory based on two dimensions, “access” and “influence”. The interest group impact theory attempts to pull together the most relevant

aspects of the other theories and apply them directly to interest group testimony and access.

The theoretical power of earlier subgovernment models of policymaking is that they considered the intersection between interest groups and congressional committees. Although this research is not entrenched in the subgovernmental policymaking model, it does recognize that interest groups cannot be studied in isolation especially when an important question asks which actor is more important in this equation. As such, consideration is given to aspects of Congress that affect how decisions are made.

Since committee members have an interest in making good policy they will seek out those interest groups that have a strong reputation for providing reliable information. A committee or subcommittee chair will look to the resources and reputation of the interest group in choosing which groups to invite. Those groups that have more resources at their disposal will gain more access and have a better chance at influencing policy. In some situations, there will be a reluctance to cede power to interest groups, particularly those that are not aligned with the majority party. The important considerations are who or what has control in the committee. What the committee power theories have shown is that it is either party or member preferences.

Party and ideology are the essential considerations. Party and ideology will impact the influence stage more so than access for a couple of reasons. First, granting access to an interest group does not necessarily mean they will also be allowed influence. Committees can maintain an appearance of being equitable and inclusive in their dealings by granting access to a wide range of groups. However, once the positions of the groups

are known, in the influence stage only groups whose interests are aligned with the majority party will be successful. Because the partisan leanings and ideologies of most interest groups are difficult to quantify without some survey of those interests, testing this part of the theory must be modified. Rather than testing specific interests, it will suffice to generalize the interests. Businesses are expected to have a close relationship with the Republican Party and be allowed more influence when the Republicans control the House whereas labor unions are more closely aligned with the Democrats and will find success when the Democrats are in the majority.

Ideology will impact access and influence as well. The impact will reveal itself in the extreme ideologues who serve as committee or subcommittee chairs as well as within the committees or subcommittees whose ideologies (mean of all individual members' measured ideologies) depart significantly from the chamber mean. Ideologue chairs are expected to be exclusive in the access they grant to groups making it much more difficult for all groups to testify in front of them. Exclusivity also reigns within ideologically divergent committees or subcommittees when it comes to allowing interest group influence on bill markups. These committees or subcommittees are loath to allow interest groups influence as they use hearings less as fact finding missions and more as a rally for supporting the committee or subcommittee position. Doing this gives them a greater chance at mobilizing support for the bill further along the policy process. Interest groups therefore will fare better in terms of access with committees and subcommittees chaired by moderates as they will have a greater chance at influencing a bill when testifying before more moderate committees and subcommittees.

Member preferences might be shaped in ways other than by partisanship or ideology. It is anticipated that preferences will reflect the amount of legislative experience a committee or subcommittee chair has. Relative newcomers in the House will have less policy expertise and therefore be more dependent on outside interests for their informational needs. Not having expertise, they will not have a predisposition to inviting certain interest groups to participate over others. Conversely, more experienced House members serving as chairs, will through their experience have come to rely on a smaller number of groups they deem as trustworthy. They will have little need to reach out to as wide of a range of groups and the less tenured House chairs. The impact of experience plays out similarly when it comes to allowing interest group testimony to influence bill markups: less tenured chairs will be more willing to allow influence than more tenured members.

While the party models of congressional control depict less autonomy of committee chairs than the informational models, the interest group testimony theory I develop acknowledges some room for leadership on the part of the committee chairs, even during conditions of strong party government. While the ability of chairs to make decisions may be hampered significantly when parties are strong, they still have the ability to make some decisions independently. They still get to choose which groups will testify and they can try to guide how their committee members vote on bill markups. Understanding this it is expected that some committees and subcommittees and chairs will be more accessible than others as some will be more accommodating in the bill markups.

Interest groups fill an informational role. They provide knowledge to policy makers, not just about policy but also about electoral prospects. While one measure of interest group resources is information, its reputation as a good source of information is also relevant. Therefore, the number of lobbyists employed, its budget, membership and campaign contributions are all measures of group strength. Group strength cannot be ignored when devising a theory about interest group access to and influence on congressional committee and subcommittee hearings.

Lastly it is expected the politics of making policy within the regulatory and distributive policy arenas will extend to both interest group access and influence. Since the regulatory arena is characterized as being more open to political actors, it is expected interest groups will have greater access to congressional hearing within the regulatory arena. However, because the regulatory arena is also marked by greater competition and conflict among policy actors, influence on bill markups will not be as easy for groups to attain. Rather, interest groups are more likely to have influence within the distributive policy arena since the very fact that they were invited to testify is an indication they belong to the policy subgovernment considering the legislation. From the privileged position of being part of the iron triangle, interest groups testifying on distributive policy will have a greater likelihood of influence on the bill mark ups.

The hypotheses that were developed to test the interest group impact theory are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Interest Group Impact Hypotheses

Access

H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by the interaction of being a business and contributions given to House Republicans seated on the committee being lobbied, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

H3: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or subcommittee chair, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

H4: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

H5: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership and budget of the group, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest receives an invitation to testify.

H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the amount of lobbying activity of a group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of active and passive media mentions of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of a group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H10: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest group gives to all members of Congress, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H11: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest group gives to committee members, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H12: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions made to the committee and subcommittee chair, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by policy committees, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

Influence

H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group's recommended change will be included in the bill markup.

H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by labor unions during a Democrat controlled House, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group's recommended change will be included in the bill markup.

H3: Partisan affinity, as measured by the level of partisanship within a committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.

H4: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group's recommended change will be included in the bill markup.

H5: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group's recommended change will be included in the bill markup.

H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of lobbyists, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group's requested change will be included in the bill markup.

H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size and budget of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of having its requested change included in the bill markup.

H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of media mentions an interest group receives, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.

H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of an interest group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest's requested change is included in the bill markup.

H10: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to House members, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.

H11: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to members sitting on the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.

H12: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to the chair of the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.

H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by regulatory policy, will be negatively to the likelihood an interest group's requested change is included in the bill markup.

Conclusion

Studying committee hearings to understand interest group influence also enables a deeper understanding of power distribution in Congress. While there are many well developed theories regarding both interest group influence and committee power, none focus their attention on committee hearings. Interest groups rank testifying as a preferred lobbying activity indicating the opportunity they see to influence policy. On the other side committees and subcommittees spend much of their time and resources holding hearings signaling the importance they place on these events. Because all parties involved in committee hearings deem them important, this is a critical venue to study.

An interest group impact theory is developed here to understand the conditions and circumstances under which interest groups are given access and have the ability to

influence bill markups. Pulling together theories regarding interest group resources and committee power, the interest group impact theory continues to build on that research. The models developed to test this theory are discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN

In examining interest group influence within House committee and subcommittee hearings, there are two dimensions to my research. The first seeks to identify what factors affect which interest groups are invited to testify in hearings. The second is to look at whether interest group testimony impacts the subsequent bill markups coming out of that committee or subcommittee. While it would appear that this would be a two-staged analysis, by necessity two separate research models are designed, using two separate data sets. As the research design is fundamental to this examination, this chapter provides the detail of that design and explains how the data were collected.

The Access Model

What factors influence whether an interest group receives an invitation to testify before a House congressional hearing? Theory suggests there could be two potential sources of influence. First, since it is the chair of the committee or subcommittee who extends the invitation, it is likely that characteristics of the chair and features of the committee or subcommittee also influence this decision. Second, characteristics of the interest group itself may affect whether a group receives an invitation. Thus a data set needs to be compiled that would enable testing of both sets of factors.

This question has previously been examined, primarily by Kevin Leyden (1995). For his data, he chose a random sample of 250 groups from *The Encyclopedia of Associations*. He then used the *Congressional Information Service* to look up how many times each group testified in 1985. His dependent variable measured the number of times each group testified. This method worked well with Leyden's theory that interest group resources influenced which groups were invited to testify. However that methodology does not work with the theoretical framework I am developing, because it does not include the collection of any information about the committees and subcommittees and their leadership. Approaching the study of this process from the perspective of interest group resources is looking at only half the equation. There is an established literature about congressional committees and their leadership; since committees spend much of their time holding hearings their role in this process should not be overlooked. Political institutions, players and organizations do not function in isolation of one another, they interact daily. For theory to best describe reality, we must study the interactions. Leyden only needed to collect data on the interest groups and how many times they testified; in the interest group testimony theory presented here information about the committee and its leadership also is included. I therefore need to develop a data sample that enables collection of both interest group and chair committee and subcommittee features.

Research Sample for the Access Model

The starting point of this research was selecting a sample of groups. Since Leyden conducted his research, a new source of lobbying information has been created.

In 1995 Congress successfully passed and enacted into law the *Lobbying Disclosure Act*. One of the requirements of this legislation is for any lobbyist to file bi-annual lobbying reports with Congress. The legislation specifies a lobbyist as: "Any individual who (1) is either employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation (2) for services that include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) whose "lobbying activities" constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services on behalf of that client during any six-month period" (2 U.S.C. § 1605). The report requires disclosure of lobbying contacts, issues that are lobbied and amount of money expended on lobbying. The database maintains all reports filed since 1998. This is a much more comprehensive listing of groups than any of the encyclopedias of organized interests that exist and as such is the sampling source chosen for this study. For example, in 2004 the number of registrants filing reports under the Lobbying Disclosure Act numbered 17,138. That same year, the *Washington Information Directory* notes in the preface that the 2004-05 edition, listed more than 13,000 organizations. This directory has been a popular source for those seeking a comprehensive listing of organizations active in federal government, but it does not identify the numerous state and local governments, coalitions, colleges and universities, and state and local trade and membership groups that actively lobby Washington policy makers.

Since one set of variables of interest are those measuring characteristics of the committee and subcommittee chairs, some variance in this set of variables is desirable. The data should span more than one session of Congress. Fortunately for purposes of this research design, the Republican majority implemented rules when they won control of

the House in 1994 that implemented term limits on committee and subcommittee chairs. No member of Congress can hold any one chair for more than six years. Since the Republicans first maintained a majority and appointed chairs in the 104th session of Congress (1995-1996), in the 107th session of Congress (2001-2002) most of the chairs were re-appointed to other members of the Republican caucus. My dataset includes hearings from the 105th through the 108th Congress; a time span that includes years prior to the switchover of chairs as well as years after. A random sampling of groups was employed to select 100 groups for each of the following years: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004. Since collecting data for all of these groups is time consuming, in the interest of conserving time one year was excluded – 2002. One concern in omitting the year 2002 is different term effects for whether it is the first or second year in a congressional session. A dichotomous variable measuring for the term effect will be included in the analysis to ensure there is no differential effect.

The random sampling of groups was conducted as follows. First, for each year of Congress, the Lobbying Disclosure Database (which can be accessed through both the US House and Senate's websites) was consulted to indicate the comprehensive number of organizations that registered for that year. Table 2 indicates the number of registrants in the database for each year. Then, 100 numbers were randomly selected for each year, using a range indicated by the number of organizations registered. So if in 2004, 17,138 groups were registered, 100 numbers between 1 and 17,138 were selected. The random numbers drawn were then matched to the number of the group and that group was

selected. If a group was selected more than once (within a year or across years), it was discarded and a replacement was randomly selected.[10]

Table 2: Number of Organizations Registered in the Lobbying Disclosure Database

Session	Year	Organizations Registered
105th	1998	13,068
106th	1999	14,020
106th	2000	13,618
107th	2001	14,845
108th	2003	16,951
108th	2004	17,138

Once the initial sample of 600 groups was collected, each group's year-end Lobbying Disclosure report was consulted to determine which issues were lobbied for the year in which they were selected. On the reports most groups identify the issues lobbied in two ways. They describe the issue and identify the bill number. For example a group might record that they lobbied: The Medicare Reform bill, H.R. 1. However some groups only identify the bill number and others only describe the bill. If only a description of the issue was given, keyword searches in LexisNexis Congressional were used to identify which committees and subcommittees held hearings on that issue during that session of Congress (both years). So if I selected the US Chamber of Commerce for

[10] This occurred fewer than ten times for each year in the sample so I am confident that the sample is not skewed toward groups with more than one registration. Some organizations are listed multiple times since each separate lobbying firm must file a report. Therefore if an interest group has in house lobbyists as well as contract lobbyists from a specific lobbying firm, then that group would have two separate registrations: one from the group itself and one from the lobbying firm.

1999, I would check to see whether the issues they report lobbying were the subject of hearings for the 106th Congress which spans 1999-2000.[11] Some groups disclose only lobbying one or two issues and others report lobbying twenty issues. Every single issue mentioned was researched using LexisNexis Congressional to determine which committees and subcommittees held hearings on that issue. Following the example of the Medicare Reform bill, using LexisNexis Congressional, it is found that in the 108th Congress, seven hearings were held on Medicare reform in the House. Therefore there were seven opportunities for an interest group to receive an invitation to testify. Each opportunity to be invited to testify (each issue for which there was also a hearing held) becomes an observation in the data set. The dichotomous dependent variable is 1=yes the group testified in that hearing, or 0 = no the group did not testify. If in a group's lobbying report it has more than one issue lobbied, each issue is searched through LexisNexis Congressional to determine how many hearings were held. Thus the initial pool of 600 groups was transformed into a data set with 2488 observations. Each observation represents an opportunity to testify on an issue in which the group is interested. Some groups have only one observation in the data set and others have as many as twenty-five observations.

There are possible limitations to creating a database in this way. First, some interest groups that do end up testifying never have to file lobbying reports with Congress. The Lobbying Disclosure law which mandates the registration of lobbying activity specifies that only organizations whose total expenses for lobbying activities

[11] Searching for hearings by session of Congress rather than by year potentially overcomes the changes in scheduling and time available for committee work seen in election versus non-election years.

exceed $24,500 during a semi-annual period need to file a report. This applies to a number of groups. For example, for one of the hearings held on Medicare reform, the House Government Reform Committee invited the Washington Business Group on Health to testify, now called the National Business Group on Health. This organization represents large employers' interests when it comes to health policy issues. It is a well established group being in existence since 1974. However it does not spend enough money lobbying to require lobbying disclosure and therefore is not found in the lobbying database.

Second, the lobbying law only applies to federal political activity. A number of groups who are invited to testify focus their activity solely on the state and local levels of government and thus are not registered in the database. In 2004, a representative for Citizens for Florida's Waterways testified before the House Committee on Resources hearing on the Endangered Species Act. This group advocates the responsible use of Florida waterways and is active particularly at the local level. However, they have never registered (or been required to) under the Lobbying Disclosure Act since they do not expend enough resources lobbying at the federal level. For both reasons, a number of groups are excluded from the registration and thus have no chance of being selected in the sample. But this is only a fraction of the whole universe of groups and should not have a significant bearing on the results of this study.

Another constant is the assumption that if a group lobbies an issue then this is an indication it wants to testify on that issue. For the most part this assumption is not problematic. We do know through survey research that groups want to testify and that

testifying is actually a *preferred* lobbying activity (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986). The only other activity that is more popular is meeting with policy makers in person. Even when an interest group has been able to meet with legislators one-on-one they do not cease to use other lobbying techniques especially testifying in hearings. As Schlozman and Tierney (1986) learned through their interviews, testifying at hearings actually puts organizations in contact with key legislators with whom they have been unable to reach otherwise. This is one of the main reasons this avenue of lobbying is so desirable. Still there might be times when a group declines an invitation to testify or times when a group does not wish to testify. Although this possibility exists, it appears to occur infrequently. In compiling the database for the second part of the research, groups who were unable to accept an invitation to testify still submitted written testimony along with an apology for not being able to participate in person. Having examined that public record, the instances of declined invitations were fewer than five, suggesting that this limitation is minimal.

Independent Variables for the Access Model

The data compiled will comprise the dependent variable in the access model: whether or not the opportunity to testify was granted. There are 2488 observations in the data set. Next, data were collected for the independent variables. Because the interest group testimony theory is derived from both, congressional committee power theories and interest group resource theories, two types of independent variables are being tested: those measuring features of the committee and subcommittee, or chair and those relating to the interest group.

The congressional committee power theories shape the first group of independent variables: partisan affinity, ideological extremism and chair influence. Barbara Sinclair succinctly describes the competing beliefs about whether parties and leaders have an impact on how members make decisions in the House in a footnote in *Party Wars* (2006, pg.377). She says congressional scholars are divided over whether it is partisanship and influence of party leadership (Cooper & Brady 1981; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 2006) that motivates behavior or whether it is individual member preferences (Krehbiel 1991). These competing views are evaluated in the conditional party government model (Aldrich and Rohde 1995, 1997, 2000), the [party as] cartel theory (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Cox & McCubbins 2002), and the informational model (Krehbiel 1991; Maass 1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990). The former two arguing the influence of partisanship and party leadership, the latter arguing individual member preferences. Various measures of partisanship and individual preferences of the chairs are developed. Preferences of the chair are used rather than committee and subcommittee members since the decision of who to invite to testify in hearing ultimately lies with chair. He or she makes this decision without taking any type of committee or subcommittee vote; in other words there is no step in the process for input from committee and subcommittee members, unless minority members are exercising their right to call their own witness.

The measures of partisan affinity then are *ratioRD* and *partisanship. RatioRD* is the ratio of Republicans on the committee or subcommittee to the number of Democrats. There are no Democratic controlled Houses used in the access sample and so keeping the

ratio in terms of Republicans to Democrats works. The distribution of seats on a committee or subcommittee is an indication of those that the party leadership deems important to control. The House Rules adopted at the beginning of each session of Congress determine the distribution of seats among parties. The ratio of majority party seats to minority party seats varies. Some committees, the Rules Committee are so important to the leadership that the majority party maintains an overwhelming majority of seats on that committee. Therefore *ratioRD* is an indirect measure of partisan influence.

Partisanship measures the level of partisanship that exists within a committee or subcommittee. This variable was developed by calculating the ratio of all bills introduced by Republicans to those introduced by Democrats that received action beyond being introduced within that committee or subcommittee[12]. Information regarding such committee action on bills was obtained through the Library of Congress's *Thomas* website. The way the ratio was calculated, the closer the value was to one, the more bipartisan the committee. However, there are a number of committees and subcommittees with values between one and zero, therefore *partisanship* uses the absolute value of the difference of the ratio and one.[13] The larger the value, the more partisan the committee or subcommittee is. Figure 1 lays out the percentage of committees and subcommittees holding each value of partisanship. This histogram was created from the access sample. The percentages represent quite a few committees and

[12] Some bills carry more than one sponsor and a number of co-sponsors. For the purposes of this measure, only the original co-sponsor is counted.

[13] With the measure devised, some (sub)committees had a blank value since they had taken no action on bills beyond them being introduced. Rather than have STATA treat this as missing data and dropping the observations, the mean partisanship score for the parent committee for that session of Congress is used instead.

subcommittees scored zero, which is the value given to the completely bipartisan committees or subcommittees. These include the Government Reform subcommittees, some of the oversight subcommittees along with a few others. The most partisan committee is the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts with a value of 24 for the 106th Congress, a value of 22 for the 108th Congress and a value of 15 for the 105th Congress. The Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Workforce Protections of the 105th Congress also has a value of 16.



While both *ratioRD* and *partisanship* measure partisan affinity, they are tapping different dimensions and are not correlated. The correlation between the two variables is .082. This is a weak correlation. *Partisanship* is more indicative of the level of partisanship within the committee or subcommittee under the leadership of the committee or subcommittee chair. The committee leadership, not the House leadership is directly responsible for how many majority or minority sponsored bills receive action. *RatioRD* on the other hand is a dimension of partisanship that is set by the House leadership. Not only does this variable give an indication of which committees and subcommittees are considered important for the majority to control, it also affects voting within the committee or subcommittee as most decisions require majority votes.

Other variables are designed to measure ideological extremism. *DWchair* measures the ideology of the committee or subcommittee chair using Rosenthal and Poole's DW Nominate scores.[14] Believing that liberal ideologues will behave no different than conservative ideologues in terms of granting access to groups, *DWchair* is the absolute value of the difference in between a chair's DW Nominate score and the mean House DW Nominate scores. The closer the score is to one, the more extreme the individual is in his or her ideology. The closer the score is to zero, the more moderate the ideology. It is believed that ideologues will rely on a small, reliable set of interest groups for testimony rather than including wide ranging groups. This behavior is expected to be displayed by both liberal and conservative ideologues. With exclusivity dominating the invitation lists of these committees and subcommittees, interest groups in general will

[14] These data are available through their website www.voteview.com.

have a more difficult time gaining access to them. If individual preferences are driving behavior, we would expect behavior to vary by level of ideology.

Understanding individual preferences also might partially be a function of how long a member has been in the House, *tenure* is included as a measure of Chair Influence. More seasoned members have spent time building expertise in their issue niches and are less dependent on interest groups for information than are newer members of the House. The length of the chair's service in the House is measured in *tenure.* More tenured chairs will not find it necessary to invite a large and diverse number of interest groups but newer members who are chairs motivated by their desire for information will.

Dummy variables are created to represent the individual chairs, committees and subcommittees, and committee type. The dummy variables serve two purposes. The first is to measure the independent effect, both chairs and committees may exert on the process. Outside of partisanship, ideology, and tenure, chairs are individuals who have personalities. Some may be very accommodating when it comes to including interest groups in hearings whereas others might grudgingly allow them to participate. Anticipating personalities will impact the decision the chair dummy variables are included. Committees themselves have distinct cultures. Fenno (1966) first demonstrated this with his detailed study of the Appropriations Committee. Understanding committees have behaviors and norms distinct to themselves, it is possible for committee type to influence what types of groups are given access and ultimately influence.

The second reason for including the chair and particularly the committee dummy variables is to take into account the effects these variables may have in this pooled time-series analysis. Since the committees and chairs cross time periods included, they can be creating statistical noise which is being picked up by other variables, unless they are included as control variables. Thus they will also serve as controls.

Committees are classified as constituency, policy or prestige depending on what type of policy is typically under the jurisdiction of that committee or subcommittee. Constituency committees are those committees where members are able to use the distributive legislation they pass to help them in their re-election goals (Deering & Smith 1990). The idea is the more benefits secured for your constituency, the better off you will be come election time. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the politics of making regulatory policy is marked by little conflict or competition among political actors as most decisions are made within the confines of policy subgovernments. There is little dissent as the benefits of distributive policy are widespread. Policy committees deal with regulatory legislation and prestige committees are the much sought after Appropriations, Ways & Means, and House Rules Committees. Theoretically, regulatory policy involves more actors and more conflict and competition since there is some constituency that will benefit from the policy at the same time there are other constituencies that will be deprived in some way. Committee types are not unrelated to member motivations. It has been theorized that constituency committees are more likely to run by consensus and exhibit low levels of partisanship whereas policy committees are highly partisan and contentious in nature (Carson, Finocchiaro & Rohde, 2001).

Looking at the descriptive statistics, it becomes clear that lobbying with money is a technique more frequently employed by certain types of interest groups, particularly businesses. It is also commonly thought that businesses are more likely to associate themselves with or support the Republican Party, this too is the assertion leveled by E.E. Schattschneider (1965). Similarly, labor unions are often the largest financial contributors in elections and they rarely support any candidates outside of the Democratic Party. Research also indicates that labor PACs are more likely to support representatives of similar ideologies just as corporate and oil PACs are more likely to support Republicans (Gopoian 1983, Grier 1989, Neustadtl, Scott & Clawson 1991). Coupled with other studies finding evidence that campaign contributions buy access to legislators (Langbein 1986, Wright 1989), it would be reasonable to expect that when businesses make campaign contributions to Republican chairs, they gain better access than other interest groups. An interactive variable is created to reflect this: *businessmoney.* This variable is an interaction between being a business and the amount of PAC contributions given to the Republican members seated on the committee being lobbied.[15] This is another measure of partisan affinity.

A last committee related variable measures whether or not the district representative of an interest group has a seat on the committee or subcommittee being lobbied. This is a variable to be included since at least one study has demonstrated how district constituents have an advantage to gaining access to members of Congress than do other political actors (Chin, Bond, Geva, 2000).

[15] A similar interactive variable to measure labor groups that support Democrats is not used since all sessions of Congress in the access sample are controlled by a Republican majority.

In line with the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3, I am interested in measuring interest group resources, visibility, and political influence. Interest group resources are measured by lobbyists, membership size, organizational budget, and lobbying activity. Visibility is measured by age and active and passive media mentions. Political influence is measured by PAC contributions to House committee and subcommittee members and contributions made to the committee or subcommittee chair. Schattschneider, widely known for his indictment that the heavenly chorus sings with an upper class accent, in his earlier *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (1935) claims that those groups who made campaign contributions and were able to maintain experienced lobbyists in Washington had the advantage in influencing Congress (Ornstein & Elder 1978). Lobbyists can be of two varieties: in-house lobbyists or contract lobbyists. In-house lobbyists are effective in communicating information to legislators since they are highly knowledgeable about the policy around which their group is organized. Since they work solely for one group, over time they build significant policy expertise if they were not hired for having such expertise in the first place. Contract lobbyists, on the other hand, are hired because of the contacts they have in government (Lowery & Brasher 2004). Many contract lobbyists previously worked in government and are intimate not just with policy makers but are knowledgeable about policy processes.

Own lobbyist and *hired guns* are two of the interest group resources variables. *Own lobbyist* measures the number of internal lobbyists an interest group has on staff, whereas *hired guns* indicates the number of contract lobbyists. Both lobbyist variables

are interval. The information for both was retrieved from the group's year end lobbying disclosure report.

"The primary political resource that organizations command is, of course, money. What makes money important in politics is its convertibility – the fact that it can easily be transformed into other valued political resources. In short, money buys things (Schlozman & Tierney 1986, pg. 89)." While PAC contributions are always the focus of studies on lobbying, the money interest groups have available for day-to-day operations must not be overlooked. Since money pays rent and salaries and is used in many ways not easily identifiable, the organizational budget is important.

Another measure of political resources is *budget. Budget* is a direct translation of a group's budget or their net income.[16] Information for this interval level variable was obtained from websites maintained by the interest groups or from Hoover's Company Reports.[17]

The size and stability of a group comprise another political resource. As indicated by Ornstein & Elder (1978), membership size is an important physical resource because members translate into votes and because membership gains legitimacy. Jeffrey Berry states, "There is no one measure of the organizational capacity of interest groups, but key variables include size, membership, stability, and… effective allocation of available funds" (1999, pg.120).

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[16] This variable ends up getting dropped. In the initial logistic regression analysis it was insignificant (P > z at 0.103) and because this variable has 686 missing observations it would have lowered the sample size to 1548. Because of its insignificance it was dropped in order to preserve a larger sample.

[17] Hoover's Company Reports is a subscription service that offers proprietary business information for more than 25 million corporations and organizations. This service was accessed through Lexis-Nexis.

Members is an interval variable measuring the size of the membership for those groups that have members, and for the others it measures the number of employees. Most trade associations count their membership by the number of companies or organizations that belong to them. However, including that number as the measurement of their members would not be accurate, because the reach of the trade association goes beyond the member companies and organizations; it extends further to the employees and organizational membership. Thus for trade associations, membership is measured by the number of individuals belonging to or employed by the trade association's institutional members. This data was retrieved from websites maintained by the interest group, from testimony they submitted to Congress and from Hoover's Company Reports.[18]

Visibility in part is measured by the age of a group. Age was an interest group variable Kevin Leyden (1995) identified as being important to include in his analysis. Although he provides no justification for this resource, likely it stems from the work done by scholars studying organizational maintenance, particularly those involved in niche theory and population ecology (Gray & Lowery 1996; Browne 1990; Walker 1983). The ability of a group to survive is important because, "[they] must survive if they are to influence public policy" (Lowery & Brasher 2004). Groups that have been in existence over a period of time are legitimate actors; they have maintained their reputations as informants on the policy in which they specialize. How long the group has been in existence is measured by *age.* The age of the group is logged since this is not a linear variable. Data again was collected from interest group websites, congressional testimony and Hoover's Company Reports.

[18] Hoover's Company Reports was accessed via LexisNexis.

An interest group's reputation is everything (Ornstein & Elder 1976; Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Levine & Wolpe 1996). The function of interest groups is to provide information. Because interest groups deal with facts and figures and members of Congress rely on those facts and figures to make policy, there is no room for error. The intelligence provided by interest groups must be legitimate and should groups tarnish their reputation for providing reliable information, they will be out of business. Interest groups provide information not only to legislators but to the media as well. Just as they cannot pass on false or exaggerated information to policy makers, they cannot provide bad information to the media. The media will just as quickly demonize those groups that cross the line of legitimacy. Thus the reputation that an interest group so carefully cultivates in Congress is analogous to its image in the mass media. Not only is the reputation the same, but any attention given to a group by a media, helps perpetuate the legitimacy of the interest group within government. For this reason, two variables that measure the amount of media attention a group receives are included. The number of times the group is mentioned in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* for the issue on which they are lobbying is represented in *active media,* while the number of mentions they receive for other issues is found in *passive media.*[19] *Active media* and *passive media* are also measures of visibility.

Schattschneider was not the only one to contend that campaign contributions are an indication of interest group influence. David Lowery and Holly Brasher (2004) proclaim that as a means of influencing the legislature, the resources interest groups

[19] The entire two year period leading up to and including the year of lobbying activity was used in this measure. This is to capture the effects of prior lobbying since in most cases it takes years of lobbying before an issue is even considered by the congressional leadership.

possess are information, votes and money. While the empirical studies on the link between voting behavior and money may be unclear, one thing is not: the widespread suspicion that if interest groups are raising and spending millions of dollars, then they must be purchasing something. Whether PAC contributions buy votes or simply gain access for groups, money will always be a consideration when studying lobbying.

Several interest group variables are designed to measure political influence: *House PAC, Chair PAC* and *Committee PAC*[20]. Campaign contributions made by the organized interest to members of the House (both parties combined) are accounted for by *House PAC*, another interval level of measurement. These data were collected from www.opensecrets.org, a website maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics that retrieves and compiles data from the Federal Election Commission as well as from data files obtained through the Federal Election Commission's website. *Chair PAC* measures PAC contributions made to the chair of the committee or subcommittee being lobbied. Lastly, *committee PAC* measure money given to both Republican and Democratic members seated on the committee. For all the political influence variables, contributions in the election cycle preceding the term of Congress under observation are used.

The last interest group resource to be included in this model is the level of lobbying activity of a group. While this is not a variable identified in other studies it is one deemed important nonetheless. If a group has enough resources and breadth to reach out to more legislators and lobby more issues, it is hypothesized that the group would

[20] Variables measuring PAC contributions made to Republican House members, Democratic House members, Republican committee members and Democratic committee members were tested but failed to carry a statistical influence and did not contribute in any significant way to the statistical model, so they ultimately are not used in the analysis.

become more influential. The more issues a group lobbies, the more legislators they will come into contact with and the more contacts they have, the more influential they will be. A strong reputation and influence within only one committee or subcommittee will do nothing to increase the overall legislative influence of a group. To become more influential, a group needs to branch out and become a trusted resource common to many legislators. The number of issues for which a group lobbies is found in *lob act* as reported in the group's year-end Lobbying Disclosure report.

Some of the interest group variables appear that they may be related to one another. For example, if it is theorized the legitimacy of a groups is measured by both media mentions and the age of a group, there is a possibility that the two measures are correlated. To guard against any intercorrelation, and to see if any of these variables collectively are measuring some underlying dimension of interest groups, a factor analysis of the interest group resources variables was conducted. Specifically, I factor analyzed *own lobbyists*, *hired guns, members (log),* and *budget (log).* The eigenvalues of the factors showed Factor 1 carrying a value of 0.727 and the following Factor 2 with a 0.308. According to the Kaiser criterion (1960) only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 are retained. Therefore the factor analysis confirms these variables are measuring different, uncorrelated aspects of interest group resources.

Collectively, then, the independent variables that account for features of the interest group are: *hired guns, House PAC, comm PAC, chair PAC, members, budget, age, active media,* and *lob act.* Table 3 below contains descriptive statistics for all of the access variables.

Table 3: Variable Descriptions for the Access Model

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Median	Std.Deviation	Min.	Max
Testifies	2488	.246	0	.431	0	1
Committee						
Partisanship	2346	3.389	1.832	4.290	0	24
Ratio R:D	2346	1.311	1.25	.243	.75	6
Tenure	2346	7.889	8	3.314	1	18
DWchair	2346	.385	.372	.166	.029	.757
Business $	2488	$2044.59	0	$7615.18	0	$102,500
Reponcommittee	2488	.020	0	.142	0	1
Interest Group						
Hired Guns	2488	6.838	3	11.719	0	79
Own Lobbyists	2488	6.026	3	7.894	0	42
Members	2276	4,572,758	23,483	8.23e+07	0	1.61e+09
Budget	1697	2.27e+09	2.29+e08	6.38e+09	-1.04e-10	8.22e+10
Lob Act	2488	9.731	7	7.757	1	34
Active Media	2488	.701	0	4.021	0	142
Passive Media	2488	35.088	7	70.909	0	506
Age	2399	76.747	74	54.294	2	466
House PAC	2488	$175,827.30	$1250	$402,393.60	0	$2,424,300
Comm. PAC	2488	$7545.31	0	$30,076.54	0	$646,725
Chair PAC	2488	$374.64	0	$1742.49	0	$55,000

Some of the variable descriptions deserve explanation. To begin, although the descriptions for *business money*, *House contributions*, *committee contributions* and *chair contributions* are listed in whole numbers, in the analysis the logs are used since these are not linear relationships. The maximum value listed for age is 466 years. This is the correct value; the oldest interest group in the access sample is the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians. Another puzzling value is the .75 minimum value of ratio of Republicans to Democrats seated on a committee or subcommittee. Even though all sessions of Congress under consideration are controlled by a Republican majority, during the 106th Congress, due to Republican vacancies, there were more Democrats seated on the Small Business subcommittee on Empowerment. The other perhaps troubling value is the maximum and minimum values for the *budget* variable. The minimum value is negative

because some of the groups in the sample were reporting negative revenues. Both Sun Microsystems and Cable & Wireless did so. The maximum value is $82.2 billion, which is the reported revenue for Daimler Chrysler in 1998.

Lastly, because this is a pooled time-series analysis it is possible that the sessions of Congress create error patterns that will affect the results of the statistical analysis. Namely they can potentially over-inflate the results or produce non-reliable results. In order to correct for this, a dummy variable for each session of Congress is included in the model. In this way, time is "taken seriously" and the inclusion of the dummy variables corrects for temporally dependent observations (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). Similarly, a series of dummy variables are introduced to indicate the type of interest group and committee. These measures are meant to control for the pattern of errors produced by the nature of the interest groups, committees and subcommittees, and types of policies.

As stated previously, the dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether or not the organized interest testifies before the committee or subcommittee hearing on the issue it lobbied. The model will be tested using logistic regression in order to determine the impact of the independent variables on the likelihood an interest group testifies at a committee or subcommittee hearing. The hypotheses for the access model are presented in the following chapter as are the results of the logistic regression analysis.

The Influence Model

The second part of this research studies what occurs when interest groups do testify. Testifying before congressional committee is reportedly a favored lobbying activity by groups; they compete with one another to be able to participate formally in the hearing process. Is this the case because of the platform it creates for groups to advance their position or is it more? Do they seek participation as witnesses because this is an avenue of influence? The influence model tests what factors increase the likelihood that interest group testimony influences the subsequent bill markups at the committee and subcommittee level.

Research Sample for the Influence Model

Had it been possible, the questions presented in the access and influence model seemingly would have enabled a two-staged analysis of some data. The reality is this does not work for a couple of reasons. First, by beginning with a selection of interest groups who may or may not have successfully been able to testify, the number of groups who do so would be small. Taking it one step further, for those few groups that were successfully able to testify you would need for the committee or subcommittee, before which the group testified, to have followed the measure beyond hearing and into markup. This would significantly limit the number of possible observations. Second, the question of whether interest groups have influence in committees and subcommittees is rather critical. To offer the best modeling of this process and how it works, there really needs to be variation in which party has majority control. Relying on the Lobbying Disclosure

database as a starting point for data collection would have prohibited including a Democrat majority in the House. Thus by necessity the ideal of a two-staged analysis was discarded and instead two separate models are developed using two different data sets.

The process of gathering data for the influence model began with taking a random sampling of hearings from a number of specified House committees and subcommittees from the 103rd, 106th and 108th Congresses. These sessions are used to ensure variation in the majority party and the committee and subcommittee chairs. The 103rd Congress (1993-1994) was the last session of Congress in which Democrats maintained majority control before the Republican revolution that kept them in the minority through the 109th Congress. When the Republicans did gain control in 1994, they implemented six year term limits on their leadership and committee and subcommittee chairs. Thus the first group of Republicans appointed as committee and subcommittee chairs in 1994 were replaced by the 108th Congress (2003-2004). Therefore the chairs in the 106th Congress (1999-2000) are largely different from those in the 108th Congress and both are different from their Democrat counterparts in the 103rd Congress.

Recognizing that there are special committees in the House such as *Ways and Means, Appropriations*, and *Rules*, not all committees were used as a sampling source for committee and subcommittee hearings. The preceding three committees are considered "prestige" committees. They are highly sought after committees with very few newer members of Congress holding seats. In addition, within these committees special norms

have been developed which guide members' behavior.[21] Many fewer hearings are held by these committees than the others and only a select number of interest groups ever receive an opportunity to participate in them. It is for this reason that the three committees were excluded from consideration.

Conducting a content analysis of all the hearings held in these three sessions of Congress would also be too large of an undertaking. There are many ways of differentiating among committees: level of partisanship within, level of legislative activity, and types of policy pursued. The level of partisanship or legislative activity undertaken is fluid, capable of changing significantly from session to session. The types of policy pursued moreover, do not frequently change as the jurisdiction of the committees and subcommittees is set by House rules and in general only gets revisited when control of the House shifts from one party to the other. Because of the stability of this differentiation among committees, a variation in this classification is pursued.

Categorizing the committees along these lines has been conducted by Fenno (1973) and later by Deering and Smith (1990). Fenno suggests three types of committees exist: policy, constituency and prestige. Policy committees tend to work with regulatory (or redistributive) policy whereas distributive legislation is the focus of constituency committees. Prestige committees are committees that have special duties and roles assigned to them, mostly dealing with money issues. For this research sample, three policy committees and three constituency committees were purposefully selected. The

[21] See for example Richard F. Fenno, Jr. 1962. "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration." *The American Political Science Review* 56: 310-24 and John F. Manley. 1965. "The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee." *American Political Science Review* 59: 927-39.

policy committees are: 1) *Financial Services*; 2) *Education and Workforce*; and 3) *Energy and Commerce*. The constituency committees are: 1) *Agriculture*; 2) *Resources*; and 3) *Transportation and Infrastructure*. These committees were selected over their counterparts as a quick assessment confirmed the level of activity within these six committees would render enough hearings with subsequent markups. The subcommittees of these six committees, each with about 5-6 subcommittees, are also included in the sample.

Table 4: Committees used in the Influence Model Along with their Legislative Activity

108th	*Hearings*	*Markups*
Agriculture	34	8
Education & Workforce	45	24
Energy & Commerce	114	51
Financial Services	95	22
Resources	85	45
Transportation & Infrastructure	69	14
106th		
Agriculture	56	21
Banking & Financial Services	41	38
Commerce	108	80
Education & Workforce	69	18
Resources	71	10
Transportation & Infrastructure	89	24
103rd		
Agriculture	55	53
Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs	120	49
Education & Labor	39	41
Energy & Commerce	98	79
Natural Resources	169	106
Public Works & Transportation	100	63

Once the committees were selected, all hearings held by the committees and their subcommittees that also had subsequent markups were identified. Many hearings never progress further. Table 4 lists the number of hearings held by each committee and its subcommittees, and how many markups were held. Every hearing that had a subsequent markup made it into the initial research sample with one exception: the Committee on Resources. There were so many markups for the Natural Resources Committee in the 103rd Congress that only 20 (randomly selected) made it into the initial research sample.

All testimony from these hearings was read and coded. The coding sheet identifies the interest group and then lists every recommendation made. Some groups make only one recommendation and others many more. The most recommendations made by any one group are 45. The next step was to determine which recommendations, if any, were included in the markup. The markup transcripts were accessed, (some are online others are only available for perusal at the committee in Washington DC) read, and compared to the interest group recommendations. Each recommendation was coded as either: no; yes – changed; yes-broad support; or yes-no change. Any recommendation (positive or negative) not included in the markup is coded "no." So if a group recommends increasing appropriations by $5 million dollars and they remain unchanged, it is coded as "no." If a group adamantly opposes the bill and wants it to die, it gets coded as "no" since the bill did not die – it made it the markup stage. When it comes to the yeses, they vary. "Yes-changed" is used to indicate when a group makes a recommendation to add an amendment or modify the legislation (including deletions) and they are successful. When these recommendations are successful, they change the

content of the legislation. Then there is testimony that recommends a change that is already included in the legislation before markup. For example, a group may testify that it recommends a citizen suit provision in the legislation to find that it is already included in the base legislation being considered. In these instances, the organization is really only indicating support for the legislation as introduced by the committee or subcommittee. When this occurs, it is coded as "yes-no change." The last code, "yes-broad" identifies testimony that says, "We support HR 10 and encourage it be passed as quickly as possible." No specific recommendation is made; the interest group is simply voicing support for the entire bill as it exists. This content analysis was conducted on both testimony submitted in person (by invitation) and that submitted in writing.[22]

Next, since some groups had lengthy testimony that included a multitude of recommendations and others very few, only three of each group's recommendations were included. From the coding sheet of each interest group hearing consideration, three recommendations were randomly selected. Each of the three recommendations (or less) of each group that submitted testimony becomes a separate observation in the database. The dichotomous dependent variable is coded 1=yes or 0=no. The only observations that received a 1=yes were those that were originally coded as "yes-changed." The other "yeses" were coded separately and were included in a separate analysis. Table 5 shows the outcome breakdown for all of the recommendations. Note this is a summary of *all* 13,177 recommendations prior to randomly selecting only three for each interest group.

[22] By House rule, all testimony submitted in writing must be included in the official record of the congressional hearing. Typically the record is left open for a number of days to allow for inclusion of all written testimony sent into the (sub)committee. No invitation is required to submit written testimony.

Table 5: Breakdown of Outcomes for all Recommendations Made by Interest Groups

	Frequency	*Percentage*
No	9193	69.8%
Yes – No Change	2998	22.8%
Yes – Broad Support	564	4.3%
Yes – Changed	422	3.2%

This table is included because it provides some revealing descriptive information about the types of recommendations interest groups and their success. The mean number of recommendations made by each interest group in this sample is 4.6 and the maximum number of recommendations of any one group was 45. But of all the recommendations rendered by the interest groups, only 4.3% were the type that affirmed the group's broad support for the legislation introduced into the committee. If the more specific affirmations are included (yes-no change) this combined category still only accounts for slightly more than 25 percent of the recommendations. *Almost ¾ of the recommendations were real attempts to change the bill as it was introduced*. This is strong evidence that interest groups are not simply taking an invitation to testify as an opportunity to provide "window dressing" support for the committee or subcommittee legislation. The success in changing the legislation was much less as interest groups only were successful in getting their recommendations into the bill markups less than 5% of the time.

Independent Variables in the Influence Model

As in the access model, the independent variables were chosen to test both committee power theories and interest group resource theory which are the foundation for the interest group impact theory being developed here. Partisan affinity, ideological extremism, and chair influence comprise the first set of variables measuring characteristics related to the committee or subcommittee and its chair. Party influence is measured by *partisan* and *maj:min.* Ideology is found in *ideology,* and *tenure* measures chair influence. *Partisan* is a measure of the level of partisanship of a committee or subcommittee. This was calculated first by taking the ratio of majority party bills to minority party bills that received consideration in the committee or subcommittee with either a hearing or bill markup. Next the absolute value of the difference between the ratio and one was calculated to get the value of *partisan*. This is done because otherwise a value of one represents complete bipartisanship with several committees and subcommittees carrying values lower than 1. The higher value of this variable, the more partisan the committee or subcommittee.[23] *Maj:min* is the ratio of majority party members to minority party members sitting on the committee or subcommittee[24]. *Ideology* is a measure of the absolute value of the difference between the first dimension of a chair's DW Nominate scores and the mean House DW Nominate score. Lastly *tenure* measures how long the chair has been a member of Congress.

Interest group resources, interest group visibility and political influence are theorized to increase the success of a group. Interest group resources are measured by

[23] Partisanship in the influence model is measured in the same way as it was for the access model.
[24] As was done for the Access model, the correlation between *partisan* and *maj:min* was calculated. At 0.0985, there is little correlation between these two *Party Influence* variables.

members, budget, own lobbyists, and hired guns. Interest group visibility is measured by *media* and *age*. Political influence is measured by several PAC variables. *Members* indicates the number of members of the group or the number of employees of the business. The budget of the group, or in the case of businesses, governments, churches, and colleges/universities the revenue of the group is represented by *budget. Own lobbyists* measures the number of in-house lobbyists and the number of contracted lobbyists representing an organization is *hired guns. Media* measures the number of mentions in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* the organization received for the two year period prior to the hearing at which the group testified. *Age* measures the age of an interest group. The dollar amount of PAC contributions made to House candidates is found in *House PACs*. *Chair PAC* measures the amount of PAC money given to committee and subcommittee chairs, whereas *comm PAC* account for money contributed to committee and subcommittee members. *Majority PAC* measures PAC money given only to majority committee members. All of the PAC variables used contributions given in the two year election cycle immediately preceding the session of Congress under observation.

In the access model, the interest group variables were factor analyzed to determine any underlying dimensions created by any combination of variables. Doing so failed to identify any notable factors. Factor analysis was applied to the interest group variables in the influence model as well. As with the first model, here the eigenvalues reveal no significant factor.

A group of dummy variables representing the type of interest group submitting the testimony follows. Groups are classified as *membership, trade association, business, church, federal government, government* (local, state, county), *college/university, union* or *think tank.* These variables will give an indication if any type of interest group holds an advantage in gaining influence. Business and labor are often cited in popular discourse as being unfairly disadvantaged. Including these variables will enable testing of this claim. A dummy variable also is included to indicate whether the policy in consideration was regulatory in nature. Table 6 gives the descriptions of the variables used in this model.

Table 6: Variable Descriptions for the Influence Model

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Median	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
Partisan	4257	3.523	2.6	2.713	0	12
Maj:min	4257	1.432	1.267	0.272	1.1	2
Ideology	4257	0.344	0.353	0.169	.003	.626
Tenure	4257	8.936	9.0	2.963	3	16
Members	2841	3,079,339	6500	3.63e+07	2	6.35+e08
Budget	1828	6.42e+10	3.98e+07	7.28e+11	6000	9.40e+12
Own Lobbyists	4257	1.749	0	4.807	0	41
Hired Guns	4257	1.736	0	6.341	0	89
Media	4257	182.4	6	431.7	0	2678
Age	2994	67.2	54	49.007	4	368
House PAC	4257	$40,209.92	0	$206,859.40	0	$3,353,926
Comm. PAC	4257	$4992.46	0	$22,609.02	0	$338.050
Chair PAC	4257	$330.78	0	$1370.95	0	$10,500
Maj.Com. PAC	4257	$3241.54	0	$13,717.80	0	$188,850

Looking at Table 6, the most tenured chair in this impact model is Charlie Gonzalez (D). The most extreme ideologue is Cliff Stearns (R). Aerospace Industries Association of America has the largest membership, but recall for trade associations

membership is calculated by total number of individuals employed by all member firms and businesses. The largest budget is found with the US Department of Commerce. Verizon has the most contracted lobbyists employed, whereas the US Chamber of Commerce has the most staff lobbyists. The city of New Castle, Delaware is the oldest organized interest followed closely by Richmond, Virginia and the University of Pennsylvania. The National Association of Realtors contributed the most money to House members and the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) contributed the most to majority party members seated on a committee before which they testified.

As is the case with the access model, since this is a time series, pooled analysis, a number of precautions were taken to ensure that the regression analysis was not detecting any error patterns created by each session of Congress and each committee or subcommittee. Following the advice of Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), dummy variables were created for two of the three sessions of Congress as well as for most committees and subcommittees. Including these dummy variables tests for autocorrelation; if autocorrelation were present these variables would be highly correlated to the dependent variable. Also, separate regressions were run in which only the observations for each separate session of Congress were included. Both precautions indicated no problem with autocorrelation.

Summary

This research into the workings of House congressional hearings, specifically the role of testifiers necessitates two separate statistical analyses. The first analysis models

the factors involved in the decision making process of which groups get asked to participate in hearings. The data used in this analysis cover four sessions of Congress (105^{th}-108^{th}) and include 2459 observations which in this model is an attempt to testify on behalf of an issue being lobbied by a group. The dependent variable is measures whether or not a group received an invitation to testify and the independent variables measure a range of interest group, committee and subcommittee, and chair characteristics. Logistic regression is applied to determine the likelihood of each independent variable on the group being asked to testify.

The influence model is the second model designed to test what influences whether or not an interest group's recommendation is heeded. The testimony and markups of six committees and their subcommittees were read and coded to determine whether the recommendation made was incorporated in the bill markup. This data was then used to test a statistical model in which the dependent variable is whether or not the recommendation was followed and the independent variables again measure a number of interest group, committee and subcommittee, and chair features. This is a pooled, time series analysis covering the 103^{rd}, 106^{th} and 108^{th} sessions of Congress. The hypotheses developed to be tested by both models and the results of the analyses are found in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTEREST GROUP ACCESS TO CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

While the normative concern driving this research is pluralist democracy, two specific questions are explored. In the legislative process, which groups are able to gain access to congressional hearings held by committees and subcommittees in the U.S. House of Representatives and, once there, whose testimony is able to influence the subsequent markups, if any? Two different data sets are compiled to test each question separately. Two statistical models are developed to test empirically each problem: an access model and an influence model. The access model is discussed in this chapter.

Access Model

Since theory suggests either factors relating to the interest group itself or those relating to the chair or committee may influence whether an interest group receives an invitation to testify, the data set developed here contains both. This is an original data set consisting of 600 groups and 2488 opportunities to testify before a House committee or subcommittee. The details of how these data were collected are found in the previous chapter.

Descriptive Statistics

Examining the pool of 600 groups reveals information about the composition of the interest group population. Table 7 displays the classification of these 600 groups. Groups are classified as either: business, trade association, membership, government, college/university, coalition, think tank or union.

Businesses are any interest groups that are for- profit entities. A business' primary function is not to lobby government but since much policy either regulates or taxes its operations, many businesses maintain a lobbying presence in Washington. Interest groups that are either trade associations or professional associations are classified here as the former. Both trade and professional associations represent practitioners in a particular field or industry and are founded and funded by member corporations, firms or individuals. Their function is to represent the interests of their membership through public relations campaigns, education and lobbying. The only difference is that trade associations represent institutions and professional associations represent individuals. Since institutions are ultimately comprised of individuals I think it is safe to collapse the two into one category especially since when looking at membership numbers I am counting individuals, not institutions.

Any group that seeks out citizen support in the form of donations or membership is classified as a membership group. This broad definition encompasses citizen groups, public interest groups, ideological groups and charities, to name just a few varieties of groups that fall under this classification. There is no prerequisite for belonging to membership groups; all that is needed is a willingness to contribute.

Governmental groups are any governmental entity whether local, state or foreign.[25] In this sample, that includes entities such as the city of Miami Beach, the Illinois Housing Development Authority and the Comanche Nation.

Table 7: Classification of Interest Groups

Type	Frequency	Percentage	Located in DC
Business	276	46.5%	25.1%
Trade Association	145	24.5%	67.1%
Membership	67	11.3%	66.7%
Government	57	9.6%	0.0%
College/University	23	3.9%	4.4%
Coalition	13	2.2%	57.1%
Union	10	1.7%	70.0%
Think Tank	1	0.2%	100%
Unknown	8	1.3%	37.5%
Total	600	100	38.6%

Colleges and universities include all institutions of higher learning. Also included in this category are any university centers of research such as the North South Center of the University of Miami and support centers like the Texas A&M University Research Foundation.

[25] In this data set, federal governmental entities are not included as they are not required by law to submit lobbying disclosure reports.

Organized labor unions are classified as union, and coalitions are any combination of the preceding types of groups who come together in order to influence a specific issue on which they have a similar interest. The coalitions included in this sample appear to be ad hoc in nature, formed solely to lobby for a specified issue. Examples from the sample include the Coalbed Methane Ad Hoc Committee, the Stormwater Reform Coalition and the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports. These are short lived organizations that dismantle once the issue is no longer on the congressional agenda. The transient nature of these coalitions makes it difficult to gather information about them; they form and then just as quickly dissolve with little trace left behind. Ideally in any type of research it would be nice to classify them and identify them by the organizations that comprise the coalition. But the very nature of coalitions precludes me from doing this. As they represent only 2.2% of the research sample, I am not overly concerned with not being able to identify them in such a way.

Of the organizations included in the sample 46.5% are businesses, while trade associations comprise 24.5% and membership groups 11.3%. This is in line with the sampling of groups conducted by Schlozman and Tierney (1986) who found 47.5% of the groups to be businesses, while trade associations accounted for 24.8%.[26] Similarly, the Baumgartner, Leech, Kimball, Berry, and Hojnacki advocacy and public policy making project that examined all of the 1996 federal lobbying disclosure reports showed that businesses accounted for 40 percent of the registrants, followed by trade association and

[26] Schlozman and Tierney actually had two separate classifications: trade associations (17.9%) and professional associations (6.9%). As this research classifies both as trade associations, they were combined. Also no direct comparison can be made of membership groups as they used a much more restrictive definition of membership than is used here.

citizen groups with about 14 percent of the registrants.[27] This confirms the reliability of the sampling. Table 7 also indicates what percentage of each type of group is located in Washington D.C. Overall, 38.6% of the groups are located in Washington D.C.[28]

The predominance of businesses in the organized interest population raises the elitist critique of pluralism that moneyed interests, those with more resources, have an advantage over other interests. Allegations such as these are in part why the research I am conducting is important. I raise the issue in Chapter 1 that no one since E.E. Schattschneider has systematically, nor empirically, tested his claims of prevailing "private" interests in government. The concern is not just whether his observations of government in 1960 are substantiated, but also whether the political climate in Washington and the interest group population has been altered since then in a way such that the "private" interests are muted by the inclusion of more and greater variation in interest groups.

The stability of the interest group population is also of interest. There is a whole stream of interest group research focused on the interest group population (Browne 1990; Gray & Lowery 1997, 2000; Haider-Markel, 1997; Lowery & Gray 1998, 1999; Nownes 2004; Nownes & Lipinski 2005). There are not only substantial barriers to the formation of interest groups, but numerous difficulties in keeping an organization afloat. Those groups which are no longer able to appeal to a membership or board of directors, will

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[27] The website of the Advocacy and Policy Making project is: http://lobby.la.psu.edu/. This specific information was obtained from a paper they presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting in 2007 entitled, "Does Money Buy Power? Interest Group Resources and Policy Outcomes."

[28] Included in the count of D.C. groups are those groups located in the suburban Virginia districts of Congressmen Davis and Moran. Many of the budget minded interest groups have found it more cost effective to keep offices in the suburbs rather than in the high rent districts of Washington D.C.

quickly find themselves out of business. Without appeal they will not be able to raise the financial and other resources necessary to maintain a lobbying presence in Washington D.C. Although many observers measure an interest group's success by how many of its policy goals it achieves, a more fundamental measure of success is whether it is able to maintain its existence. A group can only pursue policy if it subsists.

Figure 2 depicts how many groups maintained a lobbying presence over the seven year period examined in this study. To determine the stability of groups I examined whether the groups had filed lobbying disclosure reports for all seven years included in the study. The population is fairly stable with 70% of the groups being represented in Washington for all seven years examined. The most stable type of group is labor unions. Eighty nine percent of the unions are represented in all seven years and the other 11% are represented in six of the seven years. Membership groups and trade associations are also fairly stable with 80% of those groups being present in all seven years. The least stable are coalitions which have only 46% lobbying across all years. Coalitions seemingly would be the least stable as they come together on an ad hoc basis, typically, to affect some specific policy change. Once they succeed (or fail to succeed) the coalition disbands. Overall the interest group population is fairly stable, but it's not so stagnant that it disallows the entrance of new groups and the exit of others. While having 70% stability means 30% disruption, you need to keep in mind that we are looking at the stability of representation in Washington, not the mere existence of the group. This is a fairly healthy picture of the interest group ecology.

Figure 2: Percentage of Groups Maintaining a Lobbying Presence over a Seven Year Period (1998-2004)



Given the universe of groups with an interest in legislation before committees and subcommittees of Congress, Table 8 shows how many groups were invited to testify and how many were not. Of the 2488 lobbying opportunities, access to testify was granted 612 times, 24.6% of the attempts.[29] Think tanks and colleges and universities were the most successful at gaining access. Although they testify less frequently than other types of groups, as a percentage of the lobbying attempts, they do better. Think tanks are a special type of interest group in that they exist solely to engage in research geared toward policy development. It is not uncommon for think tanks to generate the policy alternatives that comprise bills which are then introduced into Congress. When this occurs, certainly the originator of the policy alternative would be an appropriate witness

[29] This is access to submit oral testimony. If a group is unable to participate in a hearing they may still submit written testimony to the committee or subcommittee. The committees and subcommittees are then legally obliged to include the written submissions in the records of the hearing.

to invite to a hearing. When it comes to colleges and universities they are successful in part because there is such a narrow range of issues they lobby. On that range of issues (funding of research, student aid, and higher education legislation) colleges and universities are the primary interests. Colleges and universities also house research centers whose work, similar to think tanks, generates new policy ideas and thus are similarly situated. In this sample colleges and universities are lobbying the aforementioned issues along with privacy issues, student gambling issues, nationality and immigration issues and appropriations for specific programs or projects.

Table 8: Access to Hearings by Type of Interest Group

Type	Lobbying Opportunities	Testifying	% of Success
Business	1042	148	14.2%
Trade Association	756	263	34.8%
Membership	292	81	27.7%
Government	123	18	14.6%
College/University	147	73	49.7%
Union	86	20	23.3%
Coalition	23	3	13.0%
Unknown	16	3	18.8%
Think Tank	3	3	100%
Total	2488	612	24.6%

Trade associations were successful about a third of the time. The expertise of trade associations probably plays a role. Since trade associations (and professional associations which here are classified together) are comprised of all the practitioners in a given field, if one wants knowledge about that field, it would be logical to seek out that trade association. For example, the Mortgage Bankers Association of America lobbied and was invited to testify on home mortgage subprime lending. In another instance, in 2003, the National Association of Water Companies was invited to testify at a hearing on the public health effects of and cause of high levels of lead in public drinking water supplies, an issue which they had been lobbying. Not only are trade associations able to give expertise on policy but, since they have contact with so many members of an industry, they often times are able to communicate political information about the implications of enacting certain policy. Membership groups are successful a little over a quarter of the time, and unions a little under a quarter of the time. Less successful in their attempts at testifying are businesses who gained entrée only 14.2% of the time. This is somewhat surprising given how this type of interest group is touted as having disproportionate influence in government.

Businesses, it should be noted, not only lobby on their own behalf but often also belong to a trade association that is engaged in lobbying. For some businesses, it is more efficient and economical to allow their trade association to lobby on their behalf rather than to expend their own lobbying resources. It might also be the case that if a business and trade association are both lobbying the same issue, that an invitation to testify will be extended to only one. Brady, Drutman, Schlozman and Verba (2007) examine this exact

question in their study of corporate lobbying. Preliminary results show that businesses in the entertainment and consumer goods industries are more likely to rely on trade association representation foregoing business level representation. The exact opposite is true for businesses in the fields of electronics, services and defense. Businesses that used both their own lobbying as well as that of trade associations were those involved with raw materials, manufacturing, transportation, finance, energy, communications, health care and retail.

Interest group scholars are quite familiar with the size of the population of political action committees (PACs) in contrast to the size of the overall population of organized interests. Whereas conservative estimates count some 20,000 plus organized interests, there are roughly only 3000 political action committees that are connected to an organized interest, and another 1,000 that have no ties or linkages. This is not to downplay the role of money; PACs contributed $225.4 million to House candidates in the 2004 election[30]. So, although there are far more organized interests who choose not to contribute money to congressional candidates, those that do contribute large amounts of money. Knowing this, and being cognizant of the elitist critique of pluralism, it is interesting to see which types of groups in this sample make campaign contributions.

Table 9 reveals how many of the groups in this sample do. The type of group most active in contributing money, and well known for it, is organized labor. Over two thirds of the labor unions in this sample actively contributed money through their PACs. Not only did many of the unions contribute, but they raised large amounts of money through their PACs. In this sample the mean labor PAC contributions for the election

[30] This data was retrieved from the FEC's website at www.fec.gov.

cycle was $880,174. Almost half of the business groups and trade associations make PAC contributions. The mean total of contributions for trade association PACs in one election cycle is $167,605. The mean total of contributions made by businesses during one election cycle is $102,811 and it is $16,784 for membership groups. A small share of membership groups has PACs, while the other types of interests have none. Also it is the colleges and universities that make no PAC contributions that are much more efficient at gaining access to congressional hearings.

The aggregate contributions made by trade association PACs, for the years under consideration are $126,388,861. Business PACs contributed a total of $107,128,977 followed by unions with $75,695,001 and membership groups with $4,884,264. In all, the interest groups that comprise this sample contributed $314 million over four election cycles. This is a considerable amount of money, given that not all interest groups make campaign contributions.

Table 9: Groups Making PAC Contributions by Type of Interest Group

Type	Total Groups	with PAC	% with PACs
Business	276	128	46.4%
Trade Association	145	71	49.0%
Membership	67	6	9.0%
Government	57	0	0.0%
College/University	23	0	0.0%
Coalition	13	0	0.0%
Union	9	7	70.1%
Unknown/Other	10	1	10.0%
Total	600	213	35.5%

The descriptive statistics, although interesting, only reveal so much. The deeper question of what it takes to gain access to congressional hearings, a much sought after venue, requires a more complex analysis. A number of hypotheses relating to this question are developed and tested. The discussion of those hypotheses and the statistical model follow.

Hypotheses for the Access Model

Following the interest group impact theory developed in Chapter 3, factors relating to both committee power and interest group resource theories are expected to influence whether interest groups receive invitations to testify in committee or subcommittee. The factors derived from committee power theories are party influence,

ideological extremism, and chair influence. In addition, the type of committee (constituency, policy, or prestige) can impact the type of access yielded.

According to the committee power theories, the three potential sources of power within committees are: party, committee or subcommittee leadership, or neither. The difficulty in directly testing these theories in the access model is that all House sessions under consideration are uniformly described as conditional party government; meaning polarization between parties and unity within them. This is confirmed, in part, by Congressional Quarterly Party Unity Scores (displayed in Table 10) and has also been verified by David Rohde[31].

Table 10: Congressional Quarterly's Party Unity Scores for Each Party within the House of Representatives for 1998 – 2004

Session	Year	Republicans	Democrats
105th	1998	86	82
106th	1999	86	83
	2000	88	82
107th	2001	91	83
	2002	90	86
108th	2003	91	87
	2004	88	86

Additionally, all sessions are under Republican control. Speaker Newt Gingrich inaugurated the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives in the 104th Congress (1995-1996) with a series of rules changes intended to increase the influence of party leaders. For example, committee and subcommittee budgets were slashed, joint

[31] This was confirmed in a personal conversation with David Rohde at the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois.

referral of bills was eliminated, term limits on committee and subcommittee chairs were enacted, and the Speaker's influence over the Steering and Rules Committees was increased. Because Gingrich used procedure to strengthen the party position, and those rules remained in place throughout the time periods under consideration, cartel theory also aptly describes these House sessions. In other words, during this time period, we do not have the necessary variation that would allow us to rigorously distinguish between conditional party government and party as cartel models.

Within the highly partisan environment, there is still expected to be enough autonomy residing within the committee and subcommittee chairs to allow them discretion in making many decisions. One of these committee decisions is which groups to invite to testify in hearing. While chairs are not immune to a highly polarized and partisan atmosphere, the effect of partisanship will be difficult to detect when it comes to compiling witness lists since most groups are not overtly partisan, or are purposefully bipartisan. However, certain types of interests naturally align with the Republican Party or the Democratic Party. For example, businesses are part of the Republican coalition and labor unions part of the Democratic constituency. Therefore, business groups are expected to have more access to hearings than other types of groups since Republicans control the House for all periods studied.

> *H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.*

The relationship between business groups and the Republican Party on one side, and labor unions and Democrats works both ways. Business groups and labor unions do

not just receive preferential treatment from their respective parties without being expected to give anything in return; the parties expect support from the interest groups. Stories abound of the parties demanding interest groups within the party coalition to pay their dues in the form of campaign contributions. House Republicans benefitted from the demands Tom Delay made of interest groups and lobbyists during his tenure as Majority Leader, just as Democrats profited when Tony Coelho headed the DCCC. This is not to imply campaign contributions buy votes, it is to suggest access is given to those groups who hold up their end of a mutually beneficial relationship by supporting the party financially during elections. Business groups that contribute money to House members are more likely to gain access than other groups, just as we would expect unions to gain access under a Democrat controlled if they made PAC contributions to House members.

> *H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by the interaction of being a business and contributions given to House Republicans seated on the committee being lobbied, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.*

The effects of committee or subcommittee leadership are subsumed by ideological extremism. The informational theorists (Gilligan & Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991) maintain policy preferences extend beyond partisan preferences, are multi-dimensional and suggest ideology factors into the position a legislator takes on a bill, among other considerations. A liberal preference does not necessarily always have to align with the Democratic Party's preference nor is the root of an ideological preference partisanship. Partisanship and ideology can be two distinct effects. The interest group impact theory developed here maintains ideology will exert a distinct influence. Specifically, it is anticipated extreme ideologues at both ends of the political spectrum will be more

exclusive with their hearing testimony invitations. The amount of access granted by extreme ideologues differs than their more moderate colleagues because the extremists need to use testimony to build support for legislation they hope to get passed through the House. Extreme ideologues are reluctant to allow dissenting testimony as this potentially weakens the committee position on the legislation being considered. They prefer to present unanimous support hoping to snowball support for the bill as it progresses toward a House floor vote.

> *H3: Ideological extremism, as measured by the committee or subcommittee chair ideology, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.*

The residual autonomy maintained by the committee and subcommittee chairs also will be manifested in chair influence. Chair influence in this access model is measured by the House tenure of the chair. Newer House members who chair committees and subcommittees will behave differently than their more senior colleagues. Members of Congress face a steep learning curve when they are first elected. Although they bring some policy experience and knowledge with them to Washington, usually they still have a significant amount of learning to do to be effective policy makers. In their earlier years they will rely on many resources to collect information, including interest group testimony. Senior members, on the other hand, may become as knowledgeable as any other player when it comes to policy niches. Having all the information they need to make policy, they are less dependent on testimony and are less interested in hearing testimony from a wide range of groups.

H4: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

Several measures of partisan affinity are included in the access model since party is theoretically important. Similarly, dummy variables for each individual chair are added as another measure of chair influence as are dummy variables for the parent committee before which an interest is seeking access. The dummy variables for the parent committees will not only measure the effects each committee may exert over the process but also control for statistical abnormalities which might occur due to the nature of the sample being used for a pooled time series analysis. Collectively, the variables included in the access model are designed to test for partisan affinity, ideological influence, ideological extremism, and chair influence.

The interest group impact theory developed in Chapter 3 maintains features of the interest group also influence the decision of which groups to include in congressional hearings as witnesses. Interest group resources, interest group legitimacy and political influence are all expected to be positively related to the likelihood an interest group will be invited to testify.

Interest group resources include the number of lobbyists on staff and those hired on a contractual basis, the size of the group's membership and budget, and the level of lobbying activity of the group. The more resources a group has at its disposal, the more widespread its lobbying efforts and the reach of its lobbying efforts will be.

H5: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.

H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership and budget of the group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify[32].

H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the amount of lobbying activity of a group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

The reputation of an interest group likely plays a role in whether it is invited to testify as the committee or subcommittee chair has an interest in receiving good, reliable information. There is no way to measure the reputation of an interest group directly. However, just as a reputation for being a reliable source will open doors to legislators, it opens doors to the media. Just as congressmen and women look to interest groups for information, so do journalists. Therefore an indirect measure of the group's visibility can be gained via the proxy of media mentions. Visible groups are cited more frequently by journalists than those who have a bad or no reputation. It is also known that groups that tarnish their reputation do not last in the business of lobbying for very long (Ainsworth 2002; Wolpe & Levine 1996). Therefore, the more established the group, the stronger and more enduring its reputation. Interest group visibility is measured by how frequently a group is mentioned in the news media and by the age of the group.

H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of active and passive media mentions of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of a group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

[32] The log of both members and budget are used as neither are expected to be linear functions.

One cannot ignore the influence of money. The literature clearly suggests the possibility of campaign contributions buying access. Political influence is specified by the amount of PAC contributions an organization makes to House members, by contributions given to members seated on the committee or subcommittee the interest group is lobbying, and by contributions given the targeted committee or subcommittee chair. Interest group potentially steer campaign contributions toward those members who are able to give them access like committee chairs or members seated on the committee.

H10: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest group gives to all members of Congress, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H11: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest group gives to committee members, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

H12: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions made to the committee and subcommittee chair, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

Lastly, the politics involved in policy making theoretically operate according to the policy arena under observation. The politics of regulatory policy making are much more contentious and involved more substantially more players than distributive policy making. Since distributive policy making is said to operate within the subgovernment policy systems, it is expected interest groups will have more success in gaining access to hearings held on regulatory policy.

H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by policy committees, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.

Even though the access model is testing sessions of Congress that are described as highly partisan and polarized, committee and subcommittee chairs still retain the ability to exert influence over certain committee processes. Underlying many of their decisions is the desire to make good policy and to collect the information needed to do so. Therefore a confluence of factors, driven by both the committees and interest groups determine whether access to committee hearings will be given to an interest group.

Results

The access model presented here is done through a progression of analyses. This enables one to see the effects of the different types of variables separately and collectively, allowing for the comparison of the effects of the separate groups of independent variables on the dependent variable. There are two different groups of variables: those relating to the interest group and those measuring the chair or committee. The first three regressions will test the chair and committee variables and interest group variables separately. The fourth regression will be run using both the interest groups variables and the chair/committee variables together. Finally, a regression will be run separately for each session of Congress. The final step, running a separate regression for each session of Congress is a necessary step to check for problems in the fully specified model such as auto-correlation between independent variables as it is symptomatic of pooled-time series analysis. In addition to separating regressions for each session of Congress, dummy variables representing each parent committee are included in the

model, not only to test for the effects of these committees on interest group access, but also to ensure the error terms of the committees are not artificially inflating the results of the statistical analysis (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).

Logistic Regression with only Chair and Committee Variables

Table 11 reveals the results of the first logistic regression in which the independent variables measuring committee and chair characteristics are regressed on the dependent variable measuring whether the interest group was asked to testify. The null hypothesis is safely rejected. The pseudo R2 indicates the fit of the data. About 14% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained.[33]

When the odds ratio of an independent variable is one, this indicates there is no relationship between that independent variable and the dependent variable. None of the measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism, or chair influence carry a statistical significance. Having a representative seated on the committee before which an interest group seeks testimony is negatively related to access, and seeking testimony before policy committees is also negatively related to access. In addition, several of the committee and subcommittee chair variables are statistically significant as are several of the dummy variables representing the parent committees.

[33] The pseudo R2 reported is the measure recommended by McFadden (1973).

Table 11: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Committee Variables Only

	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P>z
Partisanship	-.007	0.993	0.018	-0.39	.696
Ratio R:D	-.246	0.782	0.369	-0.67	.506
Tenure	.063	1.06	0.050	1.26	.208
DW Chair	.918	2.50	1.224	0.75	.453
Rep on Committee	**-.986**	**0.37**	**0.444**	**-2.22**	**.026**
Policy	**-1.758**	**0.17**	**0.832**	**-2.11**	**.035**
Prestige	.330	1.39	0.644	0.51	.608
Burton	**-2.049**	**0.12**	**0.097**	**-2.71**	**.007**
Crane	**-2.436**	**0.088**	**0.095**	**-2.24**	**.025**
Ehlers	**-2.297**	**0.101**	**0.116**	**-2.00**	**.046**
Herger	**-2.533**	**0.080**	**0.086**	**-2.34**	**.019**
Hoekstra	**1.939**	**6.950**	**6.029**	**2.24**	**.025**
Johnson, Nancy	**-2.145**	**0.117**	**0.118**	**-2.13**	**.033**
McIntosh	**-3.134**	**0.044**	**0.049**	**-2.76**	**.006**
Mica	**1.610**	**5.004**	**3.759**	**2.14**	**.032**
Oxley	**-1.456**	**0.233**	**0.133**	**-2.55**	**.011**
Thomas	**-2.517**	**0.081**	**0.077**	**-2.63**	**.009**
Armed Services	**-3.470**	**0.031**	**0.025**	**-4.39**	**.000**
Finance	**1.928**	**6.876**	**5.542**	**2.43**	**.015**
Govt Reform	**1.756**	**5.791**	**4.758**	**2.14**	**.033**
Resources	**-1.311**	**0.270**	**0.163**	**-2.16**	**.031**
Sm Business	**-1.769**	**0.171**	**0.116**	**-2.60**	**.009**
Session-2nd yr	-.163	0.850	0.110	-1.26	.209
Sixth	**-.583**	**0.558**	**0.099**	**-3.30**	**.001**
Seventh	-.369	0.691	0.178	-1.43	.152
Eighth	-.411	0.663	0.148	-1.85	.065
Constant	.148		0.816	0.18	.856
N= 2314	Pseudo R2 = .1438		Prob > chi2 = 0.000		

Somewhat troubling, though, are several of the high standard errors appearing with some of the chair and committee dummy variables. High standard error terms tend to indicate multicollinearity among the independent variables. Multicollinearity tests applied to the data (Collin test in STATA) confirm this. The dummy variables representing the individual chairs will be dropped to see if it eliminates the problem.

The measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism, and chair influence are the theoretically important variables; since those measures account for what might have been of interest in the variation among chairs, eliminating the chair dummy variables should not in anyway detract from the model specification. The results of the corrected model of committee and chair variables are displayed in Table 12.

Table 12: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Committee Variables Only (Corrected Model)

	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P>z
Partisanship	.001	1.001	0.015	0.09	.928
Ratio R:D	-.221	0.801	0.237	-0.75	.454
Tenure	-.013	0.987	0.020	-0.62	.532
DW Chair	-.236	0.789	0.278	-0.67	.502
Reponcommittee	**-9.09**	**0.403**	**0.169**	**-2.17**	**.030**
Policy	**-1.717**	**0.180**	**0.094**	**-3.28**	**.001**
Prestige	-.374	0.688	0.318	-0.81	.419
Armed Services	**-3.329**	**0.037**	**0.021**	**-5.84**	**.000**
Appropriations	**1.409**	**4.092**	**1.273**	**4.53**	**.000**
Energy	**.875**	**2.399**	**0.902**	**2.33**	**.020**
Finance	**1.387**	**4.003**	**1.588**	**3.50**	**.000**
Govt Reform	**.820**	**2.271**	**0.841**	**2.21**	**.027**
Sm Business	**-1.831**	**0.160**	**0.075**	**-3.92**	**.000**
Session-2nd yr	-.116	0.891	0.110	-0.93	.351
Sixth	**-.470**	**0.625**	**0.099**	**-2.98**	**.003**
Seventh	-.155	0.857	0.192	-0.69	.490
Eighth	-.185	0.831	0.143	-1.08	.280
Constant	.789		0.619	1.28	.202
N= 2341	Pseudo R2 = .0998		Prob > chi2 = 0.000		

I should note that, although not reported here, I also ran a regression dropping the dummy variables representing the committees but still included those for each individual chair. There were at least three dummy chair variables with standard errors above 1.000 but fewer than 2.000, and while this is an improvement over the original model, it

eliminates the control for the committee error terms and is still producing some error terms that are higher than what I would feel comfortable with. Thus the decision was made to include the dummy committee variables over the dummy chair variables.

However, multicollinearity tests were run on the variables included in this second regression and there is still a problem between *policy*, *prestige* and the dummy variables representing the committees. *Policy* and *prestige* will be dropped since the inclusion of the committee dummy variables is needed to protect against other issues related to pooled time-series analyses. Table 13 shows the corrected model minus the *policy* and *prestige* variables.

Table 13: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Committee Variables Only (Second Corrected Model)

	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P>z
Partisanship	-.002	.998	0.015	-0.11	.911
Ratio R:D	-.241	.786	0.298	-0.81	.418
Tenure	-.025	.976	0.020	-1.25	.210
DW Chair	-.145	.865	0.348	-0.42	.677
Rep on Committee	**-.927**	**.396**	**0.417**	**-2.22**	**.026**
Agriculture	**.712**	**2.037**	**0.332**	**2.14**	**.032**
Armed Services	**-2.145**	**.117**	**0.455**	**-4.72**	**.000**
Appropriations	**2.264**	**9.617**	**0.367**	**6.17**	**.000**
Finance	**.819**	**2.268**	**0.331**	**2.48**	**.013**
Sm Business	**-.734**	**.480**	**0.344**	**-2.14**	**.033**
Ways Means	**.831**	**2.296**	**0.300**	**2.77**	**.006**
Session-2nd yr	-.121	.886	0.124	-0.98	.326
Sixth	**-.460**	**.631**	**0.157**	**-2.92**	**.003**
Seventh	-.124	.883	0.224	-0.55	.580
Eighth	-.149	.862	0.171	-0.87	.385
Constant	-.289		0.538	-0.54	.591
N= 2341	Pseudo R2 = .0957		Prob > chi2 = 0.000		

As indicated in Table 13, none of the measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism or chair influence are statistically significant. An interest group that has a district representative seated on a committee is less likely to be asked to testify before the committee. Although I hypothesized the opposite, it is possible that representatives seated on a committee are already familiar with the positions of interest groups located within their districts, and therefore reach out to other groups to testify before them. This variable may also be statistically significant, because the groups that do get asked to testify are those that are headquartered in Washington D.C. Having a district representative seated on a committee presupposes the group is *not* headquartered in the capital.

Additionally several of the dummy variables representing the committees are statistically significant. Note that those committees which were not statistically significant (Banking, Commerce, Education, Energy, Government Reform, Judiciary, Resources, Science and Transportation & Infrastructure) are not reported. Table 13 shows that interest groups are more likely to be asked to testify when lobbying the Appropriations, Finance and Ways and Means committees. Two of which are considered prestige committees. Groups will find it more difficult to testify in front of the Armed Services and Small Business committees. Overall the 106th Congress was the most difficult for interest groups to gain access.

Logistic Regression with only Interest Group Variables

The next regression in this series of analyses is to consider the model with only those independent variables measuring attributes of the interest group. This allows for a comparison with the preceding regression. Table 14 reveals the result of this second logistic regression.

Positively related to the likelihood of being asked to testify is the number of in-house lobbyists a group has, how many members belong to the group, and how many times it is actively and passively mentioned in the media. There is a negative relationship between an interest group's level of lobbying activity and its likelihood of testifying. Trade associations and colleges and universities have an advantage over other types of interest groups when it comes to gaining access to hearings.

Table 14: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Interest Group Variables Only

	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P>z
Hired-Guns	-.003	0.997	0.006	-0.50	.619
Own Lobbyists	**.060**	**1.062**	**0.012**	**5.26**	**.000**
Members (log)	**.080**	**1.083**	**0.035**	**2.31**	**.021**
Budget (log)	-.051	0.950	0.037	-1.38	.168
Lobbying Activity	**-.087**	**0.917**	**0.013**	**-6.75**	**.000**
Active Media	**.003**	**1.003**	**0.013**	**0.26**	**.793**
Passive Media	**.004**	**1.004**	**0.001**	**3.63**	**.000**
Age (log)	-.006	0.994	0.091	-0.07	.945
House PAC (log)	-.010	0.990	0.014	-0.69	.487
Comm. PAC (log)	.002	1.003	0.021	0.13	.895
Chair PAC (log)	.019	1.019	0.016	1.16	.245
Business Money	-.014	0.987	0.020	-0.67	.503
Business	-.270	0.764	0.315	-0.86	.392
Trade Association	**.714**	**2.042**	**0.338**	**2.11**	**.035**
Membership	.606	1.833	0.353	1.72	.086
College/Univ	**2.167**	**8.730**	**0.353**	**6.14**	**.000**
Session 2nd year	-.166	0.847	0.175	-0.95	.341
Sixth	-.331	0.718	0.225	-1.47	.142
Seventh	.114	1.120	0.292	0.39	.697
Eighth	-.339	0.712	0.219	-1.55	.122
Constant	-.584		0.805	-0.73	.468
N= 1505	Pseudo R2 = .1658			Prob > chi2 = 0.000	

Notice that the number of observations in this first regression is only 1505. This is low compared to the number of observations included in the access model for most variables. Including the budget variable in this first regression lowers the number of observations as there is missing budget data for a number of groups. Since the initial regression indicates no statistical relationship between testifying and budget, this analysis is regressed again dropping the budget variable.

Table 15: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping Budget)

	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P>z
Hired-Guns	.003	1.003	0.005	0.56	.575
Own Lobbyists	**.054**	**1.056**	**0.010**	**5.70**	**.000**
Members (log)	**.069**	**1.071**	**0.025**	**2.99**	**.003**
Lobbying Activity	**-.070**	**0.932**	**0.009**	**-6.92**	**.000**
Active Media	.024	1.024	0.016	1.58	.114
Passive Media	**.003**	**1.003**	**0.001**	**2.85**	**.004**
Age (log)	.016	1.016	0.069	0.23	.818
House PAC (log)	-.007	0.993	0.010	-0.63	.528
Comm. PAC (log)	.013	1.013	0.015	0.88	.379
Chair PAC (log)	**.031**	**1.031**	**0.013**	**2.37**	**.018**
Business Money	**-.034**	**0.967**	**0.015**	**-2.12**	**.034**
Business	**-.462**	**0.630**	**0.141**	**-2.07**	**.039**
Trade Association	**.766**	**2.152**	**0.488**	**3.38**	**.001**
Membership	.479	1.615	0.411	1.88	.060
College/Univ	**1.963**	**7.120**	**1.953**	**7.15**	**.000**
Session 2nd year	-.196	0.822	0.114	-1.42	.157
Sixth	**-.348**	**0.706**	**0.125**	**-1.97**	**.049**
Seventh	-.219	0.803	0.184	-0.95	.340
Eighth	**-.382**	**0.682**	**0.119**	**-2.18**	**.029**
Constant	-1.398		0.431	-3.34	.001
N= 2234	Pseudo R2 = .1244		Prob > chi2 = 0.000		

The regression results without the budget variable are found in Table 15. By dropping the interest group budget variable 729 more observations are included in this regression, although the overall fit of this grouping of interest group variables is reduced to a pseudo R2 of 0.1244 (from 0.1658) which can be interpreted as about 12 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. The other results of the regression analysis remain mostly the same with two notable exceptions. Contributions given to the chair of the committee the interest group is lobbying is positively related to the likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify, and the interaction between being a business group and

giving money to Republican members of the committee is negatively related to the likelihood of gaining access. While it is easy to understand the positive relationship between money contributed to chairs and access, the second relationship is odd. However it is premature to speculate about the relationship without seeing the results of the fully specified model with both committee and interest group measures.

Logistic Regression with Interest Group and Committee Variables

The next logistic regression analysis (results in Table 16) examines the two blocks of variables for the committee/chairs and interest groups together. Unlike OLS regression, with logistic regression it is difficult to separate out the effects of each individual variable in a model. Variables included in a logistic regression will have an effect on one another. As this is the case, it is possible that by combining both sets of variables in one analysis will not only improve the overall fit of the model, but also reveal new statistically significant relationships.

Table 16: Probability of an Interest Group Being Invited to Testify with Interest Group Variables and Committee Variables

	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P>z
Partisanship	-.008	.992	0.017	-0.46	.644
Ratio R:D	-.451	.637	0.379	-1.19	.234
Tenure	-.027	.974	0.023	-1.18	.237
DW Chair	-.013	.987	0.397	-0.03	.973
Rep. on Committee	-.860	.423	0.490	-1.76	.079
Hired-Guns	.002	1.002	0.005	0.32	.746
Own Lobbyist	**.062**	**1.064**	**0.010**	**6.09**	**.000**
Members (log)	**.060**	**1.062**	**0.025**	**2.43**	**.015**
Lobbying Activity	**-.076**	**.926**	**0.011**	**-6.97**	**.000**
Active Media	**.083**	**1.086**	**0.023**	**3.52**	**.000**
Passive Media	**.003**	**1.003**	**0.001**	**2.72**	**.006**
Age (log)	-.020	.980	0.072	-0.28	.779
House PAC (log)	-.001	.999	0.011	-0.11	.916
Comm. PAC (log)	.002	1.002	0.016	0.14	.892
Chair PAC (log)	.025	1.026	0.014	1.84	.066
BusinessMoney	-.031	.969	0.017	-1.85	.065
Business	-.284	.753	0.240	-1.19	.236
Trade Association	**.858**	**2.357**	**0.246**	**3.49**	**.000**
Membership	**.567**	**1.763**	**0.276**	**2.05**	**.040**
College/Univ	**2.472**	**11.842**	**0.307**	**8.04**	**.000**
Agriculture	**.859**	**2.360**	**0.376**	**2.28**	**.022**
Armed Services	**-2.243**	**.106**	**0.484**	**-4.63**	**.000**
Appropriations	**2.541**	**12.691**	**0.424**	**5.99**	**.000**
Science	**.908**	**2.479**	**0.373**	**2.43**	**.015**
Ways Means	**1.055**	**2.871**	**0.346**	**3.05**	**.002**
Session-2nd year	-.261	.770	0.151	-1.73	.083
Sixth	-.283	.753	0.196	-1.45	.148
Seventh	-.252	.778	0.265	-0.95	.343
Eighth	-.315	.730	0.207	-1.52	.128
Constant	-.715		0.775	-0.92	.356
N= 2157	Pseudo R2 = .2199		Prob > chi2 = 0.000		

The overall fit of this regression is .2199 which can be interpreted as about 22% of the variance within the dependent variable is being explained by the interest group and committee/chair variables. Ideological extremism, chair influence, and partisan affinity

do not factor into the decision of whether to allow a group to testify. Interest group resources and interest group legitimacy do. Also, one measure of political influence is nearing statistical significance.

Logistic regression interprets the odds ratios of testifying for each independent variable. However, these numbers are still difficult to interpret since the probabilities of testifying are not linear and different values of the independent variable yield different probabilities. For the discussion of the results, CLARIFY software will be used to predict estimated values of the dependent variable for different values of the independent variables (Tomsz, Wittenberg and King, 2003).

The first statistically significant measure of interest group resources is the number of lobbyists on staff (*own lobbyists*). The relationship between this variable and the likelihood of testifying is depicted in Graph 1. Imputing the mean number of lobbyists on staff for the access sample, the predicted probability of testifying is 0.493 for business groups, 0.677 for trade associations, 0.645 for membership groups and 0.901 for colleges and universities. The greatest number of lobbyists on staff for any group considered in this sample is 42. At this number, the predicted probability of testifying for businesses is 0.849, 0.932 for trade associations, 0.921 for membership groups and 0.985 for colleges and universities. As shown in Graph 5.1 the advantages in testifying that accrue to hiring more staff lobbyists diminishes approaching the maximum value and the advantages among the various types of interest groups lessens. In this sample, the Chamber of Commerce has 42 staff lobbyists, the American Petroleum Institute has 34, Edison

Electric Institute has 30 and the National Association of Manufacturers has 29. These groups do not represent the norm among interest groups.



Another interest group resource that is statistically significant and positively related to interest group access is the level of membership within the group. While The level of membership has a large range for groups included in this sample. As you can see in Graph 2, once you reach a certain level of membership (here around the median level of membership which is 23,483), the benefits to adding more membership in terms of gaining access, diminish greatly. For example, there is no real difference in

terms of predicted probabilities of testifying between trade associations that have 100,00 members (0.820) and 1,000,000 members (0.827). What appears to make a difference, is that an interest group can reach, and potentially influence the voting, of some number of people, it does not make much of a difference whether the number is very large or not, so long as there is some constituency (membership) associated with the interest group.



The level of lobbying activity is the last statistically significant interest group resource variable. Depicted in Graph 3, you can see this is a negative relationship. In this sampling of interest groups, the mean number of issues lobbied by a group is just under 10. At this value, the predicted probability of a business group testifying is 0.386.

The predicted probability of testifying at the mean value for trade associations is 0.635, for membership groups is 0.569 and for colleges and universities is 0.878. The probability of testifying drops fairly steadily, in almost a linear relationship for each additional issue a group lobbies. The maximum number of issues lobbied by groups in this sample is 34.





In addition to the interest group resources, a positive relationship is found between interest group legitimacy and testifying. Both *active media* and *passive media* mentions work in the favor of an interest group. Having no active or passive references in the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* has a probability of 0.561 and 0.579 respectively for business groups. Having 100 active or passive media mentions increases the probability to 0.998 and 0.614 for businesses. Graphs 4 and 5 show the relationships between the interest group legitimacy variables and the probabilities of being asked to testify.



Logistic Regression Comparison by Session of Congress

The last analysis involves running a separate regression for each session of Congress so as to compare the odds ratios. This will allow us to see whether there is anything unusual that is occurring in any particular session. It is yet another measure to be sure that in the fully specified model, there are not any error patterns being exerted by each session that might distort the effects of the model (an effect commonly manifested in time series analyses). Table 17 reveals the comparison across sessions of Congress. In these regressions, the dummy variables representing the chairs were excluded in order to decrease the number of independent variables since the number of observations in each regression is much fewer.

Table 17: Comparison of Odds Coefficients for each Session of Congress

Variable	105th 1998	106th 1999-2000	107th 2001	108th 2003-2004
Partisanship	-.032	.004	-.158	.044
RatioRD	-.522	2.420	.491	-.907
Tenure	.061	.024	.051	-.114*
DWchair	1.013	.467	-.537	-1.050
Reponcommittee	-.094	-1.417	(dropped)	.496
Hired-Guns	-.031	.046**	-.008	-.004
Own-Lobbyist	.120***	.044	.055	.025
Members (log)	-.009	.187**	.186*	-.012
Lobbying Activity	-.125***	-.093***	-.106	-.058**
Active Media	.090	.356**	.056	.085*
Passive Media	.000	.008*	.010*	.005*
Age (log)	.055	.072	-.972***	.184
House PAC (log)	-.042	-.027	-.055	.013
Comm. PAC (log)	-.034	-.000	.056	.052
Chair PAC (log)	.140**	.043	.011	.007
Business Money	.037	-.046	.029	-.061
Business	-.786	.983	-1.744	-.463
Trade Assn	-.496	2.569***	-.031	1.002*
Membership	-.516	2.770***	-2.384*	1.444**
College/Univ	1.265	4.151***	2.135	2.419***
Agriculture	-.597	2.537**	1.209	.336
Armed Services	(dropped)	-2.601*	.005	-2.996***
Appropriations	2.806***	2.809*	3.690	.821
Banking	.675	1.847*	(dropped)	(dropped)
Education	.1116	1.611*	.560	-2.205**
Finance	(dropped)	(dropped)	2.878*	-1.186
Govt. Reform	.118	1.410	1.889	-.958**
Judiciary	-.129	.477	1.273	-2.449**
Science	1.827*	2.088*	2.531	-.904
Sm Business	-.142	.546	2.119	-2.528**
Session-2nd year	-.058	-.683	(dropped)	.059
N	391	812	279	670
Pseudo R2	0.2374	0.3164	0.2822	0.3158

*** significant .001 level ** significant .005 level *significant .050 level

For ease of presentation, in Table 17 only the odds coefficients are reported and the level at which they are significant. Overall, the level of lobbying activity of a group indicates a negative relationship with the group's chances of being asked to testify. On the positive side are the number of lobbyists on staff, the press attention the group receives, and the type of organization attempting to testify. However, the 105th Congress emerges with a unique finding as does the 108th. Contributions made to chairs of the committees before which interest groups sought to testify are positively related with the likelihood of doing so. It is a modest effect but it differentiates the 105th Congress from the other sessions. During the 108th Congress the tenure of the chair comes into play, exhibiting a negative relationship with the likelihood of success. This suggests chairs were able to maintain some autonomy from the party leadership for this particular legislative process even under conditions of party government. Neither effect was strong enough however, to carry a statistical significance in the fully specified model. These analyses do not reveal anything problematic with the full access model.

Eleven hypotheses were developed to be tested by this model. They are laid out in Table 18 along with whether they are supported by the results of the fully specified access model. The results are decidedly mixed. There is support for the theory that interest group resources make a group powerful; power in this situation relating to a group's ability to secure an invitation to testify on an issue which it is lobbying. Hypotheses five and six are supported by the data. Interest group legitimacy is also an important factor. Getting press coverage for this issue being lobbied or just for the group

itself has a positive impact on gaining access. And while the seventh hypothesis is supported by the data, it is revealing a relationship opposite of what was expected.

Table 18: Were the Access Hypotheses Supported?

H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.	No
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by the interaction of being a business and contributions given to House Republicans seated on the committee being lobbied, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.	No
H3: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or subcommittee chair, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.	No
H4: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.	No
H5: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group receives an invitation to testify.	Yes – lobbyists on staff
H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership and budget of the group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest receives an invitation to testify.	Yes – membership
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the amount of lobbying activity of a group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.	No – it's a negative relationship
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of active and passive media mentions of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.	Yes
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of a group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood or receiving an invitation to testify.	No
H10: Political influence, as measured by the amount of PAC contributions an interest group gives to all members of Congress, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.	No

H11: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions to committee members, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.	No
H12: Political influence, as measured by PAC contributions made to the committee and subcommittee chair, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.	No
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by policy committees, will be positively related to an interest group's likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify.	Dropped due to correlation

Discussion

The interest group impact theory on access is largely not supported by partisan affinity, ideological extremism or chair influence. None of the attributes relating to the committee or subcommittee are exerting an influence other than the dummy variables representing the committees themselves.

Partisan affinity as measured by the partisanship variable is not statistically significant. This variable is a unique measure created by looking at how many majority sponsored bills receive action in committees and subcommittees over minority sponsored bills. Confident this measure is a valid measure of partisanship I believe it is not significant because partisanship is not a central consideration when it comes to compiling witness lists. The other measure of partisan affinity, the interaction between being a business group and making contributions to GOP committee members is also not significant.

Neither is interest group access impacted by ideological extremism. The ideology of the committee and subcommittee chairs is not statistically significant. This process is driven by considerations other than a chair's individual ideological preferences.

Tenure measures chair influence, along with a series of dummy variables representing all of the committees. *Tenure* is another variable that is not a statistically significant. Originally I had planned to also include dummy variables representing the committee and subcommittee chairs. But due to problems of multicollinearity (mostly with the committee dummy variables) they were withdrawn from the analysis. Two other variables that were eliminated were the *prestig*e and *policy* variables which were used to measure the type of committee before which the interest group sought access.

The effects of the *prestige* and *policy* variables were being picked up in part by the dummy variables representing the parent committees. Of those, there is a statistically significant relationship for the Agriculture, Appropriations, Science and Ways and Means committees. Two of those, Appropriations and Ways and Means are prestige committees. Prestige committees deal with money issues and so tend to operate differently than other committees. They would not have been the committees I would have thought to have a positive relationship with the likelihood of testifying. However, looking into the issues groups were lobbying one thing immediately becomes apparent. Ways and Means had part jurisdiction over the heavily debated Medicare prescription drug reform. This issue was identified by Congressional Quarterly as being one of the "key votes" in the 106th, 107th and 108th Congresses. Many hearings were held on the matter enabling significantly more opportunities for interest groups to be invited to

testify. Further, Ways and Means also had jurisdiction over the estate tax, another "key vote" in the 106th Congress.

The Agriculture and Science committees are more easily understood in terms of having a positive relationship with the likelihood of testifying. Theoretically, regulatory policy making includes a wide range of interests. In contrast to distributive policy subgovernments, regulatory policy is made in much more open and fluid issue networks. The data here confirm the theory in that interest groups have a greater likelihood of receiving invitation to testify before committees considering regulatory policy.

The only committee to exert a statistically significant negative relationship with the likelihood of testifying is the Armed Services committee. There is a wide range of interests lobbying this committee for any number of defense authorizations, which typically lead to contracting of private companies. These contracts are highly desirable and attract a lot of lobbying activity when only a select few ever get to testify in hearing.

Supporting the interest group impact theory on access, interest group resources, interest group visibility and political influence do matter. Interest group resources as measured by an organization's own lobbyists positively affects the likelihood of receiving an invitation to testify but external representation does not. There are distinct differences between contract lobbyists and in-house lobbyists. Although for the most part, contract lobbyists, through their experience in government and lobbying may develop expertise in a particular policy area, they are more valuable for the relationships they have in Congress and for their knowledge about how things work. They are not like in-house lobbyists who are hired for their policy expertise or their dedication to the

interest group's goals and mission. Additionally, hired guns, since they are contracted by a number of groups at one time, can never give their full attention to lobbying the issue at hand. They are not as effective as the full time, on-staff lobbyists who dedicate 100% of their time to the organization's issue agenda. All of these differences combined may explain why in-house lobbyists are statistically significant in this model and hired guns are not.

It is also the case that resource-rich organizations are able to maintain full time lobbying staffs, and frequently it is smaller interests who rely on short term contracting for their lobbying needs. For example, in this research sample Paradise Canyon Resort, Folia Inc, Cash America, Intl, and the Security Industry Association all had hired two hired guns while maintaining no in-house lobbying staff. At the same time the American Medical Association, Associated Builders and Contractors, and Friends of the Earth all had more than ten in-house lobbyists and contracted not a single hired gun. This in part reflects the elite critique that interest groups with ample resources have an advantage over smaller or unorganized interests. Reality is best described as a combination of both explanations.

Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size of a group, are also positively related to an interest group's success in securing an invitation to testify. The more members a group has (or employees in the cases of businesses and governmental entities) the stronger its chances of securing access to a congressional hearing. While members are important to an organization for financial reasons, they also help leverage support for a group. Interest groups always trumpet the number of individuals that

belong to the group as a way of signaling to a legislator, how many individuals the group can communicate with and mobilize when elections roll around. Members of the House of Representatives are always facing the prospect of the next election and are wary of any vote they may or may not make that will trigger a group to mobilize its membership against him or her. Membership numbers always represent votes in an upcoming election and so they are used to leverage access or influence. That membership is statistically significant in this model reflects that reality.

Not all political resources positively impact the likelihood of testifying. The level of lobbying activity of a group, contrary to what is hypothesized, has a negative effect. A group's chances of participating in a hearing on which it is lobbying decreases with the number of other issues it is lobbying at the same time. It is likely groups that are focused on a small number of issues and that concentrate their resources on those issues are more effective than those that seek to influence every type of policy. Furthermore, focused groups likely have a policy niche in which they are considered the experts. For example the Education Policy Institute, an organization that engages in policy research aimed at advocating for parental school choice is more likely to be asked to testify on a school voucher program, since this is its primary focus, than the AFL-CIO which lobbies on hundreds of issues, including school vouchers. This is in line with the intuition regarding in-house lobbyists versus contract lobbyists. It was suggested that in-house lobbyists are more effective than hired guns when it comes to providing information to law makers since they are focused only on the policy issues pursued by their group. Hired guns may know people in government, but they often lobby multiple issues for multiple clients

simultaneously, taking away from their ability to become a policy expert. It follows that the more issues a group lobbies, the less able they are to become the "go-to" expert on any one issue, decreasing its likelihood of being asked to testify.

Political influence, in the form of PAC contributions to House members does not carry a statistical significance but nearing statistical influence is contributions made to the committee or subcommittee chair. Interest groups that make contributions to the committee or subcommittee chair in the two-year election cycle preceding the hearing were slightly more likely to receive an invitation to testify. If indeed organizations use PAC contributions as a means of buying access, it makes sense that they would seek access to the committees and subcommittees whose jurisdiction coincides with their own interests. In the case of trying to secure invitations to participate in committee and subcommittee hearings, this strategy works.

As revealed through passive and active media mentions, political visibility is also positively related to interest group access. Being mentioned in the *New York Times* or *Washington Post* for the issue being lobbied in the two year period prior to the congressional hearing increases the probability of being asked to testify on that issue. Even if the story in which the group is mentioned is not about the issue at hand, the percentage odds of receiving an invitation to testify still increases. This is a very subtle advantage, but still important. Being mentioned in the media is a reflection of the interest group's legitimacy. Even if receiving the media spot light does not reflect a group's reputation that they are known as being active in a particular issue area helps them gain an invitation to testify. A committee or subcommittee chair conceivably wants to include

in hearings the most interested and active organizations on the issues. Interestingly, even if the interest group is mentioned on an unrelated issue its chances of being asked to testify increase. This seems reasonable as most chairs would want recognizable participants at the hearing rather than groups that have no pertinent knowledge or group that will not help raise the profile of the issue.

Interest group resources that are not statistically significant include the size of organizational budget. Since budget is not exerting a statistically significant influence, it was dropped in order to increase the number of observations in the model. There are many observations in the dataset for which there is missing budget data. Dropping this variable increased the number of observations included in the regression by 729. The budget variable may not be exerting a statistical influence because there might be better ways to measure this variable. The budget specification had to be expanded to include groups that do not have a budget. For instance, net income was used instead of the organizational budget. This likely stretched the concept too far and thus no relationships were detected. Future attempts to include budget variables should be better specified.

Political visibility specified as the age of an organization also fails to impact interest group access. Unlike what was expected, being a more established, older group does not gain an advantage when it comes to being asked to testify. Some groups like Anheuser-Busch and the American Library Association have been active in government affairs since the 19th century. Other groups like RetireSafe and the Electronic Industries Alliance are only a couple of years old. But when it comes to gaining access to House hearings, organizational age does not matter.

It is surprising PAC contributions, an important measure of political influence are not statistically significant in the full model. The more pointed measure of contributions made to the committee or subcommittee chair are significant and as this analysis suggests, the more important type of contribution to make if a group is working to gain access. Also included in the analysis is a measure for contributions made to members of the committee or subcommittee being lobbied. This variable is not statistically significant likely because it is solely the chair's decision whom to invite to testify.

The other series of dummy variables included in the statistical model measure the type of interest group seeking access. Trade associations, membership groups and especially colleges and universities have an advantage over other groups. They have an advantage over businesses which might be unexpected considering the purported close relationship between businesses and the Republican Party. The explanation for why these groups have an advantage over others is their expertise. Colleges and universities are centers of research; much of which can become valuable information for policy makers when deliberating legislation. While trade associations typically do not engage in research they are storehouses of knowledge about the industries they represent. Because they pull together many companies in one field, they can compile industry wide information that proves useful not only to their members, but also to legislators. Lastly are membership groups. There are a wide range of membership groups. Some like the Center for Science in the Public Interest actively research policy issues and have research scientists on staff. Others like Concerned Women for America and the American Jewish Committee do not. But even when a membership group does not maintain a research

staff, it does tend to develop policy niches of which it maintains expertise. If the purported function of interest groups is to provide information, as the interest group impact theory being developed here does, then it comes as no surprise that these types of groups have an advantage over others when it comes to accessing committee and subcommittee hearings as witnesses.

The interest group access model develops a picture in which interest group resources, interest group legitimacy, and political influence affect the likelihood of testifying. The interest group resources and interest group legitimacy signaling to the chair which interest groups would bring the most pertinent information to the table. Good purveyors of information are sought out, perhaps again pointing to the interest group access theory.

Conclusion

There is considerable interest in the ability of interest groups to gain access in government. Although we know that access is given and groups can be influential, the logistics are less clear. It's the details that matter. Pluralists want to ensure all organizations have equal access. The ideal does not hold if any one group or category of groups has an unfair advantage over others. We also want to be sure that the politics are clean: that money is not being used to purchase special consideration. Even if there is certainty about the integrity of the system, scholars are interested in the particulars of the functions.

Limitations withstanding, there is some support found for the interest group impact theory developed here. Interest group resources and interest group legitimacy matter in a way that seems to indicate chairs are distributing invitations based on the potential information that can be gained in return. Interest groups are touting their expertise and are getting selected for it. That there are some dummy variables for the committees that are coming into play also is evidence that there are different ways in which different committees approach this process and that the chairs have some autonomy to make this decision independent of any party effects. This supports the interest group impact theory nicely.

The next chapter addresses the influence dimension of the theory. While theoretically both the access and influence models would contain similar variables, there is now a heightened expectation about how partisan affinity and ideological extremism will manifest in the influence model. There is power at stake when allowing interest group testimony to impact legislation and so the considerations should shift to reflect this.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUP TESTIMONY ON LEGISLATIVE MARKUPS

Two processes are at work when it comes to interest group testimony in House committees and subcommittees. The first, which was discussed and tested in the previous chapter, is deciding which groups will be asked to testify. Theoretically the same variables used in the access model should also be used in the influence model. The access model provides evidence that access to testifying in committee and subcommittee is primarily a process driven by interest group resources, interest group legitimacy, and partially political influence. Unexpectedly, partisan affinity, ideological extremism and chair influence did not affect the decisions made. One of the functions of interest groups is to provide information. The access model confirms this, as chairs seek out groups they believe have something to say and that are legitimate sources of information on the policy under consideration.

Since legislators are interested in making good public policy many of the same considerations will drive the decision making behind whether or not the interest group's recommendation offered in testimony is taken. Particularly since there is more at stake in this decision as it affects legislation. However, there is also the possibility that early anecdotal evidence about this process is true; interest groups are not invited to influence the policymaking process but rather serve as "window dressing" support for the chair and

the committee or subcommittee's pre-formulated position on the legislation. The only way to clarify what this process entails is to test the interest group impact theory on this dimension of influence. That is the focus of this chapter.

The Influence Model

Similar to the access model, this model includes variables designed to measure partisan affinity, ideological extremism, chair influence, interest group resources, interest group visibility and political influence. A unique data set was developed that includes 4257 separate observations – an observation consists of an interest group recommendation made in hearing. The dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether or not the recommendation was incorporated in the subsequent bill markup. As explained in the research methods chapter, for each change (to the legislation) recommended in the testimony, a zero was assigned if the change was not made and a one designated the changes that were incorporated in the bill markups. Of the 4257 observations in this model (4257 recommended changes), 253 or 5.9% of them were included in the bill markups.

Descriptive Statistics

Before discussing the hypotheses developed for the influence model it is helpful to look at some of the descriptive aspects of these data since they reveal important information. A common assertion is that businesses are over represented in the interest group universe leading to unfair advantages. Looking at the composition of the interest

group universe in this sample is telling. Table 19 highlights the different types of groups. The difference between this sample of groups and that used in the access model is that this pool of interest groups is made up of those testifying. Table 19 does not reflect the interest group population as a whole, but rather the population of interest groups that testified in the 103rd, 106th and 108th Congresses before the committees on Agriculture, Education, Energy & Commerce, Financial Services, Resources and Transportation and all of their subcommittees. Another difference between the sample in Chapter 5 and this chapter is that federal government agencies are not required to register as lobbyists with Congress and so they are excluded from the first sample; they are, however, represented here.

Table 19: Types of Interest Groups Comprising the Influence Data Set

Type	Frequency	Percentage
Trade Association	834	30.7
Business	560	20.6
Membership	415	15.3
Fed. Government	325	12.0
State & Local Government	262	9.6
Coalition	114	4.2
College/University	82	3.0
Unions	61	2.2
Individuals (no affiliation)	29	1.1
Think Tanks	23	0.9
Church	7	0.3
Foreign Government	4	0.2
Total	2716	100.1

Looking at Table 19, trade associations, businesses and membership groups are represented at 30.7%, 20.6% and 15.3% of the sample population respectively. Descriptively, businesses do not appear to have a disproportionate level of representation when it comes to presenting testimony considering they constitute 46% of the overall interest group population sampled in this research. Trade associations are better represented in hearings with 30.7% since they make up only 24.7% of the interest group

population sample. Membership groups are similarly better off in this venue with 15.3% in contrast to their representation of 11.2% of the population as a whole. Somewhat surprising is the relatively low percentage of federal government representation here at 12.0%. It seems as if in every hearing, the federal agency responsible for policy implementation is included, but the numbers say otherwise. This stands in sharp contrast to the iron triangle models of policymaking that posit a cozy and exclusive relationship between the committee or subcommittee, the agency responsible for implementation, and select interest groups. While the previous model indicated more success in receiving invitations to testify, colleges and universities still present only 3% of the total sampled recommendations.

Table 20 describes the sample of groups that testified in person which requires an invitation; this is an exclusive process. If an interested party is not asked to testify but would still like to make policy recommendations at the hearing stage, they may do so by submitting written testimony; this is fully inclusive - anyone who wants to submit written testimony may. Table 20 indicates the distribution of oral and written recommendations submitted to the committee and subcommittee. By submitting written testimony in the sample, trade associations and membership groups are able to increase the recommendations they make to the committees and subcommittees while businesses and the federal government for the most part forego the opportunity to do so. The data in Table 20 tells one of three stories. The first is that membership groups, trade associations and individuals and any type of group that increases its representation by submitting written testimony, are not receiving enough formal invitations to testify to satisfy their

needs. When these types of groups want to be included and are not, they go ahead and attempt to put their position on record through written testimony. Following this line of thought, those types of groups who do not pursue written submissions are fully having their needs met; when they have something to say, they get included in the hearing. This scenario is plausible as submitting written testimony is a fairly low cost venture that does not require extraordinary resources.

Table 20: Types of Groups Testifying Orally as Compared to those Submitting Written Testimony

Type	% of Groups Testifying Orally	% of Groups Submitting Written Testimony
Fed. Government	94.8	5.2
Business	89.3	10.7
College / University	89.0	11.0
Think Tanks	82.6	17.4
State & Local Government	80.9	19.1
Trade Association	75.1	24.9
Coalition	74.6	25.4
Membership	69.9	30.1
Unions	65.6	34.4
Individuals (no affiliation)	62.1	37.9
Foreign Government	50.0	50.0
Church	28.6	71.4

A second possibility is that the types of groups who choose not to submit written testimony when they are not invited to testify know that submitting testimony will have no effect on the outcome of the legislation and as such do consider it a costly activity and

so do not participate. Or they feel they can lobby more effectively in other ways such as meeting members of Congress in person.

An alternate explanation is that those interest groups that are accountable to a membership, constituency, or board of directors find they have to act on legislation to appear they are "working" on an issue. For example, the staff lobbyists for the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) may find themselves having to respond by written testimony to hearings held on consumer safety when they are not formally included as witnesses. They may feel compelled even if this is not a priority issue for the NFIB because they need to show their member businesses they are active on consumer safety care issues. Absent that activity, they may be seen as negligent in their jobs or not as effective as other lobbyists. Submitting written testimony is then a symbolic act. Other types of interest groups such as businesses, membership groups and trade unions likely also face such pressures, needing to demonstrate legislative activity to the many small business that pay yearly membership fees to the group. It is likely no one scenario describes the activities of all interest groups but rather each of the three scenarios is relevant in explaining interest group activity on written testimony.

Money is always a central consideration in American politics; therefore it is helpful to look at which types of interest groups are making PAC contributions. Table 21 shows this. Unions, as might be expected, as a share of their total population, have much more active PACs than trade associations, businesses or membership groups. The other types of groups not included in the table make absolutely no contributions at all: federal government, state & local government, think tanks, colleges/universities, coalitions and

churches. Of all the groups in the influence sample, only 17.8% of them get involved in elections by making PAC contributions. While the large amounts of money *some* of these interest groups spend always gain media attention, as a whole most groups refrain from giving money to candidates.

Table 21: Percentage of Each Type of Interest Group Making PAC Contributions in the Influence Sample

Type of Group	# of Groups	% Making PAC Contributions
Union	58	60.3
Trade Association	848	35.1
Business	576	24.8
Membership	423	5.4
Overall	2834	17.8

The heart of the research here is whether interest groups are able to influence policy through their testimony. In Chapter 4 we learned that of all the testimony recommending some change in the legislation, less than 5% of the recommendations were incorporated in the markup[34]. This is a low percentage as 73% of all testimony requests real changes in the legislation. These are changes to the legislation; this a narrow definition of interest group success used in this research. These are recommendations seeking to make real changes to the legislation either by adding amendments or by deleting clauses. This does not incorporate the broader definition of

[34] The 5% refers to all recommendations made in this analysis and accepted of all the testimony I coded. After I randomly selected a set of recommendations to be included in this analysis, the number of observations drops from 13,177 to 4257. Of those, 253 or 5.9% of them were included in the bill markup.

interest group success which also includes testimony supporting the current form of the legislation, be it a specific clause or the bill as a whole. With the broader definition, interest group success is higher since in many cases it requires no action on the part of the committee or subcommittee members.

In this chapter, the analyses begin with the broader definition of interest group success. The success rate in these terms is 34.6%. Although I begin with the more broadly defined dependent variable, I will later in the chapter use a model with the narrower definition of success as the comparison of the results is informative.

Table 22 reveals what type of groups were successful in getting recommendations into the bill markups, using the narrow definition of success.

Table 22: Groups that Successfully Made Recommendations by Type

Type	Number of Successful Changes	Success Rate
Think Tank	4	11.1%
State & Local Government	25	8.1%
College / University	7	7.5%
Federal Government	34	7.3%
Coalition	11	7.2%
Membership	32	6.2%
Trade Association	55	5.6%
Business	36	4.7%
Churches	0	0.0%
Foreign Government	0	0.0%
Unions	0	0.0%

As a percentage of attempts to change policy through testimony, think tanks are most successful while trade associations and businesses are significantly less so. Think tanks are a unique type of interest group in that they focus all of their energy and resources on researching policy and, based on that research, make policy recommendations. It is not unusual for think tanks to be a source of policy alternatives that are debated in Congress. Colleges and universities also are near the top of the charts and this again relates to the credibility of the research being conducted in various policy areas, only in this case it is being conducted by academics.

Federal government ranks fourth in terms of success rate. Looking more closely at which agencies within federal government are successful, it is interesting as one agency is disproportionately more successful than others: the Army Corps of Engineers. Consulting Appendix B which lists the interest groups successful in getting their changes incorporated in the bill markup, the Army Corps was successful on 23 recommended changes. This testimony was technical in nature, rather than political and often on regulatory policy. It should come as no surprise the expert testimony from the Army Corps is not only valued, but influential.

Those who contend that business has an unfair advantage over other interests because of the resources at their disposal find limited support in this data. Often times these critics envision business interests to be the large corporate conglomerates; they forget that many businesses are small, independent enterprises. While American Airlines, Bank of America and Citigroup are all represented in the sample, many more businesses are not large corporations. For example, in the sample you will also find A.

Duda & Sons, County State Bank of Miller, South Dakota, JK Creative Printers and Lehn & Fink Products. Even if the picture consisted of businesses whose size gives them an advantage (resource-wise) over other types of groups, increasingly there is more support being found that the reason they have to expend so many resources lobbying is because policy is not favorable to their interests (Kamieniecki 2006). If businesses were truly advantaged they would not have to expend so many resources lobbying, in fact they would not require a business presence at all.

Labor unions similarly are deemed to have an unfair lobbying advantage because of the large amounts of money they contribute in elections. During the 2003-04 election cycle three of the top ten PACs represented labor unions. The Laborers Union contributed $2.7 million, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) spent $2.4 million in contributions and the United Auto Workers gave $2.1 million. Similar patterns of giving are found each election year. With such large amounts of money being spent, conventional wisdom suggests they must be receiving influence in exchange. Yet the data do not support this claim. Labor unions were worse off than businesses when it comes to being able to use congressional testimony to force change; they were not able to get a single recommended change incorporated into bill markups.

The popular view that those interest groups with more resources will be more successful in their lobbying efforts than other groups is one of many hypotheses that will be tested in the influence model. Certainly this research is only looking at a narrow range of influence - within House congressional committees via hearing testimony. However,

results from this research contribute to our understanding of interest group influence more broadly. The next section lays out the hypotheses.

Hypotheses for the Influence Model

The congressional literature suggests the source of influence in committees emanates from congressional leadership, from parties or from individual preferences. Variables designed to incorporate these elements are included in this analysis and are classified as partisan affinity, ideological extremism or chair influence. Ideally this research would test the competing theories of committee power, but there are several barriers preventing this.

Table 23: Congressional Quarterly's Party Unity Scores for Each Party within the House of Representatives for the 103rd, 106th and 108th Sessions

	Year	Republicans	Democrats
103rd	1993	84	85
	1994	83	83
106th	1999	86	83
	2000	88	82
108th	2003	91	87
	2004	88	86

First, as was the case in the access model, all the House sessions under observation are aptly described as conditional party government. The Republican takeover of the House in 1994 did not prompt strong party loyalties and division between

parties. That environment existed even when the Democrats had control. Similarly, the party cartel model can describe all periods in this sample. The Republican leadership, although very sharp and resourceful, did not create the art of using House procedure to wrest advantages for their party. They learned how to do that from their masterful predecessors. Referring to the Democratic Speaker Jim Wright (1987-1989), congressional observers Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein write: "On major bills, Democrats took to using special rules that restricted debate, disallowed most amendments, and provided blanket waivers against points of order. On key legislation, especially if there was any Republican alternative brewing, Wright has a hand in crafting the rules strategy" (Mann & Ornstein, 2006). All sessions of the House used in this study meet the standards of conditional party government and the party cartel model.[35] Table 6.5 shows the party unity scores for these sessions. Without significant variance among the sessions in party unity, the conditional government model cannot be tested. Although the conditional party government cannot be directly tested, party affinity measures are included. The party affinity measures speak more directly to normative concerns being addressed in this research.

The second obstacle to testing the committee power theories is the inability to code the interest groups according to their party preferences. While we know that labor unions align nicely with the Democratic Party and oil interests with the Republican Party, there is no classification or scale to apply the vast majority of groups that seemingly have no preference. For example, how would you classify the America Outdoors Association,

[35] This was confirmed by David Rohde in a conversation we had at the Midwest Political Science Association's annual meeting in Chicago, Illinois in April, 2008.

the National Community Capital Association, Investor-Owned Utilities of the Northwest or even Citigroup? Citigroup, a major banking corporation, might be categorized by some as a Republican interest. However, looking at their PAC contributions, they have contributed almost equal amounts of money to Democrats and Republicans.

Even though the competing committee power theories cannot be tested against each other they are instructive in indicating what are likely to be the important variables. Measures of partisan affinity, ideological extremism and chair influence are all expected to impact interest group success. While there are no specific measures for partisanship for all groups, I will be testing to see whether business is generally advantaged by Republican control and whether labor unions receive special treatment under Democratic control.

> *H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.*
>
> *H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by labor unions during a Democratic controlled House, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.*

A variable measuring the level of partisanship is included in the analysis because of its theoretical importance. Although interest groups cannot be measured in terms of their partisanship, the committees and subcommittees can. Stronger partisans in Congress are more likely to favor groups aligned with their party only, and not all interest groups more generally. Because of this, a negative relationship between the level of partisanship within a committee or subcommittee and the likelihood of success is expected.

H3: Partisan affinity, as measured by the level of partisanship within a committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.

Even though all sessions of Congress in this study are party dominated, the Interest Group Impact theory posits chairs are still able to maintain some autonomy and influence some decisions. Their influence will be felt both through their ideological preferences and their positions as committee and subcommittee chairs. Ideologically extreme committees and subcommittees are expected to use their hearings to showcase support for their positions. This being the case, they will not only invite "friendly" interests to testify, but should any recommended changes be made, they will not be heeded. The less extreme the committee or subcommittee is in its ideology (the closer their ideology is to the House mean ideology) the more willing they will be to consider witness testimony and allow it to influence their legislative markups.

H4: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of the committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood that an interest group's recommended change will be included in the bill markup.

Just as more tenured House members who served as chairs are predicted to be more exclusive with their witness lists, they are predicted to be more unwilling to allow a group's testimony to influence bill markups. Again this is because older members are expected to be less dependent on interest groups for their informational needs. Newer House members who are still learning about the policy under their committee or subcommittee's jurisdiction will be more open to the suggestions of interest groups as they provide much needed policy input. Although every committee or subcommittee

member has a vote on markups, it is expected that the chair is able to influence the votes of at least his or her own party which would constitute a majority.

> *H5: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change will be included in the bill markup.*

In addition to the measures just discussed, dummy variables indicating the parent committees are included as is a variable indicating whether the policy under consideration is regulatory in nature. The committee dummy variables will serve as both control measures in this pooled time-series analysis as well as variables to test for the independent effects of the committees on interest group influence. The variable measuring the type of policy is included since the classic iron triangle literature relates to distributive policy not regulatory policy. Therefore it would be expected privileged interest groups would likely have influence over distributive policy.

The second set of variables is designed to test for interest group resources, Interest group legitimacy and political influence. All of these factors are theorized to have a positive influence on interest group success.

Interest group resources are measured by the membership size and budget of an interest group, and by the number of internal and external lobbyists an interest group has. Interest groups with more resources are expected to have greater influence and as such, a greater chance at getting their recommendations into the bill markup.

> *H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size and budget of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of having its requested change included in the bill markup.*

H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of contract lobbyists and lobbyists on staff, will be positively related to the likelihood that an interest group's requested change will be included in the bill markup.

According to the Interest Group Impact theory, the function of interest groups in committees is to provide information. The currency of interest groups is the information they possess. But only groups that have reliable, credible, and useful information will develop a good reputation. Only legitimate groups will gain access to lawmakers and have the ability to influence legislation. Interest group legitimacy is measured by how often an organization is mentioned in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* in the two years prior to the hearing. It is also measured by how long the interest group has existed. Both measures of legitimacy are expected to positively impact interest group influence.

H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of media mentions an interest group receives, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.

H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of an interest group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest's requested change is included in the bill markup.

There is enough anecdotal and empirical evidence to suggest political influence in the form of PAC contributions will be positively related to interest group success. Interest groups contribute money to those individuals who hold positions of consequence to groups. For example, it is not uncommon for committee and subcommittee chairs to receive more contributions than other members simply because they hold a position of influence. One of the findings of the access model tested in chapter five is the greater likelihood of committee and subcommittee chairs to grant access to interest groups that

had given them campaign contributions. I expect contributions would also grant them a greater likelihood of influence over bill markups. There is also the possibility of members of Congress voting in favor of interest groups (or their policy recommendations) that *do* regularly make campaign contributions in the hopes of attracting contributions for themselves in future elections.

> *H10: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to House members, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.*
>
> *H11: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to members sitting on the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.*
>
> *H12: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to the chair of the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.*

Just as was hypothesized in the Chapter 5, the politics of making distributive policy is expected to be different from regulatory policy. Theoretically, distributive policy is made in policy subgovernments. Understanding access into the committee or subcommittee hearing comes first, it follows that interest groups included in hearings on distributive policy are more likely to influence the legislation than they would if they were testifying on regulatory policy. This is because there are many more actors involved in regulatory policy consideration and so the likelihood of any one group having influence is diminished.

> *H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by regulatory policy, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's requested change is included in the bill markup.*

The preceding thirteen hypotheses test the Interest Group Impact theory as applied to the influence model. Any support for the hypotheses will in turn support the Interest Group Impact theory which has already been supported by the access model.

Results

Logistic regression is applied to the influence model. A series of logistic regressions was run with each progressive run testing a separate set of variables or adding another set to the model. The benefit of proceeding in such a manner is being able to compare the models with each added set of variables. It also enables a comparison fit of the model with only interest group variables against a model with only the chair and committee and subcommittee variables. The last series of regressions tests the model for each session of Congress under consideration: 103rd (1993-94), 106th (1999-00) and 108th (2003-04).

Logistic Regression with Only Committee Variables

The first regression analysis tests the variables which measure committee conditions, specifically partisan affinity, ideological extremism, and chair influence. The results are shown in Table 24. One measure of partisan affinity, *ratio maj:min*, is significant as are both measures of ideological extremism and chair influence. The ratio of seats held by the majority party as compared to the minority party is negatively related to the predicted probability of interest group impact. Committees or subcommittees where the majority party has a higher proportion of seats as compared to the majority

party are less likely to include interest group's recommended changes in their bill markups. Interest groups will face difficulties when testifying before more ideologically extreme committees and subcommittees. They will also have a lower probability of influence when they testify before committees and subcommittees chaired by more tenured members of the House. The overall fit of this regression is 0.0065, so while several of the variables are carrying a statistical influence there is a lot of variance in whether interest group testimony is included in the bill markup that is still unexplained.

Table 24: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup with Committee Variables Only

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Partisanship	-0.008	0.992	0.010	-0.82	.410
Ratio Maj : Min	**-0.470**	**0.625**	**0.108**	**-4.34**	**.000**
Ideology	**-0.693**	**0.500**	**0.166**	**-4.16**	**.000**
Tenure	**-0.029**	**0.971**	**0.010**	**-2.97**	**.003**
Constant	**0.548**		**0.172**	**3.19**	**.001**

N = 4257 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2 = .0065

Table 25: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std.Error	z	P > |z|
Members (log)	-0.028	0.973	0.033	-0.84	.399
Budget (log)	0.035	1.036	0.033	1.06	.290
Hired Guns	-0.059	0.942	0.031	-1.93	.053
Own Lobbyists	**0.042**	**1.043**	**0.019**	**2.21**	**.027**
Media (log)	**-0.044**	**0.957**	**0.023**	**-1.96**	**.050**
Age (log)	0.154	1.167	0.154	1.00	.317
House PAC (log)	0.018	1.018	0.038	0.46	.643
Chair PAC (log)	0.054	1.055	0.042	1.27	.204
Com PAC (log)	-0.175	0.839	0.168	-1.04	.299
ComMaj PAC (log)	0.092	1.097	0.169	0.55	.585
Constant	-3.468		0.689	-5.03	.000

N=1735 Prob >chi2 = 0.0194 Pseudo R2 = .0234

The next regression analysis tests variables based on characteristics of the interest group, specifically interest group resources, interest group legitimacy and political influence. The results are found in Table 25. Most of the results are not significant. However, one measure of interest group resources and another of interest group visibility are statistically significant. The predicted probability of interest group success is positively related to the number of lobbyists it has on staff. Also the predicted probability of interest group success is negatively related to the number of contract lobbyists it hires. This disparity is due to the difference in these two types of lobbyists. Staff lobbyists work only for the organization that employs them. Typically they are hired for their policy expertise or are able to develop it by working for the interest group

over a number of years. Contract lobbyists however tend to get hired not for their policy expertise but rather for their knowledge of how the policy making process works or for the relationships they have with policy makers. If interest groups are being invited to share their expertise in committee and subcommittee hearings, then it makes sense that law makers are more willing to accept the advice of interest groups who have more staff lobbyists. The number of staff lobbyists serves, in this capacity, as a signal to the legislators about the quality of information being presented. Interest groups that have a tendency to rely on hired lobbyists are perceived as having lower quality policy information.

The other statistically significant variable is *media*. This is a measure of interest group legitimacy. However, contrary to what is expected, there is a negative relationship with the probability of interest group success. The more frequently the media mentions the interest group, the less likely it will succeed in getting its recommendation into the markup. It is plausible that groups who are more frequently being mentioned in the media are attracting that attention because they lobby on a wide range of issues, not just the one in my data set. If this is the case, law makers may be more resistant to incorporate their information than they would be to include the recommendations of an interest group whose sole focus was the policy at hand.

The number of observations in the model in Table 25 is comparatively low with only 1,735 cases. The low number of observations is due to a number of missing data for the *budget* variable. In order to increase the number of observations, *budget* will be

dropped. Eliminating this variable adds 898 observations[36]. This variable is not included in any of the remaining regressions. The regression is rerun without *budget* with results shown in Table 26.

Table 26: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping *budget*)

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Members (log)	-0.031	0.969	0.024	-1.27	.205
Hired Guns	**-0.053**	**0.948**	**0.024**	**-2.16**	**.031**
Own Lobbyists	**0.031**	**1.032**	**0.015**	**2.14**	**.032**
Media (log)	-0.012	0.988	0.015	-0.80	.426
Age (log)	0.154	1.167	0.138	1.30	.193
House PAC (log)	**-0.093**	**0.911**	**0.023**	**-3.67**	**.000**
Chair PAC (log)	-0.016	0.984	0.023	-0.66	.510
Com PAC (log)	0.079	1.082	0.058	1.47	.141
MajCom PAC (log)	0006	1.006	0.050	0.12	.905
Constant	-3.031		0.489	-6.20	.000

N=2633 Prob >chi2 = 0.0005 Pseudo R2 = .0220

In this model, both *hired guns* and *own lobbyists* are carrying a statistical influence in the same direction as the previous regression. *Media* is no longer statistically significant but one measure of political influence: *House contributions.* The relationship between PAC contributions made to House members and the probability of success is negative though, contrary to what was expected. Possibly again, the perception is that the larger groups who are giving vast contributions to all members are not providing as high quality information as groups who are solely focused on providing

[36] The *budget* variable, where I was forced to include business revenues as a proxy for membership group budgets, is perhaps not the most valid measure in any case and so dropping it is not problematic.

information to committee or subcommittee. *Members* is another variable with a number of missing data as is shown in Table 26. Dropping *members* from the model adds another 1682 observations. Table 27 reveals the results of this final limited model with only interest group variables.

Table 27: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping *budget* & *members*)

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Hired Guns	-0.000	1.000	0.005	-0.02	.988
Own Lobbyists	0.009	1.009	0.006	1.42	.156
Media (log)	0.006	1.006	0.007	0.97	.334
Age (log)	**0.184**	**1.203**	**0.053**	**4.16**	**.000**
House PAC (log)	0.006	1.006	0.012	0.56	.577
Chair PAC (log)	**-0.022**	**0.978**	**0.009**	**-2.43**	**.015**
Comm PAC (log)	-0.039	0.962	0.020	-1.87	.061
MajCom PAC (log)	**0.041**	**1.042**	**0.019**	**2.26**	**.024**
Constant	-1.474		0.187	-7.89	.000

N=4315 Prob >chi2 = 0.0000 Pseudo R2 = .0067

This regression reveals statistical significance for one measure of interest group legitimacy and two measures of political influence. *Age* is positively related to the likelihood the interest group's recommendation will be incorporated in the bill markup. The older a group is, the more likely it will see success. Looking at political influence, *House PAC* is no longer statistically significant, but contributions made to the committee or subcommittee chair as well as to the majority party members of the committee or

subcommittee are. But to confuse things, making a contribution to the chair is negatively related to interest group influence whereas contributions made to majority party members seated on the committee or subcommittee is positively related.

These results are contradictory almost. To be sure these results are not being offset by any problems with the model specification the variables have been tested for multicollinearity using the Collin test in STATA. The resultant VIF values for the political influence variables do indicate multicollinearity. To alleviate this problem, the only measures of political influence to be kept in the model are *chair PAC* and *comm PAC.* Table 28 reveals the results of the corrected model.

Table 28: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup with Interest Group Variables Only (dropping *budget* & *members,* corrected)

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Hired Guns	-0.000	1.000	0.005	-0.01	.991
Own Lobbyists	0.010	1.010	0.006	1.64	.101
Media (log)	0.006	1.006	0.006	0.91	.361
Age (log)	**0.185**	**1.204**	**0.044**	**4.18**	**.000**
Chair PAC (log)	**-0.017**	**0.983**	**0.009**	**-1.96**	**.050**
Comm PAC (log)	0.003	1.003	0.007	0.43	.668
Constant	-1.484		0.187	-7.95	.000

N=4315 Prob >chi2 = 0.0000 Pseudo R2 = .0057

The model is better specified but the counterintuitive relationship between *chair PAC* and influence remains. This is not the fully specified model and it remains to be seen whether this relationship will persist and maintain significance. At this stage,

preliminary speculation is reluctance on the part of any chair to be engaging in any type of behavior which might be construed as "vote buying." While it is not necessarily the case that a chair who receives money from an interest group and then yields them influence on a committee markup is engaging in any unethical behavior, the appearance may lead others to think otherwise. If this is the case, the negative relationship between *chair PAC* and the likelihood of getting a recommendation included in the bill markup is logical.

The other significant variable is *age*, which is positively related to interest group success. Older, more established groups are more likely to get their recommendations marked up into the bill. Political visibility comes with age and experience.

Logistic Regression with Committee and Interest Group Variables

The next model combines the interest group variables and committee and chair variables. It also includes dummy variables to measure the parent committee for the committees and subcommittees used in the research sample. For example, the Agriculture Subcommittees on Livestock and Horticulture are both measured by their parent Agriculture Committee. The Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation is measured as a Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.[37] The results of this fully specified model are shown in Table 29. In addition, dummy variables representing the type of interest group and the session of Congress are included to control

[37] This is done since many subcommittees have no instances of accepting an interest group's recommended change and were predicting failure perfectly. When this occurs, STATA drops them. There were also many subcommittees being dropped due to correlation with one another. Using the parent committees for the dummy variables resolved this issue.

for the effects they may exert in a pooled time-series analysis. Lastly, a variable to measure whether the testimony is submitted in writing (rather than in person) is added.

Table 29: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Partisanship	**-0.071**	**0.931**	**0.014**	**-4.96**	**.000**
Ratio Maj : Min	**0.740**	**2.096**	**0.357**	**2.07**	**.038**
Ideology	**-0.774**	**0.461**	**0.236**	**-3.28**	**.001**
Tenure	-0.016	0.984	0.015	-1.11	.269
Regulatory	**0.445**	**1.560**	**0.084**	**5.31**	**.000**
Hired Guns	-0.004	0.996	0.005	-0.73	.463
Own Lobbyists	0.011	1.011	0.007	1.59	.111
Media (log)	0.003	1.003	0.008	0.44	.661
Age (log)	**0.153**	**1.165**	**0.048**	**3.17**	**.002**
Chair PAC (log)	-0.007	0.993	0.009	-0.73	.463
Comm PAC (log)	0.003	1.003	0.008	0.39	.693
Business	0.011	1.011	0.137	0.08	.934
Trade Assn	0.079	1.082	0.112	0.70	.481
Membership	-0.208	0.812	0.131	-1.59	.113
Fed Govt	0.163	1.177	0.130	1.26	.209
Union	**-1.216**	**0.297**	**0.327**	**-3.72**	**.000**
Agriculture	**-1.004**	**0.366**	**0.173**	**-5.80**	**.000**
Banking	**-0.554**	**0.575**	**0.161**	**-3.44**	**.001**
Commerce	**-0.701**	**0.496**	**0.162**	**-4.31**	**.000**
Resources	**-1.579**	**0.206**	**0.209**	**-7.56**	**.000**
Transportation	**-0.793**	**0.452**	**0.168**	**-4.72**	**.000**
106^{th}	0.370	1.447	0.207	1.79	.074
108^{th}	0.307	1.360	0.215	1.43	.152
Submitted	-0.098	0.907	0.091	-1.07	.283
Constant	-1.394		0.758	-1.84	.066

N = 4311 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2 = .0337

This model confirms the importance of partisanship. The more partisan a committee or subcommittee, the less likely an interest group is to get its recommendation included in the bill markup. The mean level of partisanship for all committees and subcommittees in the sample is 3.526. The predicted probability of an interest group having its recommendation taken, with all other variables set at their mean values is 0.184. The predicted probability at the mean partisanship level during for businesses is 0.186 and the odds rise to 0.195 for trade associations. Membership groups face a 0.157 probability of success at mean levels of partisanship and agencies of the federal government a probability of 0.208. Graph 6 shows the predicted probabilities at other values of *Partisanship* using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003).



Graph 6a charts the difference in probabilities for various levels of partisanship while testifying before the various groups of committees.



The other measure of partisan affinity is also revealing a statistically significant, but positive relationship with interest group influence. Unlike with partisanship, the greater the number of majority party members seated on a committee or subcommittee to minority party members, the greater the likelihood an interest group will get its recommendation included in the markup. Graph 7 illustrates the relationship between this ratio of seats and the predicted probability of interest group success. The predicted probability of interest group influence for a business group testifying before a committee or subcommittee with the mean ratio of seats is 0.115. The probability under similar

circumstance for a trade association is 0.195, 0.157 for membership groups, 0.208 for the federal government and only 0.070 for labor unions.



Graph 7a shows the predicted probabilities of success for an interest group testifying in front of various committees. Testifying before the Agriculture Committee or any of its subcommittees with a mean ratio of seats yields a predicted probability of 0.077. The same conditions within the Banking Committee or any of its subcommittees give a probability of 0.115. The predicted probability before Commerce with a mean ratio or majority party to minority party seats is 0.1015, and before Transportation is 0.093.



Ideological extremism also has an impact; it is negatively related to interest group success. The farther the mean ideology of a committee or subcommittee is from the House mean ideology, the more difficult it is for interest group testimony to have an impact. Inputting the mean *ideology* value of 0.341 yields a predicted probability of 0.1843 for interest group success for businesses, holding all other variables at their means. The predicted probabilities for trade associations, membership group, the federal government and labor unions testifying before committees or subcommittees with a mean value of *ideology* is 0.192, 0.155, 0.204 and 0.067 respectively. These probabilities are shown in Graph 8.



Graph 8a depicts the predicted probabilities of interest group impact by the type of committee or subcommittee to which they are testifying. Testifying before the Agriculture Committee or any of its subcommittees that have a mean value ideology yields a predicted probability 0.026. On the other extreme it is easier to be successful if testifying before a Banking committee or subcommittee with a mean value of ideology as that yields a predicted probability of 0.039. But note that difference between the two predicted probabilities is slight, as they are for all the variables.



Chair influence is not supported by the statistical model as *tenure* is not statistically significant. However, all of the dummy variables for the committees (and their subcommittees) are statistically significant and reveal negative relationships with interest group success. The Committee on Natural Resources and its subcommittees were not included in the regression model and serve as the base.

Interest group legitimacy also finds support in this model, although interest group resources and political influence do not. Looking at interest group legitimacy, one variable, *age,* is positively related to the probability of interest group success. At the mean value of age, which is 70 years old (interest groups founded in 1938), the probability of success for business groups is 0.332. For trade associations of the mean *age*, the probability is 0.347 and it is 0.291, 0.362 and 0.143 for membership groups,

federal government agencies and labor unions respectively. These probabilities along with those for other values of *age* are depicted in Graph 9.



The predicted probabilities for interest group impact, testifying before the various committees and subcommittees are charted in Graph 9a. It is, once again slightly easier for a group to have its recommendation included in the bill markup if it is testifying before the Banking Committee or any of its subcommittees and slightly more difficult testifying before Agriculture. Note also in terms of the number of years it takes to become a legitimate interest, the data show most of the impact comes within the first 50 years of an organization's existence, beyond that each additional year adds little more.



The dummy variable measuring whether a bill is regulatory in nature also carries a statistical influence. Interest groups are much more likely to see their recommendations included in the bill markup if they are testifying on regulatory policy. This likely is the case because the information they are providing in testimony is more technical in nature. For example, testifying on the Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994, Arthur Wilmarth of George Washington University recommended in testimony the prohibition of any bank from holding more than 10% of the total deposits held by insured depository institutions in the US, or from holding more than 25-30% of the total deposits held by such institutions in any state. He justifies his recommendation in testimony. Similarly, in his testimony on the Comprehensive One-Call Notification Act of 1994, Walter Garner

of the National Utility Contractors Association urges the committee to consider an additional program element whereby the states would establish guidelines requiring facility operators to ensure that new underground construction and installations can be reasonably located at a later date as built. The recommendation was technical. Technical information in the form of a policy recommendation plausibly has a better chance of impacting bill markups.

Before proceeding to the last analyses, I would like to look at the preceding regression analyses, but with the narrower definition of influence. All of the influence models have been examined using all of those recommendations that were supported by the subsequent bill markups, whether they were seeking changes or whether they testified in support of already existing portions of the bill. Recommendations accepted using this definition comprise 34.6% of the observations. Based on our understanding of influence, particularly as it is conceptualized by Cox and McCubbins (1993) in relation to negative agenda control, it is exerted both offensively and defensively. The results restricting influence to explicitly changing some part of the bill are presented in Table 30. Using this narrower definition of impact, only 4.3% of the recommendations are incorporated in the bill markups. The results present some interesting changes.

Table 30: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup (narrower definition of impact)

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Partisanship	**-0.130**	**0.878**	**0.035**	**-3.77**	**.000**
Ratio Maj : Min	**-1.746**	**0.174**	**0.848**	**-2.06**	**.040**
Ideology	**-1.328**	**0.265**	**0.548**	**-2.42**	**.015**
Tenure	**-0.144**	**0.866**	**0.032**	**-4.53**	**.000**
Regulatory	0.188	1.207	0.191	0.99	.324
Hired Guns	**-0.050**	**0.952**	**0.024**	**-2.07**	**.038**
Own Lobbyists	-0.010	0.990	0.018	-0.53	.593
Media (log)	-0.012	0.988	0.016	-0.74	.459
Age (log)	-0.013	0.987	0.107	-0.13	.900
Chair PAC (log)	0.010	1.010	0.025	0.42	.672
Comm PAC (log)	0.001	1.001	0.020	0.04	.968
Business	-0.219	0.803	0.283	-0.78	.438
Trade Assn	**-0.517**	**0.596**	**0.226**	**-2.28**	**.022**
Membership	-0.219	0.803	0.264	-0.83	.406
Fed Govt	-0.368	0.692	0.273	-1.35	.178
Union	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Agriculture	**-2.141**	**0.118**	**0.401**	**-5.33**	**.000**
Banking	**-1.985**	**0.137**	**0.405**	**-4.90**	**.000**
Commerce	**-1.155**	**0.315**	**0.383**	**-3.02**	**.003**
Resources	**-2.185**	**0.060**	**0.660**	**-4.27**	**.000**
Transportation	**-2.160**	**0.115**	**0.407**	**-5.30**	**.000**
106th	**-1.726**	**0.178**	**0.481**	**-3.59**	**.000**
108th	**-2.891**	**0.056**	**0.538**	**-5.38**	**.000**
Submitted	0.093	1.097	0.190	0.49	.626
Constant	4.876		1.750	2.79	.005

N = 4213 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2 = .0891

First, the direction of the relationship between the ratio of majority party members to minority party members seated on a committee or subcommittee and interest group

impact changes. Here the relationship is negative, indicating it is easier for interest groups to set their policy in committees where the margin of seats between the majority party and minority party is slimmer. It could be that for highly politicized bills on highly politicized committees, interest groups that are aligned ideologically with the majority party are more likely to offer testimony seeking to preserve the bill in its original form as it heads into markup, and then in markup their position prevails. While on the other hand, interest groups seeking to change the bill in its original form have a more difficult time gaining votes from the majority party members on a committee or subcommittee; they are more likely to prevail when the committee seats are more evenly distributed.

The other interesting change when defining the dependent variable more narrowly is the appearance of tenure as being statistically relevant. The more senior chairs in the House are less likely to yield influence to interest group recommendations when the group is trying to change the bill. This is what is expected. Over time members in the House gain policy expertise through committee work. Individuals who have more years of service likely have more expertise and therefore are reluctant to change bills they likely had a hand in creating. This variable wouldn't impact the more broadly defined dependent variable because chairs want interest groups to testify in support of their bills.

The political resource of contract lobbyists also impacts the likelihood of success with the narrower dependent variable. There is a negative relationship between the number of contract lobbyists hired, and the group's ability to change the bill. Committee members likely identify the presence of contract lobbyists as partially a political ploy and partially as a signal to the salience of the issue at hand. While most of the work

occurring in committee goes unnoticed, this is not true of political and salient issues. It seems reasonable that committee and subcommittee members would be more reluctant to incorporate an interest group's recommendations under these conditions. Although the change would please the group it would likely not please others and members of Congress are careful with their votes when the issue is politicized.

The only other difference between the two regression models is that interest group legitimacy as measured by age is supported by the first model but not by the second.

Logistic Regression Comparison by Session of Congress

The last analysis examines the influence model for each House session separately. Since all three sessions operate under the conditional party government model this helps to see whether interest group impact operates similarly when the Democrats control the House of Representatives as when the Republicans do. The results of these regressions are found in Table 31.

Table 31: Probability an Interest Group's Recommended Change is Included in the Bill Markup by Session of Congress (w/submitted, y1)

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std. Error	z	P > |z|
Democrats (103rd)					
Partisanship	**-0.081**	**0.922**	**0.023**	**-3.52**	**.000**
Ratio Maj : Min	-0.698	0.497	0.596	-1.17	.241
Ideology	**-0.982**	**0.374**	**0.317**	**-3.10**	**.002**
Tenure	**-0.073**	**0.930**	**0.030**	**-2.44**	**.015**
Regulatory	**0.414**	**1.513**	**0.137**	**3.03**	**.002**
Hired Guns	-0.005	0.995	0.011	-0.47	.641
Own Lobbyists	-0.009	0.992	0.011	-0.79	.431
Media (log)	0.014	1.014	0.013	1.09	.277
Age (log)	0.204	1.226	0.093	2.20	.028
Chair PAC (log)	-0.003	0.997	0.016	-0.16	.874
Comm PAC (log)	-0.005	0.995	0.013	-0.35	.728
Business	-0.036	0.965	0.240	-0.15	.881
Trade Assn	0.197	1.218	0.187	1.05	.292
Membership	0.193	1.213	0.221	0.87	.382
Fed govt	0.138	1.148	0.220	0.63	.531
Union	**-1.895**	**0.150**	**0.562**	**-3.37**	**.001**
Submitted	-0.267	0.766	0.149	-1.79	.074
Constant	0.695		1.423	0.49	.625

N = 1747 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2 = .0493

Republicans (106th)					
Partisanship	-0.059	0.942	0.044	-1.34	.181
Ratio Maj : Min	**6.049**	**423.9**	**1.501**	**4.03**	**.000**
Ideology	-0.514	0.598	0.610	-0.84	.399
Tenure	0.044	1.045	0.035	1.24	.216
Regulatory	-0.336	0.715	0.177	-1.90	.058
Hired Guns	0.004	1.004	0.011	0.35	.728
Own Lobbyists	0.021	1.021	0.016	1.34	.182
Media (log)	-0.007	0.993	0.015	-0.49	.621
Age (log)	0.098	1.103	0.084	1.17	.243
Chair PAC (log)	-0.008	0.992	0.018	-0.43	.669
Comm PAC (log)	0.001	1.001	0.014	0.05	.958
Business	0.044	1.045	0.239	0.18	.854
Trade Assn	-0.178	0.837	0.201	-0.88	.377
Membership	**-0.659**	**0.517**	**0.250**	**-2.64**	**.008**
Fed govt	-0.059	0.942	0.231	-0.26	.797
Union	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Submitted	0.186	0.209	0.174	1.07	.284
Constant	-7.969		1.872	-4.26	.000

N = 1165 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2=0.0290

Republicans (108th)					
Partisanship	0.023	1.024	0.023	1.01	.310
Ratio Maj : Min	0.431	1.539	0.575	0.75	.453
Ideology	0.269	1.309	0.476	0.57	.572
Tenure	-0.039	0.962	0.036	-1.07	.284
Regulatory	0.218	1.243	0.148	1.47	.141
Hired Guns	-0.009	0.991	0.008	-1.20	.232
Own Lobbyists	0.021	1.021	0.011	1.95	.051
Media (log)	0.018	1.018	0.014	1.26	.207
Age (log)	0.081	1.085	0.079	1.02	.305
Chair PAC (log)	-0.009	0.991	0.017	-0.56	.578
Comm PAC (log)	0.007	1.007	0.014	0.51	.608
Business	0.179	1.195	0.242	0.74	.460
Trade Assn	0.312	1.366	0.195	1.60	.109
Membership	-0.351	0.704	0.221	-1.59	.112
Fed govt	0.381	1.464	0.229	1.67	.096
Union	-0.366	0.693	0.493	-0.74	.457
Submitted	-0.019	0.981	0.157	-0.12	.904
Constant	-1.658		0.800	-2.07	.038

N = 1398 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2 = .0264

Some important differences are gleaned when running the regression for each separate session of Congress. Many of the statistically significant effects are coming from the Democratic controlled 103rd House. There are no variables with statistical significance for the 108th session and while the 106th session yields two statistically significant variables, *ideology* and *tenure* are not statistically significant. This means individual characteristics of the chairs impact the likelihood of interest group success under Democratic control, but not under Republican control. The difference can be attributed stronger, more centralized control under Republican leadership which leaves little autonomy (or less so than existed under Democratic control) for the chairs. On the other hand, the distribution of seats on a committee between the majority and minority party is impacting decisions in the 106th Congress, under Republican control. Interest groups see more success in committees with a greater share of the seats being held by Republicans.

To understand why the 103rd Congress is revealing statistical relationships and the others are not, I examined the percentage of successful recommendations made. Table 32 reveals this information. A greater percentage of changes were successful, using the broader definition of the dependent variable, during the 106th and 108th Congresses than in the 103rd Congress, but the advantage is slight. It could be that Republicans, under tight party leadership were careful to select supportive interest groups into committee hearings and they submitted affirming testimony. Looking at the rates of success for the broader definition and comparing them to the success rates for the narrower definition which precludes affirmative testimony, this appears to be the case.

Table 32: Percentage of Recommended Changes Accepted by the 103rd, 106th and 108th Congresses

	# of Proposed Changes	% Accepted (broad- y1)	% Accepted (narrow –y2)
103rd	2563	30.0%	5.9%
106th	1690	37.4%	3.7%
108th	1865	38.3%	2.5%

Lastly, the regressions for each separate session of Congress enable testing of the partisan affinity hypotheses that labor unions would fare better under Democrat controlled sessions and businesses under Republicans. Neither hypothesis is supported by the analysis. Labor unions actually are negatively associated with interest group impact under the 103rd Congress which is the exact opposite of what is hypothesized.

Table 33: Were the Influence Hypotheses Supported?

H1: Partisan affinity, as measured by businesses during Republican controlled Houses, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.	No
H2: Partisan affinity, as measured by labor unions during a Democrat controlled House, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.	No
H3: Partisan affinity, as measured by the level of partisanship within a committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.	Yes
H4: Ideological extremism, as measured by the ideology of committee or subcommittee, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's recommended change is included in the bill markup.	Yes
H5: Chair influence, as measured by the number of years a chair has been a House member, will be negatively related to the likelihood of having its requested change included in the bill markup.	No
H6: Interest group resources, as measured by the membership size and budget of an interest group, will be positively related to an interest's likelihood of having its requested change included in the bill markup.	No
H7: Interest group resources, as measured by the number of internal and external lobbyists, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.	No
H8: Interest group visibility, as measured by the number of media mentions an interest group receives, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group's requested change will be included in the bill markup.	No
H9: Interest group visibility, as measured by the age of an interest group, will be positively related to the likelihood an interest group's change is included in the bill markup.	Yes
H10: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to House members, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.	No
H11: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to members sitting on the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.	No

H12: Political influence, as measured by an interest group's PAC contributions to the chair of the committee holding the markup, will be positively related to the likelihood its requested change will be included in the bill markup.	No
H13: Regulatory policy arena, as measured by regulatory policy, will be negatively related to the likelihood an interest group's requested change is included in the bill markup.	No – relationship is positive

Discussion

While theoretically the same variables that go into the decision making process of whom to invite to congressional hearings should also be pertinent when deciding whether to incorporate recommendations made in testimony, the results of the influence model show otherwise. The most telling difference is that when it comes to deciding whether or not to incorporate an interest group's recommendation, interest group resources and political influence do not enter into the equation while Democrats or Republicans are in control. Hypotheses six, seven and ten, in Table 6.15 are not supported. This runs counter to conventional wisdom suggesting money is the root of all influence, but is consistent with a fair amount of political science literature. Money will not be influential in this particular venue whether it is in the form of PAC contributions, how many lobbyists are hired or how large budgets are. None of the interest group factors affect whether or not that group's testimony will be incorporated in the bill markup.

This is somewhat comforting, though. What the regression results of this influence model indicate is there are no statistically significant effects detected by these variables. This means here and there the resources of a group may come into play, but not frequently enough to establish a pattern of behavior. The comfort lies in the

suggestion that if there is no discernible pattern in this regard, then committee and subcommittee members are listening to and considering testimony and then based on the merits of the recommendations, deciding whether or not to follow them.

Aiding in the comfort is the positive relationship between age and interest group success. Interest group visibility is partially supported as older groups have an easier time impacting bill markups than newer groups, as is seen in the eighth hypothesis. Newer groups are not necessarily offering bad advice, but it may take them a bit longer to build their reputation on the Hill and for policy makers to perceive them as quality information providers. In an environment where there is little time to research the information being offered by interest groups, the age of a group serves as a valuable cue.

While most interest group factors do not bear out, several measures of committee characteristics do. First is ideological extremism. As hypothesized, the fourth hypothesis listed in Table 33, there is a negative relationship with the level of ideology of the committee or subcommittee. Extreme ideologues, whether liberal or conservative are less willing to allow interest group's to change the legislation under consideration. While there are a number of interest groups which can be considered ideologically extreme, most are more moderate, leaving the likelihood of interest group success negative.

One measure of partisan affinity, the level of partisanship within a committee or subcommittee is negatively related to the likelihood an interest group will get its recommended change into the markup. This supports the third hypothesis. This is not too surprising and was expected to be a statistically significant variable as all the sessions of Congress included in the data set are classified as conditional party government, as

well as the "party as cartel" model. The hypothesized predictors of party affinity, being a business during Republican controlled Congresses and a union during Democrat controlled Congresses were off. As was indicated previously, ideally the way to test party affinity would be to have some sort of partisan measure of each interest group in the sample. Lacking such a measure, I chose to generalize the relationships between business and Republicans and between Democrats and unions. In reality, however, not all businesses or business interests are aligned solely with the Republican Party. Most interest groups are more pragmatic and work with both parties so as to not be disenfranchised when one or the other holds the majority. Labor unions, on the other hand, still mostly align themselves with the Democratic Party. Being part of the Democratic constituency appears not to give them an advantage in impacting policy as not a single union recommendation was incorporated in a bill markup.

Using these results to seek confirmation of the competing theories of committee power, evidence is found for both of the major variables: *partisanship* and *ratio of majority to minority party members*. While all the congressional sessions under observation qualify as conditional party government, the regressions run on each separate session are even more revealing.

Partisanship, ideology and *tenure* are statistically significant for the 103rd Congress. The ratio of majority to minority party members seated on a committee is statistically significant for the 106th Congress. None of the variables are significant for the 108th. Power in Congress is limited. There is only so much of it. If you have strong party leadership you will necessarily have less power within the committees. On the

other hand if you have more powerful committees, that would come at the expense of a strong centralized party leadership. This is a simplistic understanding of power but it useful to think about the relationships revealed in the impact model. The statistically significant variables for the 103rd are all variables linked to individuals either as chairs or as committee and subcommittee members. In other words, individuals within the committee's leadership and rank and file alike are influencing whether or not interest groups are successful in their attempts to impact policy. On the other hand, in the 106th Congress, the statistically significant variable is linked not to individuals but to the committee itself. It is an institutional characteristic. If, none of the individuals within the committees for the 106th and 108th Congress are exerting an influence it could be indicating they do not have the power to do so, their loss of power is subsumed by a strong party leadership.

Although all three sessions of Congress can be described as conditional party government, it appears committee members and chairs were able to retain some autonomy under Democratic control. This also fits in well with what we know about the Republican leadership during the 106th and 108th Congress – it was strong and centralized. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert is known for maintaining tight control over Republican House members with the help of majority leaders Armey (106th) and Delay (108th). He kept in tact all of the institutional arrangements put in place by Newt Gingrich when the Republicans regained control as majority party in 1995.

Looking again at the comprehensive model, the dummy variable measuring whether the hearing considers regulatory policy is statistically significant. Interest groups

are much more likely to see success when testifying on regulatory policy rather than distributive policy. This runs counter to the hypothesized relationship. I expected it to be easier for interest groups to have influence within the policy subgovernments considering distributive legislation, since their presence as testifiers indicates some status within the committee or subcommittee. However, interest groups testifying on regulatory policy have a greater likelihood of impacting policy. I had hypothesized the increased number of actors involved in the policymaking process would diminish the likelihood of success, but in reality it increases it. The more groups involved in policymaking, the more likely any one of them will be influential in the process.

Conclusion

One thing can definitively be concluded after examining the influence dimension of the interest group impact theory: interest group testimony plays a substantive role. Holding legislative hearings is an important step in the policymaking process. It is a stage in which members gain information about the bill under consideration. The evidence, dating back to the 1950s, anecdotal and otherwise (Del Sesto 1980; Farnsworth 1961; Huitt 1954; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Lutzker 1969; Morrow 1969; Redman 1973) suggesting congressional hearings are orchestrated to show case the already configured legislation of the committee is not supported. This is shown by looking at the recommendations made: almost 75% of all the recommendations made sought real changes in the legislation (as opposed to just supporting the bill as introduced). This role of providing information to committee and subcommittee

members is one which interest groups take very seriously. Not only are most recommendations seeking real changes, but the logistic regression results also indicate this is an information gathering stage. No one type of group has an advantage, and no single resource gives a group an advantage. The merits of the testimony are considered and if warranted they get incorporated into the markup.

While interest group characteristics are prevalent in the access model, they mostly are not in the influence model. Rather partisan affinity and ideological extremism are important considerations. Interest groups are assessed and vetted during the access stage. Their legitimacy is checked. Interest groups that are more present, because of their ample resources, are included. Once the group gains access, committee and subcommittee members can mostly rest assured they do not individually need to "assess" the reliability of the interest group as a source of information. I say "mostly" since it appears committee and subcommittee members do take into consideration the legitimacy of the group is evidenced through the age of the group. Nonetheless, since most of the vetting process occurs in the earlier stage, members can focus on *what* is being said rather than trying to figure out who is saying it.

The assessment of what is said in testimony is a different story. Here is the stage where partisanship and ideology come into play. The more partisan and ideologically extreme committees and subcommittees are reluctant to allow any interest group influence on policy. The only possibility of interest group success seems would come from very friendly (in terms of ideology) interest groups. However, if such a "close" relationship exists between a committee and interest group, it is highly unlikely the

interest group would be asking for any real changes in the legislation. Instead it likely would offer up the type of testimony that affirms the legislation in part or whole. In fact the regression results reveal with the broader definition of support groups have a greater likelihood of success in committees and subcommittees with a high ratio of majority to minority party members. On the other hand, when the definition of influence is narrowed to include only recommendations that seek to "add' provisions to the bill, interest groups have greater difficulty in testifying in committees that give a greater share of the seats to the majority party. Committees are willing to allow interest group influence when the testimony includes broad support for the committee legislation, yet when the testimony seeks real changes the relationship turns negative.

Influencing legislation through congressional testimony is not easy. Not many groups can successfully get their recommendations incorporated into the bill markups. But the opportunity is there and it is a popular option. This is not the only way interest groups lobby, but it is a public platform and puts groups in direct contact with those most involved in making that particular policy. For that reason, and still the possibility of being able to impact bill markups, is why testifying in committee remains a popular lobbying activity.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Interest Group Impact Theory

Guided by the interest group and congressional committee literature, I have built the Interest Group Impact Theory. This theory explains how interest groups gain access to congressional committee hearings and if they are invited to testify, under what conditions interest group testimony is able to impact legislative mark ups. The theory maintains an informational role for interest groups in committee hearings; committee and subcommittee chairs seek out those groups they believe can best provide information about the policy under consideration. Interest group proliferation in the 1970s coincided with House congressional reforms which opened up participation in the policymaking process to many inexperienced, rank and file House members. Over the past couple of decades, interest groups and House members have come together in a symbiotic relationship in which legislators aid groups in their policy pursuits and interest groups provide information and campaign support in return.

According to the Interest Group Impact Theory, well reputed interest groups gain greater access to congressional committee hearings. They are valuable to legislators in this capacity since they provide information relating to politics, elections and policy. But once access is gained, the data show in order for their testimony to have influence,

interest groups will have much better success if they work with ideologically moderate, more bipartisan committees, chaired by a less tenured member of Congress. The considerations of influence are shaped by characteristics of the committee rather than features of the group itself.

Summary of Results

Two statistical models, one looking at the access given to interest groups to serve as witnesses in committee hearings and the other examining the impact interest group testimony has on subsequent bill markups, test the Interest Group Impact Theory. A unique data set was developed for each model. The access data set consists of attempts by interest groups to testify before House committees during the 105th, 106th, 107th and 108th sessions of Congress. The influence data set was constructed from a stratified sampling of testimony made by interest groups, before six House committees during the 103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress. Variables measuring party influence, partisan affinity, ideological extremism, chair influence, interest group resources, interest group visibility and political influence are tested in both models.

The Access Model

Testing the models, the data reveal access to hearings is a separate process with considerations distinct from the influence derived from interest group testimony. Interest groups with reputations for having good information in a policy area have greater access to hearings than other groups, even those that have more resources. Resource rich

groups, with the exception of lobbyists on staff, and groups that contribute money to members of Congress have no advantage in this process. While the number of lobbyists on staff may in one sense be considered a resource, here it is signaling the reach of expertise an interest group has on a given issue. Along the same lines, groups that are too busy lobbying a wide range of issues are less likely to be seen as an expert source on any one issue and therefore are less likely to be invited to testify.

Committees are also more willing to give access to groups that have contact with some population of individuals whether it is their membership or their employees. It is not the case that highly populated groups will have a significant advantage over lesser populated groups, but it is the case that committees value organized interests that have at a minimum *some* population of individuals with whom they have contact. This in a way is another signal to legislators, one indicating the potential reach of influence a group has within the electorate.

The access model also reveals prestige committees, along with the Agriculture and Science Committees, both policy committees, are more accessible to interest groups. Chapter five includes a discussion of how the Ways and Means Committee was considering a highly salient issue on which it held many hearings, Medicare Prescription Reform. The large number of hearings on this issue increased the opportunities to testify. A similar story emerges for the Appropriations Committee where a high number of subcommittees create multiple opportunities for interest groups to be involved in hearings.

In part, the committee data support Theodore Lowi's (1964) theory of differentiated policy arenas. Lowi suggested policymaking on regulatory policy (handled by policy committees) differs from that on distributive policy (considered by constituency committees). Regulatory policy debates occur in more open arenas and involve a number of political actors and interest groups. Unlike distributive policy which stands to benefit a large number of interests, regulatory policy may positively affect some interests, but it also typically negatively impacts others. From the view of organized interests, there is more at stake prompting wider activism, which in turn increases the level of competition. The data show greater accessibility for interest groups attempting to testify before the Agriculture and Science committees, as would be expected given Lowi's theory.

Interest groups rank testifying in committee as one of their preferred lobbying activities (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Nownes & Freeman 1998; Walker 1991; Berry 1997). If they want to be invited to testify, this research indicates they need to demonstrate to committee members they are experts in their policy area and have contact with a population of individuals interested in the outcome of the legislation. The more visibility a group has on a particular policy issue, the more likely it will get to participate in the hearing as a witness.

The Influence Model

Once granted access, the advantage gained by being a reputable source of information largely disappears. One measure of visibility still remains influential – the

age of the group. But other than a group's age, the question of influence turns on characteristics related to the committee. Partisan affinity and ideological extremism figure most prominently in whether an interest group's testimony influences subsequent bill markups.

The more partisan a committee or subcommittee is the less likely an interest group will be able to influence a bill markup. Interest groups will also have greater difficulty impacting legislation being considered by ideologically extreme committees. The only conditions in which an interest group is more likely to have its recommendations incorporated into the legislation, is when testifying before a committee with a larger ratio of majority to minority party seats and when testifying on regulatory policy. These results however pertain to a broad definition of influence, one that includes testimony which solely affirms the committee position.

More interesting is what happens when the definition of influence is narrowed to include only recommended changes in the legislation; in other words, when the "window dressing" supportive testimony is excluded. The fundamental difference is now interest groups find it more difficult to influence policy being considered by committees where seats are more skewed toward the majority party. When the testimony included the "window dressing" supportive testimony, they were more likely to have influence. Now the relationship is reversed. Another difference is now interest groups have greater difficulty impacting legislation when the committee or subcommittee chair is more tenured; interest group expertise is not valued as much.

While the Interest Group Impact Theory was guided by congressional committee theory, the various theories could not be directly tested by the influence model. Despite this, in comparing the 103rd, 106th and 108th sessions of Congress a particularly revealing result is found. The data indicate more autonomy for committees under the 103rd Congress and little to no autonomy for the Republican controlled 106th and 108th Congress. If the committees and their chairs are unable to control decisions, it is because the party leadership is. This confirms what we do know about the successful efforts of the Republican House leadership to centralize power in its own hands.

Contributions to the Interest Group Literature

The Interest Group Impact theory supports John Wright's (1996) informational lobbying theory. My research confirms the importance of information relating to a congressional member's interests. These interests are re-election, influence within the chamber and good public policy (Mayhew 1974). Interest groups have created a role for themselves in the House of Representatives by being a source of information for members.

In addition, my research also finds limited evidence of PAC contributions buying access or influence in Congress. This adds another finding of limited impact of PAC contributions that is common in the literature (Chappell 1981, 1982; Grenzke 1989; Kabashima and Sato 1986; Lothenberg 1992; Owens 1986; Vesenka 1989; Wright 1985).

But the largest contribution this research makes to the interest group literature is it fills a void. As discussed in the literature review, very few scholars have examined

interest group testimony as a potential source of influence. Some have already examined interest group access to committee hearings as witnesses (Leyden 1995; Holyoke 2003; Kollman 1997; Hansen & Mitchell 2000). As Leyden (1995) this research finds interest group resources such as the number of lobbyists on staff positively influence the likelihood of gaining access. Unlike his model only one of the PAC variables here (contributions made to the chair), neared statistical significance. Leyden found the presence of PAC money positively impacted access. The difference in the two studies is the sample size of interest groups. The access model had a larger sample and was culled from the Lobbying Disclosure database rather than from the *Encyclopedia of Associations.*

Looking at interest group influence through testimony this research steps into new territory. Richard Smith (1995) conducted a comprehensive literature review of interest group influence in Congress and found only three studies examining interest group influence in congressional committees. Only one study was found by Baumgartner and Leech (1998) to use interest group testimony as a measure of lobbying (Segal, et. Al 1992). Most studies on congressional hearings, many using case studies as a method of analysis, found interest group testimony to be little more than a scripted show of support for the committed (Del Sesto 1980; Farnsworth 1961; Huitt 1954; Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993; Lutzker 1969; Morrow 1969; Redman 1973). This research is unique in providing a comprehensive analysis of congressional testimony to determine whether it impacted legislation.

This research indicates most testimony is real. Over 70% of the recommendations made in hearing are real requests to change the legislation in the way the interest group sees fit, not merely cheerleading the committee position. This either indicates a changed role for interest group testimony in the modern post-reform Congress or it reveals the shortcomings of the methods employed by previous studies.

Contributions to the Congressional Committee Literature

While the congressional committee power theories guided the development of the Interest Group Impact Theory, as mentioned previously, the data disallowed direct testing of these theories. Although there is variation in the time periods under examination they do not extend to a time before the onset of conditional party government. Conditional party government in Congress is marked by party polarization, high levels of party unity in voting, and stark difference between the two parties. All of the House sessions included in this analysis can be described as such. Nevertheless this research reveals a process in which congressional committee power does not come into play at all. The decision of which groups to include in committee hearings is not directly related to power; this process is about access. And when it comes to access, the decision turns on which groups will best supply the information valued by committee holding the hearing.

Power within the committee enters into the equation once the testimony is delivered. Whether or not the testimony will be adopted ultimately depends on characteristics related to the committee. The levels of partisanship within the committee are important as is the ideology of the committee and how experienced is the chair.

Whether or not interest group testimony is influential depends on what is happening within the committee.

In Chapter Six, in testing the influence model, one of the analyses involved testing each session of Congress, the Democratic controlled 103rd, the Republican 106th and the Republican 108th, separately to allow for comparisons between the three. What emerged from the results was an indication that House committees and subcommittees retained more autonomy under the Democratic majority than they did under Republican control. The committees under Republican control had less autonomy as the party leadership was more centralized and more powerful. This finding supports other studies which have described the strengthening of the party leadership under Republican control.

Underlying my research is the normative concern about how power is dispersed in our government. I ultimately want to be able to answer bigger questions related to the quality of democracy. In the next section I will go back to these normative concerns and will speak to the questions identified by Schattschneider (1960) in the *Semisovereign People*.

Pluralism and Plural Elitism

Power is central to the study of politics. The fundamental questions driving much of our research are how is power dispersed and how is it used to wield influence? Arthur Bentley's (1908) research did much to bring interest groups into the study of politics as key political actors, and since then many studies seeking to understand power in American politics have included, if not focused on, a discussion of interest groups.

While Bentley's work brought interest groups to the forefront of political science research, pluralism as a theory of political power and democracy does not take hold as a dominant framework of American government until the 1950s and 1960s. Bolstered by the research of David Truman, Robert Dahl, and Charles Lindblom, pluralism describes power as being de-centralized and dispersed among the many interests and actors involved in American policymaking.

Leading the charge against pluralism in the 1960s is a group of scholars Andrew McFarland (1987) has labeled as the "plural elites." While the problems with pluralism are varied, McFarland (1987) summarizes their arguments in the following propositions: "1) many widely shared interests cannot be effectively organized within the political process; 2) politics tends to be fragmented into decision-making in various specific policy areas, which are normally controlled by special-interest coalitions; 3) there are a variety of specific processes whereby pluralist rule is maintained; 4) a widespread ideology conceals the truth about American politics" (pg. 133). E.E. Schattschneider's (1961) *The Semi-Sovereign People* helped to discredit pluralism as a framework for understanding American politics. But the charges against pluralism did not just arise in response to the work of the pluralists in the 1950s and 1960s. Critical studies date back to the early 1900s following the work of Arthur Bentley.

Schattschneider accuses interest group pluralism as being tilted heavily in favor of advantaged private interests. Not only are businessmen (and women) more likely to write their members of Congress than are manual laborers, but political participation is skewed toward individuals occupying higher levels of socio-economic status. It is not the

disadvantaged, under-resourced or even common middle class individual who is joining interest groups, it is the wealthier and better educated individual; it is not the laborers but the business owners. Power is hardly dispersed evenly in such a biased interest group system, particularly as the "pressure system" at the time of Schattshneider's observations was fairly small. Powerful private interests prevailed over more universalistic public interest groups.

But the advantage of private interests over public interests extends beyond representation. Understanding the complex nature of power, Schattschneider recognized some of the most powerful corporations did not lobby government directly. They did not need to engage in lobbying strategies like other interests because their alignment with the Republican Party makes it unnecessary. So long as Republicans maintained their ideology which is pro-business in many respects, corporations did not need to directly lobby policy makers. Today, some 30 years later, the Republican ideology although shifting to incorporate moral issues, still encompasses a pro-business attitude.

The political issues raised by Schattschneider remain unsettled to this day. Is the pluralist system today as "small" and "exclusive" as Schattschneider had characterized it? If not, is there greater competition among interest groups seeking to influence public policy? Are business groups and trade association still the dominant actors in the pluralist system? Do business groups and trade associations enjoy more "access" to Congress and "influence" over legislation than other types of interest groups? Is access by business groups and trade associations and their influence over legislation facilitated by Republican control and frustrated by Democratic control of Congress? Since

"weaker" interests want to socialize conflict in the public domain, are they advantaged in congressional committee deliberations (being a public venue) relative to business groups or trade associations?

Interest group scholars have yet to answer the preceding questions definitively. In part, this is because research in this field has evolved along two separate paths: organizational maintenance and influence. Those studies pursuing interest group influence have been lacking in many regards. For one, there has been too much focus on PAC contributions since the creation of the Federal Election Commission which provides readily available public data. We are not any better able to link PAC contributions to interest group influence now than we were prior to passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). The research examining PAC contributions and voting records has resulted in confusing, disjointed and contradictory results.

Another problem with the interest group influence literature is the tendency for scholars to use narrow case studies examining only a group or a particular policy sector rather than engaging in comprehensive examinations of interest group lobbying that extend over a period of time and encompass a wide range of interests and lobbying activities. The notable exception is the recent comprehensive effort by Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech to create the advocacy and public policymaking data base funded by the National Science Foundation.

But perhaps the biggest problem is the tendency of interest group scholars to avoid directly taking on the question of interest group influence; whether it's because of

not wanting to reignite a battle between pluralists and plural elites or because of having found no way to deal with the complex nature of power and influence. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) first noted the intricacies of measuring power in their discussion of negative agenda control. When once research spoke directly to the concepts of power and influence, recent scholarship has side-stepped the issue never fully addressing the questions raised by Schattschneider and others. Scholars have been reluctant to ask difficult questions about influence and we still have not come to terms with how to be able to measure power in all its manifestations.

The combination of these varied troubles within the influence literature has led to what Baumgartner and Leech (1998) have termed, "A literature that grows but does not accumulate." After 30 years it is questionable as to whether we have a better understanding of interest group influence than Schattschneider had writing in 1960.

While this research certainly has not solved all of these problems, it *does* attempt to address the normative concerns raised by Schattschneider. I have found a void in the interest group literature and my efforts *do* contribute to our understanding of influence as it works in congressional committee hearings. Certainly, I am only looking at one of the many ways in which influence is exerted by interest groups, and recognize the limitations of being able to explain only some of the multifarious sources of that power. Not only does this research contribute to interest group scholarship but it also reveals the forces at play in congressional committees.

It is fitting perhaps, that this search for a better understanding of interest group influence led to congressional committee testimony - the very same place Schattschneider

began his intellectual pursuit of the very same questions. But much has changed since the 1930s and even the 1960s. Interest groups have proliferated beyond the extant people like David Truman and E.E. Schattschneider ever imagined. The relatively small "pressure system" has been replaced with an interest group universe which is much larger, more diverse, and perhaps more representative of American interests than ever before. Policymaking, too, has changed. Reflecting the complex nature of the American economy, legislating requires far greater issue expertise and law makers must respond to ever more competing demands. And the polarization between the two parties governing has never been greater.

The population of interest groups in the American political system has proliferated greatly since the 1960s. Over 20,000 interest groups operate in federal government. Much of the growth in the interest group populations since the 1960s has been among membership groups, whether they be environmental, civil rights, women's or gay rights groups. But just as more membership groups entered the fray, even more businesses came to Washington D.C. to be represented as a countervailing force. So while it is true more single issue membership groups organized, so too did more businesses and corporations seek representation.

The data from the access sample shows businesses and trade associations representing 71% of the interest group population. This dwarfs membership groups which only occupy 11.3% of the same population. Looking specifically at the participation of interest groups in hearings, the influence sample shows businesses and trade associations predominant at 51.3% as compared to membership groups at 15.3%.

Taken prima facie, this buttresses the plural elites' allegations of a "pressure system" tilted toward business interests.

But Schattschneider contended many corporations did not even have to lobby since the Republican Party served effectively to represent them. There is not one notable corporation of business that does not lobby our government today. Microsoft used to pride itself on its Silicon Valley culture of not getting involved in politics in any way, but after their difficulties with the Justice Department they have not only maintained a lobbying presence in Washington, they are one of the most active corporate interests in D.C. (Hart 2002). All the large business and corporate interests have representation in Washington. If we are to follow Schattschneider's reasoning, this indicates they do not believe the parties are adequately protecting their interests.

Although a number of studies have explored business activity in policy making,[38] there is still much unknown about this population of organized interests. Brady, Drutman, Schlozman and Lee have been working on this area of research recently and will have a book forthcoming. Their comprehensive literature review on corporate lobbying demonstrates the business population is not monolithic. There are different types of businesses – private businesses, firms, corporations – that represent a range of industries – medical, educational, retail, entertainment, hospitality, wholesale, manufacturing, agricultural, etc. In addition, businesses have different motivations for having representation in government. Some are concerned with improved infrastructure, others with tax structures, property rights, or market structures. Furthermore they allege

[38] Brady, Drutman, Schlozman and Lee have identified 24 papers or articles. See the paper they presented at the American Political Science Association's meeting in 2007 entitled, "Corporate Lobbying Activity in Politics" for the list of works.

"there is quite of bit of bias within the bias of the pressure system" (Brady, et al. 2007, pg. 32). Meaning there are certain types of businesses within certain industries that are better represented and more influential than others. Yet it should be noted that even with such a large business presence in the interest group population this does not necessarily pose a barrier for membership groups. Leech et al. (2007) note that although citizen groups may not lobby as much as businesses or expend as many resources, they are time and again recognized as "major players" within the policy making arena. In *The New Liberalism,* Jeffrey Berry (1999) comes to a similar conclusion.

The variety of groups represented in both the access and influence sample suggest a range of types of groups participated in policymaking. There are old groups, new groups; large groups and small groups; business groups and labor groups. The access model shows membership groups have an advantage over business groups in receiving invitations to testify, but trade associations are slightly more advantaged than membership groups. Trade associations, however are then slightly disadvantaged over other types of groups when it comes to influential testimony (based on the narrow definition of influence). So while the evidence suggests membership groups are not left without any participation or influence within the policymaking process, there is also no definitive evidence to suggest businesses are properly balanced by countervailing forces.

There is also no evidence to suggest a close relationship between either Republicans and business interests or Democrats and labor unions. This holds true when speaking both of access and of influence. In fact, the influence model broken down by

session of Congress for comparison, show labor unions were less likely than other groups to influence bill markups when the Democrats controlled the House.

Political influence in the form of campaign contributions, whether given to chairs, committee members, one party of the other also fails to impact the likelihood of access or influence. This means there is no direct link between an individual group and that group's chances of gaining access or being influential. But again, the Interest Group Impact Theory maintains a cooperative, if not symbiotic, relationship between interest groups and House members. In exchange for information and campaign support (money and otherwise), House members will give interest groups access to the policymaking process and at times aid them in their policy pursuits. But it does not operate in a "pay to play" manner where a single interest group must make a contribution before it gains access. So long as House members are gaining something of value from interest groups, they will allow them a role in the policymaking process.

Probably the aspect of this research that best allays the concerns that private interests are too powerful in the policymaking process comes from the influence model. While it is true that interest groups prefer testifying as a lobbying technique, it is not so true their testimony is influential. While the testimony is real, in that it is mostly seeking substantive changes in the legislation, very little testimony actually gets incorporated into the bill – at least at the markup stage. Less than 5% of 13,000 real recommendations actually made it into the bill markup. This is hardly an endorsement of interest group influence.

This research allays some of the concerns of the elite pluralists regarding the undue influence of business interests. There is no evidence to suggest they have an advantage over other types of organized interests. Indeed their presence as participants in the hearing process may suggest they feel their interests are not being properly protected by our policy makers. On the other hand, pluralists cannot claim evenly dispersed power in the policymaking process. The fact that less than 5% of 13,000 interest group recommendations are heeded, along with the results of the influence model revealing a committee driven process, interest groups in this aspect of policymaking process have little to no influence. Powerless interest groups are not any better than a pressure system dominated by business interests. The very ideal of pluralism encourages as many interests involved in the policymaking process as want to be a part. But it also must be recognized this is only one stage of a very intricate legislative process.

Limitations and Future Research

The legislative process is complicated but so are the relationships between interest groups and congressional members. Studying influence within the legislative process is difficult as quid pro quo exchanges which may be easier to detect, mostly do not exist; power is wielded is more subtle ways. Influence can be direct or it may be indirect, positive or negative. Interest group resources factor into the power of interest groups, but no singular asset or resource, bestows special advantages across all interest groups (Smith 1990). The legislative process is extensive, not one single stage, step or procedure can fully capture the flow of power and influence amongst political actors.

While this study is ambitious in its attempt to understand how power is wielded within the legislative process, it is limited by only looking at two steps which take place publicly. It cannot account for any interest group lobbying preceding the legislative hearing and markup, nor does it examine what occurs after the legislation leaves the committee and it does not consider lobbying behind closed doors. In addition, there is no way to measure negative agenda control which is often the strategy employed by interest groups. These are significant limitations, ones of which I was aware in deciding to undertake this research. Although this research does not consider other avenues of influence, it was decided examining hearings and markups can help inform us of the nature of power at other stages and in other legislative venues.

Part of this shortcoming will be addressed in the next stage of the research which will be to add a qualitative component. Surveys and interviews of interest group representatives, legislators and House committee and subcommittee chairs are planned in order to better understand interest group influence.

Another limitation of this study is it only considers two players involved in policymaking: House members and interest groups. There are other contextual factors which can be added such as presidential support and the saliency of the issue under consideration; saliency from the perspective of legislators, the public and the interest group population alike. While some of these contextual measures can be added to the quantitative models used in this research, speaking with individuals directly involved in the process will help identify which measures should be considered and even aid in measuring how salient the issue is.

One of the greatest frustrations in understanding how interest groups operate stems from the wide range of organized interests actively involved in the process. The plural elitist concern of a pro-business bias among the interest group population led me to incorporate a very broad definition of interest groups. By including any organized interest attempting to influence American public policy in my definition, businesses were considered alongside membership groups and governmental entities enabling testing of whether any type of interest group has an advantage over others. The difficulty is these organizations have different structures; measuring the budget of a group is challenging in that the budget of a membership group is very different from the budget of a business or government agency. While ultimately this variable is dropped from the analysis, it raises the question whether all types of interest groups can be compared against one another.

Some scholars like Jeffrey Berry and Andrew McFarland have focused solely on membership groups. But still others have specified interest groups as broadly as this research has. Future research should perhaps follow the lead of Berry and McFarland and study only one type of interest group or at least test alternative models in which interest groups are pooled by type.

Lastly, future research should include in its analysis earlier sessions of Congress. While this is a time-series analysis and it covers sessions of Congress from the 103rd (1993-1994) through the 108th (2003-2004) all of these are categorized as periods of conditional party government. In order to understand how strong parties impact congressional hearings and markups, it would be instructive to include at least one session that predates conditional party government.

Conclusion

Interest groups have an informational role in the policymaking process. Groups with a sound reputation for good information serve Congress by presenting testimony in congressional hearings. Interest groups enjoy this public opportunity to make their positions known. Testifying also allows interest groups to show their members, employees and clients they are actively engaging in legislation.

Testifying is not an effective means for influencing legislation directly. Very few of the recommendations made by interest groups are actually incorporated into bill markups and it is only the moderate, bipartisan committees led by relatively inexperienced chairs that do incorporate the recommendations.

The Interest Group Impact Theory was tested along the dimensions of both access and influence. Two statistical models tested data collected from the committees, the interest groups and the testimony given. While the work is sound, it lacks some of the deeper understanding of the process that comes from speaking directly with committee chairs, members and the interest groups themselves. Future research will take this qualitative approach.

While none of the results can raise concerns about the undue influence of certain types of interests over others, other concerns remain. For pluralists, the concern is the inability of interest groups to have little influence through congressional testimony at all. Future research should continue to directly confront the question of influence in the policymaking process as we can no longer avoid the concerns raised several decades ago by the plural elites.

APPENDIX A:

LEGISLATION IN WHICH INTEREST GROUPS SUCCESSFULLY IMPACTED BILL MARKUPS

Date	(Sub)Committee	Legislation
6-9-94	Agriculture – Dept. Ops.	HR 8: Healthy Meals for Healthy Americans Act
6-15-94	Agriculture – Dept. Ops.	HR 1627: Food Quality Protection Act 0f 1993
4-1-93	Agriculture – Env & Credit	HR 1440: Site Specific Agricultural Resource Mgmt Act of 1993 (-)
8-4-93	Agriculture – Farm Comm.	HR 2689: US Grain Standards Act Amendment
7-13-93	Agriculture – Full	HR 3450: NAFTA Implementation Bill (+)
10-26-93	Agriculture – Livestock	HR 2664: Dairy Budget Reconciliation and Self-Help (-)
5-5-99	Agriculture – Livestock	HR 3428: Reform of Milk Marketing Orders (-)
3/10/99	Agriculture – Risk Mgmt	HR 2559: Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 1990 (-)
5-18-95	Agriculture – Spclty. Crops	HR 3905: Opal Creek Forest Preserve Act of 1994
7-14-00	Banking & Finan – Full	HR 4585: The Medical Financial Privacy Act (+)
6-15-99	Banking & Finan – Full	HR 1095: The Debt Relief for Poverty Act (+)
6-20-00	Banking & Finan –Full	HR 4419: Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act (+)
7-19-06	Banking & Finan – Full	HR 4541: Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (+)
3-16-99	Banking & Finan – Housing	HR 1073: The Homeless Housing Programs Consolidation and Flex. Act

4-28-99	Banking & Finan – Housing	HR 21: Homeowners Insurance Availability Act of 1999
9-15-99	Banking & Finan – Housing	HR 1776: American Homeownership & Economic Opportunities Act of 2000
2-24-94	Banking & Urban – Housing	HR 3838: Housing & Communities Development Act
7-15-99	Commerce – Energy & Power	HR 2944: Electricity Competition & Reliability Act of 1999
3-22-00	Commerce – Energy & Power	HR 3383: Amend Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Exempt Non-Profit Inst.
3-30-00	Commerce – Energy & Power	HR 2335: Hydroelectric Licensing Process Improvement Act
4-5-00	Commerce – Energy & Power	HR 2461: Amend Energy Policy Act to extend the Uranium Mill Tailings
5-13-99	Commerce – Energy & Power	HR 2944: Electricity Competition & Reliability Act of 1999
3-11-03	Ed & Work – 21st Century	HR 1261: Strengthening One-Stop Career Centers (+)
5-20-03	Ed & Work – 21st Century	HR 2211: Ready to Teach Act of 2003
3-6-03	Ed & Work – Ed Reform	HR 2210: Head Start Reauthorization (+)
6-19-03	Ed & Work – Select Ed	HR 3077: Amend Title VI of the Higher Ed Act to Enhance Intl Programs
2-24-93	Energy & Commerce – Commerce	HR 965: Child Safety Protection Act
6-23-94	Energy & Commerce – Energy	HR 4394: Comprehensive One Call Notification Act
4-21-93	Energy & Commerce – Haz Mat	HR 3800: Superfund Reform Act of 1994

6-23-93	Energy & Commerce – Haz Mat	HR 3800: Superfund Reform Act of 1994
3-10-04	Energy & Commerce – Telecomm.	HR 4501: Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act
3-11-93	Public Works - Pub. Bldgs.	HR 881: Ban on Smoking in Public Buildings Act (-)
10-28-93	Public Works – Pub. Bldgs.	HR 2680: Public Buildings Ac of 1959 Amendment (-)
8-10-94	Public Works – Pub. Bldgs.	HR 4704: Hopewell Township Investment Act of 1994 (-)
6-15-93	Pub Works – Surf. Transp.	HR 2121: Negotiated Rates Act of 1993
6-22-94	Pub Works – Water Res.	HR 4460: Water Resources Development Act of 1994
6-9-94	Pub Works – Water Res.	HR 3800: Superfund Reform Act of 1994
6-26-03	Resources – Fisheries	HR 1204: A Bill to Amend the Natl Wildlife Refuge System
4-28-04	Resources – Full	HR 2933: To Amend the Endangered Species Act of 1993
6-18-03	Resources – Full	HR 884: Western Shoshone Claims Distribution Act
9-30-99	Resources – Natl Parks	HR 2541: A Bill to Adjust the Boundaries of the Gulf Islands Natl Park
6-9-99	Transp & Infra – Aviation	HR 1000: W.H. Ford Aviation Investment & Reform Act (-)
3-17-03	Transp & Infra – Aviation	HR 2115: Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (-)
3-4-04	Transp & Infra – C Guard	HR 2443: Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Act of 2004

5-22-03	Transp & Infra – C Guard	HR 2443: Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Act of 2004
7-13-99	Transp & Infra – Water Res	HR 1237: National Estuary Program
7-8-04	Transp & Infra – Water Res	HR 784: Water Quality Investment Act of 2003
7-8-04	Transp & Infra – Water Res	HR 4470: Federal Water Pollution Control Act

APPENDIX B:

LISTING OF SUCCESSFUL INTEREST GROUPS

Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting One Recommendation Changed

A Duda & Sons	Business
AARP	Membership
Agribusiness Council	Membership
Albina Head Start Program	Government
Alliance of Western Milk Producers	Trade Assn
American Assn of Community Colleges	Trade Assn
American Assn of Crop Insurers	Trade Assn
American Assn of Grain Inspection & Weighing Agencies	Trade Assn
American Assn of Port Authorities	Trade Assn
American Assn on Mental Retardation	Trade Assn
American Commodity Distribution Center	Trade Assn
American Congress of Community Supports & Employment Services	Trade Assn
American Council of the Blind	Membership
American Farm Bureau Federation	Trade Assn
American Network of Community Options & Resources	Trade Assn
American Public Power Assn	Trade Assn
American Sod Producers Assn	Trade Assn
American Soybean Assn	Trade Assn
American Subcontractors Assn	Trade Assn
Assn for Educators of Community-Based Rehabilitation Personnel	Trade Assn
Assn for Persons in Supported Employment	Membership
Assn for Service Disabled Veterans	Membership
Assn of General Contractors of America	Trade Assn
Assn of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies	Trade Assn
Assn of Oregon Counties Public Lands Committee	Trade Assn
Assn of State & Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt Officials	Trade Assn
Assn of University Centers on Disabilities	Trade Assn
Blakely Crop Hail, Inc	Business
Bureau of Indian Affairs	Fed Govt
C.J. Neitzke, Inc	Business
California State University, Northridge	College/Univ
Chemical Producers & Distributors Assn	Trade Assn
Citizens for Florida's Waterways	Membership
City of Chicago	Govt
Coastal States Organization, Inc	Trade Assn
Commercial Energy of Montana	Business
Commodity Distribution Coalition	Coalition
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities	Coalition
Corporation for Supportive Housing	Membership
Council of State Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation	Trade Assn
Crop Insurance Services	Business
Denver, CO	Govt
Distributed Power Coalition of America	Coalition

District 22 of Texas State Senate	Govt
Dredging Contractors of America	Trade Assn
Echostar Communications Corp	Business
Education Leaders Council	Membership
Electronics Industry Assn	Trade Assn
Elkhart, IN	Govt
Farmers & Merchants State Bank of Clarkfield	Business
Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc	Membership
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc	Membership
Federal Maritime Commission	Fed Govt
Federal Trade Commission	Fed Govt
Financial Services Roundtable	Trade Assn
First Command Financial Planning, Inc	Business
Florida Dept of Agriculture	Govt
Florida Marine Contractors Associates	Business
Friends of Blackwater Natl Wildlife Refuge	Membership
Friends of the Earth	Membership
Gifts in Kind America	Membership
Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce	Trade Assn
Gulf Citrus Growers Assn	Trade Assn
Helen Keller Natl Center	Membership
Hoover Institution	Think Tank
Hydropower Programs for American Rivers	Membership
Hydropower Reform Coalition	Coalition
Intel Corp	Business
Intl Assn of Business, Industry & Rehabilitation	Trade Assn
Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters	Union
Intl Dairy Foods Assn	Trade Assn
Intl Foodservice Distributors Assn	Trade Assn
Intl Swaps Derivative Assn	Trade Assn
Investment Company Institute	Business
Landfill Solutions Group	Coalition
Latin American Mgmt Assn	Trade Assn
Latter & Blum	Business
Life & Health Insurance Foundation	Trade Assn
Local 175 (Teamsters)	Union
Local Govts for Superfund Reform	Coalition
MBNA America Bank	Business
Marine Contracting Corp	Business
McLaughlin Gormley King Company	Business
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, UT	Govt
Minnesota Dept of Administration	Govt
Mobile Home Federation of Massachusetts	Trade Assn
NISH	Membership

NJ Dept of Environmental Protection & Energy	Govt
NY Bureau of Government Donated Foods	Govt
Narragansett Bay Commission	Govt
Natl Agricultural Aviation Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Agricultural Chemicals Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Counties	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of County & City Health Officials	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Insurance & Financial Advisors	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Pipeline Safety Representatives	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Protection & Advocacy Systems	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Realtors	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Rehabilitation & Resource Training Centers	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of State Foresters	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Wheat Growers	Trade Assn
Natl Cattleman's Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Corn Growers Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Cotton Council of America	Trade Assn
Natl Family Farm Coalition	Coalition
Natl Governors' Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Head Start Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Industries for the Blind	Trade Assn
Natl Pork Producers Council	Trade Assn
Natl Review Online	Business
New York Racing Assn	Trade Assn
New York University	College/Univ
Non-Commissioned Officers Assn of the USA	Trade Assn
North American Electric Reliability Council	Trade Assn
North-South Center at the University of Miami	College/Univ
Oxfam America	Membership
PacificCorp	Business
Paragould Light & Water Commission	Business
Paralyzed Veterans of America	Membership
Pennsylvania Pubic Utility Commission	Govt
Port Authority of NY & NJ	Govt
Port of Richmond, CA	Govt
Richmond, VA	Govt
Ruth, Young, Pignatelli & Over	Business
Small Business Working Group on Procurement Reform	Coalition
Somersworth, NH	Govt
Southwest Virginia Vegetable Growers Assn	Trade Assn
New York State	Govt
Pennsylvania State	Govt
Stuntz, Davis & Staffner PC	Business
TASH	Trade Assn

Transportation Claims & Prevention Council, Inc	Trade Assn
US Conference of Mayors	Trade Assn
US Rice Producers Group	Trade Assn
US Trade Representative	Fed Govt
United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Assn	Trade Assn
University of the District of Columbia	College/Univ
Water Policy Center of Albany State University	College/Univ
Williams Distributed Power Services	Business
Women Involved in Farm Economics (WIFE)	Membership

Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 2 Recommendations Changed

65th State Legislative District of Florida	Govt
Albany Law School	College/Univ
American Trucking Assns	Trade Assn
Assn for the Development of Inland Navigation…	Coalition
Charles E. Smith Mgmt	Business
Chase Manhattan Bank	Business
Citigroup, Inc	Business
Consumer Federation of America	Membership
Consumers Union	Membership
Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc	Business
DuPont Company	Business
Education Trust	Membership
Enlisted Assn of the Natl Guard of the US	Trade Assn
Environmental Protection Division of Minnesota	Govt
Eugene Area Chamber of Commerce	Trade Assn
Federal Aviation Assn	Fed Govt
First Energy Corp	Business
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Assn	Trade Assn
Goldman Sachs & Co	Business
Harker Firm	Business
Harvard Institute for Intl Development	College/Univ
Intl Assn of Fish & Wildlife Agencies	Trade Assn
Jones-Blair Co	Business
Kerr McGee Chemical Co	Business
Maine Public Utilities Commission	Govt
Merrill Lynch & Co	Business
Michigan Dept of Natural Resources	Govt
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co	Business
Natl Alliance to End Homelessness	Membership
Natl Assn of Attorneys General	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Counties	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Manufacturers	Trade Assn
Natl Assn of Towns & Townships	Trade Assn

Natl Coal Assn	Trade Assn
Natl Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty	Membership
Natl Motor Freight Traffic Assn	Trade Assn
Natl League of Cities	Trade Assn
Natl Safe Kids Campaign	Coalition
Natl Wildlife Refuge Assn	Membership
New Castle, DE	Govt
North Baton Rouge Environmental Assn	Membership
Oregon Airport Mgmt Assn	Govt
Public Citizen	Membership
Responsible Industry for a Sound Environment	Trade Assn
Securities Exchange Commission	Fed Govt
US Coast Guard	Fed Govt
US Conference of Mayors	Trade Assn
US Public Interest Research Group	Membership
University of Waterloo	College/Univ
Volunteers of America	Membership

Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 3 Recommendations Changed

Alcoma Packing Company	Business
American Automobile Manufacturers Assn	Trade Assn
Atlantic Richfield Co (ARCO)	Business
California Citrus Mutual	Trade Assn
Child Welfare League of America	Membership
Chrysler Crop	Business
Citrus Growers Assn	Trade Assn
Dept of Interior	Fed Govt
Economic Council of Okeechobee	Membership
Environmental Defense Fund	Membership
Environmental Law Institute	Think Tank
EPA	Fed Govt
Federation of Manufactured Home Owners of Florida	Trade Assn
Florida Citrus Mutual	Trade Assn
Florida Citrus Packers	Trade Assn
Florida Citrus Processors Assn	Trade Assn
Florida Dept of Citrus	Trade Assn
Florida Farm Bureau Federation	Trade Assn
General Services Administration	Fed Govt
Golden State Mobilehome Owners League Inc	Trade Assn
Indian River Citrus League	Trade Assn
W.R. Grace & Co	Business

Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 4 Recommendations Changed

Concerned Neighbors in Action	Membership
Dept. of Army	Fed Govt
Dept of Commerce	Fed Govt
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission	Fed Govt
Federal Reserve Board	Fed Govt
Littleton, CO	Govt
Natl Commission on Superfund	Coalition
Natl Paint & Coatings Assn	Trade Assn
Western Shoshone Claims Distribution Steering Committee	Govt

Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 5-9 Recommendations Changed

American Movers Conference	Trade Assn
Clean Sites, Inc	Business
Dept of Energy	Fed Govt
Dept of Treasury	Fed Govt
Florida Dept of Agricultural & Consumer Services	Govt
Household Goods Carriers' Bureau	Trade Assn
Housing Assistance Council	Membership
USDA	Fed Govt

Interest Groups that Succeeded in Getting 20+ Recommendations Changed

Army Corps of Engineers	Fed Govt

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